The aim of this communication is to prove that commonly used principle of exensionality (according to which the logical value of a complex sentence depends only on the logical values of sentences that are the parts of it) implies the fregean axiom. Moreover it has been presented in what sense the non-fregean logic is extensional.
In this article a language in which several statements concerning relations between the situations and the objects can be expressed is considered
The author presents the essence and ancient origin of the controversy between the idealistic and normative principles of philosphy and utilitarian attitude of democracy. This opposition is universal and can be seen on many levels in education (both in schools and universities), ethics, politics, and relations between technology and axiology. The conflict arose in the period of the Athenian democracy. According to Plato the democratic constitution is totally opposed to truth, values and knowledge, because it is based on opinions (doxai). The spirit of democracy is reflected in the relativistic and pragmatic art of persuasion, taught by the sophists and contrary to rational philosophical analysis leading to cognition of good and evil. Plato and sophists gave rise to the opposition to the theory and praxis, emphasized by the classical philosophy. The fundamental aspect of that opposition is the contrast beween a philosophical theoretical model of a constitution and the requirements imposed by political and legal realities. The communication contains the general comparison of several philosopher's views on that subject. Among others, the author discusses the opinions of Burke, Montesquieu, Mill, Tocqueville, Nietzsche, and the contemporary liberals and postmodernistic pragmaticists who are convinced that democracy needs no philosophical justfication because all systems and paradigms created by moral and rationalistic thinking are 'irrerelevant' (Rorty) in regard to democracy. Life in democracy will be always the meeting point of various incompatible, and often contrary, normative ideas. Habermas, on the other hand, sees the task of philosophy, adjusted to the requirements of our times, in investigatig acts that produce agreement, cooperation, influence and dialogue, and not in creating epistemological, methaphilosophical and axiological systems that would serve as the basis for politics.
The main purpose of this paper is to provide a critical analysis of Edmund L. Gettier's argumentation against adequacy of the classical theory of knowlegde. The critic consists in showing that in both Gettier counterexamples one of two situations takes place: either at least necessary condition specified by the classial definition of knowledge remains unsatisfied (so that the counterargument failed to be valid), or all conditions are satisfied while saying we have to do with knowledge is not counterintuitive. The major step of the argumnetation is to justify a prima facie unacceptable claim that one cannot simultaneously believe that p and that p or q. The analysis is preceded by an attempt to locate the philosophical concept of knowledge in proper contexts of the verb 'to know that' usage in ordinary language.
The article dwells with the problem of transcendental unity as opposed to mathematical one. Fine arts know well their preponderance over production, for they appeal to the prior perception of subsitent, individual beings, whilst production is manner of subordnation of the nature on its quantitative aspect. Metaphysics thus dwells with the transcendental unity and is indispenasable for human being - individual of intellectual nature.
W artykule poruszony zostaje problem tzw. filozofii narracyjnej w myśli F. W. J. Schellinga. Chodzi mi zwłaszcza o kwestię możliwości tzw. opowiedzenia filozofii, to znaczy o powzięty przez samego Schellinga pomysł połączenia w jednym systemie poezji, religii, mitologii i filozofii, z czego sam filozof ostatecznie się wycofuje. Rozważam problem mitologicznego i symbolicznego charakteru Schellingiańskiej refleksji, a także możliwości odnalezienia w niej miejsca dla myśli dyskursywnej. Nawiązuję w tym celu do koncepcji interpretacyjnych zbliżonych do koncepcji filozofii narracyjnej, to znaczy do interpretacji Jaspersa (filozofia jako tzw. „historia bytu”), a także V. Jankelevitcha oraz X. Tilliette‘a (koncepcja procesu absolutnego) i porównuję je z interpretacją M. Maesschalcka. Celem artykułu jest pokazanie, iż można rozpatrywać myśl Schellinga poza estetyzmem i finityzmem wczesnej refleksji. Przykładem jest dialektyka filozofii narracyjnej, gdzie zasada rozświetlająca, objawicielska pokonuje ostatecznie świadomość mitologiczną, zaś nacisk pada na źródłową wolność jako substancję systemu czasów.
In this text standpoints of Kierkegaard and Stirner concerning topic of human person have become a frame of reference, more or less critical, in comparison to conception of dialogical human being by Martin Buber. Buber and Kierkegaard get bring together, because both look for inspiration for their statements in religion experience. As distinct from the Individual of Kierkegaard the human being of Buber isn't isolating person who lonely appears before The Infinite, but human being participating in relations, especially in personal relationship. Buber gets closer to Stirner and Kierkegaard by antiheglism. They all want to reveal real existence of human being, they don't want to create a new another 'conception of human being'. Kierkegaard allows a relation with God, but Stirner's conception of The Unique turns down this relation, which caused an importand distinctness from dialogical perspective.