The aim of the article, which is a part of my dissertation entitled Atheistic Apology of Religion in Contemporary Polish Philosophy, is to present the views of the late professor Bogusław Wolniewicz on religion and Christianity. The story of Bogusław Wolniewicz is very peculiar indeed. While he did not believe in all of the Christian dogmas (in particular in the Christian God and the possibility of life after death) he persistently called himself a Roman Catholic. Which lends itself to the following questions: what shaped his stance and philosophical outlook? Is there any strong claim that would support the idea of an atheistic Christianity? The article consists of two major parts. In the first part, we analyse Wolniewicz’s views on religion itself, presented by him in the paper O istocie religii. While doing so, we are trying to get to the essence of his religion and religiously inspired outlook according to which Wolniewicz was guided, and whether or not his theory can be properly described and explained as the phenomenon of religion. In the second part, we combine Wolniewicz’s philosophy of religion with his views on Christianity. This, eventually, gives us the idea of how Wolniewicz perceived himself as a Roman Catholic, and what his theory can bring to the philosophical debate regarding religion.

We owe the terms ‘diachronic logic’ and ‘non-Fregean logic’ to Roman Suszko. Suszko called ‘diachronic logic’ application of classical logic to study the development of knowledge. But non-Fregean logic is logical calculus obtained from the classical logic by adding identity connective and axioms for it. The main goal of the paper is to prove that the non-Fregean logic is certain continuation of diachronic logic.

What has conservative liberalism in common with modern (socialist) liberalism? The former is generally considered right wing, whereas the latter – clearly left wing. In order to provide an answer to the question, not only must one specify the meaning of “liberalism”, but also cast some light upon the ever blurry distinction between right and left. The question is answered, first, by laying down two concepts of freedom underlying the two different traditions of liberalism. One of these is the intuitive concept adopted by both classical liberalism and modern social liberalism. The other, first clearly formulated by Immanuel Kant, combines freedom of the individual with law, and hence with equality and reciprocity. A visualisation metaphor is offered to aid imagination in conceiving of the difference. The concepts are somewhat developed and comparisons are drawn between them. Secondly, a set of criteria are offered facilitating the allotment of political positions along the political spectre, thus bringing clarity to the rather obscure everyday concepts of political left and right.

The article presents the most important stages of research on the metaphysics of situations contained in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus carried by Professor Bogusław Wolniewicz.

The author assumes an axiological understanding of culture (‘the culture is a system of man’s intrinsic values’). In his view, the spiritual history of mankind has been dominated by three forms of culture: primitive (xenophobic, naturalistic, related to security, collectivistic), traditional (hierarchic, idealistic, ascetic, collectivist or individualistic) and contemporary (egalitarian, utilitarian, hedonistic, auto-centric). They have appeared consecutively. Today they function side by side.

The article is a continuation of my deliberations on the connective ‘czy’ (equivalent to ‘or’ in English) as the natural language equivalent of the functors in logic. I showed that the connective ‘czy’ can also be the equivalent of the functor of conjunction and not, as I mentioned before, of the functors of inclusive or exclusive disjunction only.

The article presents scientific personalities and main achievements of two great scholars: Alfred Tarski and Władysław Tatarkiewicz. They represent different disciplines: Tatarkiewicz was first of all an aesthetician and historian of philosophy; Tarski was a logician and mathematician. The article, however, concentrates on similarities between them. Firstly, both Tatarkiewicz and Tarski are counted among members of the Lvov-Warsaw School. Secondly, they were born and worked in Warsaw (in the case of Tarski – until the outbreak of the World War II). Thirdly, they were strongly attached to their homeland: Poland. Fourthly, one of the common motives of their views is philosophical absolutism. The article is based on the lecture delivered on the 29th of November, 2016, at the University of Warsaw. The lecture was a part of the naming ceremony of two lecture halls at the Institute of Philosophy (Krakowskie Przedmieście 3) in honor, respectively, of Tatarkiewicz and Tarski.

The article is a defense of my definition of lie from my paper W sprawie pojęcia kłamstwa. Tomasz A. Puczyłowski in his article O celowości kłamstwa claims that my definition is too wide, because it allows some non-verbal acts of communication as lies, and too narrow, because someone can lie without having an intention to deceive anybody. I argue that Puczyłowski’s objections are based on two false premises: (1) we cannot express the statements non-verbally; (2) if something is impossible for us, we have no intention of doing that.

The article is a reply to Andrzej Stępnik’s defense of his definition of lying, first proposed in Stępnik 2013 and subsequently criticized by Tomasz Puczyłowski (2014). We begin by claiming that the adequacy conditions imposed by Stępnik (2013) on definitions of lying are unjustified, because they are based on a conflation of lexical definitions of everyday expressions with precising, or perhaps stipulative, definitions of scientific terms. Only lexical definitions, whose purpose is to capture a word’s existing usage in a given speech community, are straightforwardly evaluated in terms of accuracy. By contrast, stipulative definitions are evaluated only in terms of theoretical and practical usefulness, with precising definitions falling somewhere in between. If Stępnik is proposing a lexical definition then he should first identify the relevant speech community and then base his proposal on relevant linguistic evidence. He does neither of these things. What is more, his definition is clearly at odds with the available linguistic evidence. If he is offering either a precising or a purely stipulative definition then he should provide theoretical motivation for it. But, as we point out, he does not do that either. We then focus on Stępnik’s (2017) two counterarguments to Puczyłowski’s (2014) objections. We show that the first counterargument misses its mark, because it is based on a misunderstanding concerning the meaning of the term “speech act”. The second counterargument fails, because it relies on an unwarranted and uncharitable construal of Puczyłowski’s argument. We conclude that the definition proposed by Stępnik is both inaccurate and unmotivated.