The main objective of this paper is to expose and phenomenologically analyze the concepts and mutual relationships between 'nature' and 'birth' which derive their origin and specific meaning from the old Greek philosophical tradition, and at the same time play a key role in our contemporary understanding of our own culture, and specifically in understanding of our unique relationship with nature. Scientific idealizations (mathematical-technical thinking) move us more and more away from the primordial experience of nature so that the original experience of nature itself becomes gradually mediated (or replaced) by technical thinking and step by step falls into oblivion. In the next part the author dwells phenomenologically on the meaning of 'birth' and 'being born, which constitutes the condition of every experience and makes my access to physis possible. Being born is therefore my 'emerging from secure darkness of the womb and appearing on the risky lit scene of the world'.. Nowadays, due to technical engineering and genetic manipulations - it became a matter of technology that man can be genetically and technically produced, transformed and 'born' beyond and independently of mother's body. No one can see what kind of creatures can be produced in this way. The tendency to eliminate pain and suffering from pregnancy and birth (and from our life in general) seems to irreversibly transform our attitude to ourselves, to our fate, to nature and natural processes. So, Holderlin's question: 'is there a measure on Earth?' retains its actuality.
The author compares the theory of moral behavior presented by Boguslaw Wolniewicz in his article 'Hedonism and Duty' with a theory of such behavior contained in the author's treatise on 'Sense and Truth in Ethics'. The author tries to show that the main source of the difference between them lies in the conception of moral cognition, as assumed by these theories; in contradistinction to Wolniewicz, the author ascribes to such cognition, besides descriptive, an emotive and prescriptive content. This makes it possible to explain moral motivation without recourse to the concept of character - essential in Wolniewicz's theory.
The article presents and polemizes Wolfgang Welsch's postmodern justification of sport as a kind of art. Welsch maintains and tries to demonstrate that contemporary sport passes from the sphere of ethics (that was a peculiar foundation for the ancient traditional olympism) into the domain of aesthetics. This passing is a 'signum temporis' of a more general process called by Welsch (also by Richard Shusterman) the aesthetization of life. When life is permeated by aesthetic values and estimates then all its factors, and sport among others, are close to the experience of art. This is the best argument (and indeed the postmodern argument) to legitimize sport as a noteworthy phenomenon of culture. The thesis of above article is that sport in its Greek origins was and nowadays it goes on to be both ethical and aesthetic phenomenon. Giving up the moral basis would be destructive for sport. Sport is much more conservative than art that can effort experiments with good and evil. Such experiments within the area of sport are not allowed because sport engages human body and its health. Contemporary sport seems not to apply to the rhetoric of postmodern philosophy.
The author criticizes the abstract character of Badiou's St. Paul-derived universalistic subjectivity, notably his omissions of the relation between 'organic body' and 'inorganic body' (Hegel, Marx, Bergson), or the 'great mystic' and its essential influence on the entire universe. He accuses the author of neglecting the personalistic aspects of St. Paul's - and entire Christianity's - thought; He also contests his not-open theory, which he denies the full status of universalism. He praises the breaking down of all conceptual and communal particularism and resulting need for communication (always and to all) based on spiritual essence reaching beyond bodily laws ('death', 'legislation').
There is strong connection between metaphilosophy, epistemology, philosophy of education and the philosophical reflection on the pedagogical practice. Is it possible for philosophy to preserve its identity when cooperating with other subjects adjacent to it? The answer how to remain real philosopher turns on a trio of concepts topic, which can but does not have to be metaphysical abstract, the particular method at the heart of which is dialectic and the philosophical tradition, which is to be kept in mind constantly. None of these elements precludes extensive and effective engagement with non-philosophical partners, but that engagement must proceed on terms that respect the identity of philosophy. All of them should be anyway the basis of teaching philosophy in order to make students' essays really philosophical. Also some rules of the age are to be reconsidered.
