Fashion in philosophy is often a camouflage for spiritual misery. The analysis of what is considered to be fashionable allows us to demystify this camouflage. I conduct this analysis in three stages. In the first stage, I determine phraseological contexts in which the word “fashion” and the related words occur, its synonyms and antonyms of it, and its polisemy. The second stage consists in constructing the contextual definition of a word “fashion”. The aim of the third stage is to formulate 13 theses on fashion; these theses are mostly not strictly general; they use quantifiers of the form “usually” or “often”. Next – in two stages – I deal with philosophical fashion. The first stage of the analysis of philosophical fashion consists in indicating the types of objects of these fashion. In the second stage, I illustrate these types in the possibly most various way. The evaluation of philosophical fashion is the third stage. I do not disavow philosophical fashions as such, but I recommend the attitude of sound reason, moderation and caution to them.

In matters of life people are not rational: more often they follow the emotions than a reason. The author presents a simple explanation of this fact. In his opinion, the rational beings care, above all, for themselves. As a result, they neglect the transfer of their genes, resulting in their genes falling out of the population. The medium of the basic value of nature, which is having the children, is emotions. For this reason, homo sapiens species is dominated by the genes of people, whose emotions dampen the reason. The nature created the intelligence not to reach the truth, but to support procreation. If the intelligence inhibits the procreation, the nature narrows its use.

In this paper, I consider the problem of the spatial and temporary infinity of the Universe. I give an ontological interpretation of the mathematical definition (Bolzano-Dedekind definition) of infinity. I consider the problem of the infinitesimal too.

In my paper I aim to show that Christian Kanzian’s conception of the semantic character of a term “person” is false. According to Kanzian, the term “person” is an incomplete general term which needs to be combined with another general term, namely “Homo sapiens” or “human being”. Unlike the former, the latter terms give us clear criteria for identification of the entities they denote. Given that, we can comprehend how the term “person” is used for both synchronic and diachronic identification. After presenting the Kanzian’s proposal, I move on to my critique. In a nutshell, I show that his conception rules out non-human persons a priori and that the term “person” is: (i) general, (ii) semantically incomplete, (iii) non-sortal and (iv) phasic.

In Polish, the word „czy” is most frequently viewed as an interrogative particle (it has a similar function to the English word “whether” but only in indirect questions) as well as a connective (equivalent to “or” in English). I’m interested in the connective function of the word „czy”. In my article I look for an answer to the question whether the word „czy” viewed as a connective can be an equivalent to one of the functors in logic (if so, to which one?).

This is a non-contradictory with the concept of turning from virtual values towards the spiritual ones [as per Andrzej Grzegorczyk] and perhaps a bold interpretation of the mainstream myth of the Book of Genesis. In an immediate dimension, it is a reminder of the Conjectural Beginning of Human History, where, based on the concept of conviviality, Kant describes man’s striding and inexorable departure from the condition of an animal nature. The increase in the freedom of the rational being-in-the-world comes at the expense of the development of particular human persons subjected to the antinomy of guilt and the work of self-perfection.  We speak of the progress as if it was permitted by God – would Grzegorczyk say, but now made on one’s own and requiring responsibility: the drama of existence. The myth of original sin is therefore at the same time a genealogy of morality, not just of punishment. This means opening of the gates of the world of freedom but of spiritual struggle, too. The latter is divine – God also relaxed after the act of creation and did not see it as a punishment as He made a self-sacrifice in His creations. Hence, in Laborem exercens, there is the idea of a man being God’s collaborator in the process of creating the world.

This article compares Zen Buddhism with the mysticism of St. John of the Cross. There are some similarities in these two systems (eg. the relief of suffering on the way to full development or love for other people – as a manifestation of the highest moral attitude). On the other hand, there are some differences (the main one is the concept of the Christian God as an omnipotent being, in which a man is always an insignificant and sinful unit). The author argues that the mysticism of both East and West can complement philosophical thinking, because, in times of crises in life, people usually turn to religion to obtain comfort.