In the article, I discuss the ideas that Marian Przełęcki shared with representatives of the Lvov-Warsaw School – either modifying them or giving better argumentation for them. These are, among others: (moderate) anti-irrationalism, stimulative rationalism (in relation to faith), logical (restrained) reconstructionism, (liberalized) conventionalism, ontological indeterminism (in the negative part), recognition of ontological reism as an explanatory hypothesis regarding semantic reism, the directive of practical realism (towards actions – and not towards the goals of these actions) and ethical eternalism. As the analysis of this resonance shows – Przełęcki’s modification was mainly weakening relevant ideas.

The article presents the conception of analytical hermeneutics as a theory and methodology of text interpretation developed on the grounds of analytical philosophy. In the first part, the author recalls selected definitions of hermeneutics and its most important postulates, as well as the method of creative interpretation formulated by Tadeusz Kotarbiński. The second section presents examples of interpretations taken from Marian Przełęcki’s Lektury platońskie [Readings in Plato], which were used to describe selected interpretative tools of analytical hermeneutics. The third part contains a comparison of analytical hermeneutics with logical and philological hermeneutics defined by Bogusław Wolniewicz. The summary discusses selected aspects of analytical hermeneutics as a philosophical, methodological, social and didactic program.

Although Marian Przełęcki considered moral cognition as non-scientific, he shaped his views on its sources and structure according to his earlier views on cognition in natural sciences. The starting point in the latter are individual sentences based on experience and sensual cognition, which are then generalized as empirical principles or laws. On the other hand, the starting point in moral cognition are individual assessments rooted in intuition or moral sense, next generalized inductively as moral principles. Therefore, Przełęcki named his metaethical views an inductive intuitionism. The paper presents three reflections evoked by those views: 1. In metaethics, the border between intuitionism and naturalism is vague. Moreover, in spite of the common view and Przełęcki’s conviction, each of those two concepts must include an admixture of the other. 2. There are some interesting analogies (going beyond Przełecki’s project) between sensual illusions and moral-sense illusions. 3. As well as there exist analogies dealing with the relations between the reason and, on the one hand, empirical cognition, and on the other hand, intuitive moral cognition.

Marian Przełęcki is primarily known for his scientific work on the broadly understood logic and ethics. However, the anthropological threads are found in various texts of this philosopher, therefore this article is an attempt to present and discuss them. M. Przełęcki expresses a strong faith in the goodness inherent in man, he is interested in the vision of human being developed by Pascal, as well as in views on determinism and the attitude of people to animals.

Collective intentionality is essential to understanding how we act as a “team”. We offer an overview of the contemporary debate on the sense of acting together. There are some theories which focus on unconscious processes and on the capabilities we share with animals (Tomasello, Walther, Hudin), while others concentrate on the voluntary, conscious processes of acting together (Searle, Tuomela, Bratman, Gilbert). Collective intentionality also represents a relevant issue for economic theories. The theories of team reasoning move from the assumption that agents can sometimes behave in accordance with beliefs and preferences attributed to a group or a team. We will point out the role of institutions as created by collective intentionality (Searle) for understanding coordination and cooperation.

Judicial cognition – the basic cognitive category – expressed mainly in the operability of existential judgements and in the structure of predicative judgements is the core of metaphysical realism. As transmitters of truth primarily serve the subjective and predicative judgements, but their epistemic status depends on the cogency of the first judgement, which is always the existential judgement. It is this very judgement that affirms the existence of the world completely spontaneously and directly. Thus, the initial affirmation of existence takes place in the cognitive cogency of the existential judgement and for this reason, by its very nature, it is a super-intelligible and signless judgement. For it is the raison d’être of truth and, as such, it becomes the basis for the operability of the truth-transmitting/intelligible judgements, which are predicative judgements. Therefore, the existential judgement is the main communicator of the real existence of the world and as a specific sign of truth in its epistemic (defining) aspect, is the basis for comprehending and explaining its ontic structure.

The article aims to present some questions concerning the mysterious author of Corpus Dionysiacum as well as of its lecture more in the light of Dionysian Letters and their early reception (6th – 7th c.).

The aim of the article was to present four principles of the ethics of Thomas Aquinas. Wisdom, contemplation, synderesis and conscience are either habits and acts of the possible intellect. Wisdom, contemplation and synderesis and conscience clearly show how the cognitive activities of the intellect serve to recognize reality, and, in a further consequence, allow actions resulting from human nature that recognize self and the good to which it is to aim. Remarks about wisdom, contemplation as well as synderesis and conscience, as responsible for moral actions of man, justify ethical intellectualism attributed to Aquinas, because the intellect determines any volitional acts and choices.

This paper aims to presenting that to use the category of ‘border situation’ from the perspective of Karl Jaspers’ philosophy and from the perspective of psychology of reproduction and sociology and pedagogics may be legitimate to characterize the situation of women with high-risk pregnancies – with diagnosis of fetal malformations which: (a) did not occur in their families earlier, and (b) a full etiology of malformations is unknown. In the text I used materials from conversations which I conducted with women with high-risk pregnancies and materials from the film My child is an angel and from the book A gift of Time. Continuing Your Pregnancy When Baby’s Life Is Expected to Be Brief.

Looking for the best natural language equivalents to various functors in logic I turned my attention to the Polish connective “I… i…” (“both… and…” in English). This connective, although it may look like one, is not a simple, stylistic variant of the Polish connective “i” (“and” in English). The connective “i” and the connective “I… i…” are two different connectives. I consider the connective “I… i…” a better equivalent to the functor of conjunction in logic than the connective “i”.