The author presents questions and problems characteristic of the field of Philosophy of Teaching Philosophy. One of the problems is the situation of the Philosophy as the subject within a system of education. The specific context for rising this issue is Polish Education System. We confront main goal of this system and specific goals teacher of Philosophy is supposed to adopt within this system with some philosophical tradition and its specific goals of teaching Philosophy. The thesis we propose here is that Philosophy as much is structurally incompatible with this system.
We discuss here the so-called 'deflationary conception of truth'. After sketching the basic ideas of the deflationists, we concentrate on the issue of conservativeness, presented in the literature as an important requirement for deflationary truth theories. It's the deflationist's intuition that truth is in some sense 'innocent' or 'metaphysically neutral'. The truth predicate is just a 'logical device' permitting us to formulate (and perhaps to prove) useful generalizations, but it doesn't by itself add any new content to our non - semantical base theory. Conservativeness comes as a handy explication of these intuitions: the deflationist should adopt a theory of truth which is conservative over its base theory. In the paper we try to assess the merits and demerits of conservative truth theories.
This text presents the origin of pragmatism and its influence on the diversity of contemporary varieties of this school functioning under the common name: neo-pragmatism. The paper is composed of six parts. Each of the parts presents views of pragmatists and neo-pragmatists.
The author presents three main types of reference to human corporeality in the anti-Cartesian philosophical anthropology of the XX century: 1.The phenomenological description of the bodily experience (M. Merleau-Ponty. H. Schmitz, E. Strauss). 2.The constitutive role of human body in the structure of the definitions of humanity proposed by the classical philosophical anthropology of the XX century (M. Scheler, H. Plessner, A. Gehlen). 3.Human corporeality from the perspective of the historical anthropology (H. Schmitz, N. Elias). In the last fragment of his deliberations author shows the contemporary attempts of making the connection between the significant topics of the anthropology of human body and the ethical and aesthetic discourse (J. Habermas, G. Böhme).
This paper is the reconstruction of Simone Weil's views on values and possibilities of their recognition. Those views can be summarized by a conviction that a discursive language is not able to express values because they escape from any definitions. What we consider as values are aspects (or social illusions or imitations) of the highest Good - Reality - God. Therefore the recognition of values needs reconstructing of a personality, throwing away social mental constructions and individual openness for Reality. Simone Weil identifies philosophy with mysticism, and theory of values - with reconstruction of personality, emotionality and life practice. As a consequence the recognition of values is not a theory but a personal relation with the highest Good.
The French Revolution was undoubtedly the most important political experience in the life of young Hegel and it had a great impact on his later philosophical system. One of the main ideas of the Revolution: the liberty became one of the main notions of his philosophy of history. He considered the Revolution an universal history event and a manifestation of the activity of the 'Weltgeist'. Thanks to the Revolution it was possible to destroy the alienated state of the 'Ancien Régime' and to build a new one founded on the basis of the reason. However, destructive forces of the Revolution were at the same time its advantage and its greatest danger. The liberty degenerated into the 'absolute liberty', which led to the terror. Notwithstanding this ambiguity of the Revolution Hegel perceived it as a necessary stage in the historical process of realization of freedom, in which France at the moment bore the palm.
Phenomenology of Levinas is founded on the category of transcendence, whereas for phenomenology of Michel Henry immanence is the crucial notion. The analysis of main terms of both philosophers allows us to interpret these two concepts as similar ones. They try to find a fundament for subjectivity which for them is always embodied. However, for Levinas subject depends on the Other, on the transcendence, while according to Henry the subject is identified with radical immanence related to Life. They both use the same terms and describe the same phenomena: body and flesh, arché, passivity, self-affection, sensibility and vulnerability.
Aristotle, in his treatise 'On the Heavens', discussed in books I-II the problem of universe's indestructibility from philosophical point of view. He put forward following arguments: a body in which no change is perceived has no disposition for the change and persists continuously in the same state. The cause of bodies' perpetuity is an actualised by form a potentiality as a matter. Thus, everything what is always indestructible and ingenerated exists directly and is a being.