In this paper I consider the following ontological principles: principle of identity, principle of contradiction, principle of the excluded middle, principle of the double negation, principle of the sufficient reason and principle of the conservation of the being. I show a several problems connected with them.

The polish word „względnie” is most frequently used as an uninflected adverb (equivalent to “relatively” in English). However, there are cases where it occurs as a connective (equivalent to “or” in English). It is the connective from of “względnie” that I will deal with in my article. I look for an answer whether the connective “względnie” can be a natural language equivalent to one of the functors in logic.

The article contains an analysis of a few sentences and concepts in the field of bioethics of two authors: Peter Singer and Kazimierz Szewczyk. In these statements may be noted logical errors undermining the value of the arguments of the authors. The main mistake it seems identifying the concepts with names. The authors rightly distinguish different levels of human development, but draw the dubious conclusion here that it indicates the different categories of people or persons: biological (genetic) and moral (ethical). People belonging to the first category would have different rights than those of the other. Moral status of the human, and especially being a person, it would depend on the degree of its development. Furthermore, they use the term "criteria of humanity", suggesting that the very origin from a man is not enough to be a man, which is also dubious.

Leszek Kołakowski’s views on religion, while widely known, have not yet seen an adequate explenation. The main purpose of the article is to show how Kołakowski’s thoughts have evolved over time and what led this fierce critic of religion to become one of the most ardent advocate of Christianity

Michael Dummett was a British philosopher who established research program – antirealism. The aim of paper a present is describe to the notion of truth in antirealism of Dummett and problems. I show the differences the notion of truth both in between truth in realism and antirealism. From the perspective of antirealism truth is recognized by the method of verification. It has the epistemic truth have epistemic character unlike truth in realism

We consider Kripke’s interpretations of Wittgensteinian rule-following considerations. We claim that the main skeptical argument presented by Kripke fails to address the issue whether it is possible to have an intention of performing certain behavior in certain specific circumstances which a subject is able to recognize. We claim that if the rulefollowing skepticism recognizes possibility of having such intentions, then its findings do not imply its most radical intended consequences concerning semantics. Moreover, we think that in such case the subject might have an intention to compute values of recursive number-theoretic functions. On the other hand, it seems to us that Kripke presents no actual argument against the possibility of this restricted kind of intentions and that it should not be treated as prima facie controversial.