Lem put into words the paradox of resuscitation form atoms in the book 'Dialogues' (1957), paradox unsolved untill today. There is followig problem : is X * an alive copy of dead person X - who has identical atomic structure - the same as X? The issue has already been considered in the past although in crude version by Lucretius. Lem's arguments against the possiblity of resuscitacion only intesify the power of paradox. It also appears with reference to cloning of human beings. Lem objected to such process. Identity of reproduced zygote is unclear and therefore reasonable resistance arises to human clonnig.

In this paper the author offers a critical survey of the most important answers to the so-called Special Composition Question (Peter van Invangen) mereological universalism, mereological nihilism, brutal view, organicism, eliminativism, mereological essenialism and functionalism. He also suggests his own response to the van Inwangen's question: neoessentialism – a combination of brutal view and mereological essenialism towards which his sympathies lean.

The authoress discusses a problem of human rights in the context of Kantian's ethical formalism and Socrates' ethical intellectualism. She refers to Girard's interpretation of Hiob's story according to which this biblical hero is a victim of so called collective mimetism, connected with a totalitarian situation or society created by a soul of crowd. On the contrary to this totalitarian type of community human rights have their origins in the conscience of individual, in reason or a subject. According to her interpretation they mediate between external and internal sphere, between legal and moral sphere (Kant) and also between 'loi' and 'droit' (S.Weil). In this way they give a possibility to establish a really just law which - thanks to the mediation done in a conscience of individual - includes an element of transcendence and rationality, so it isn't a blind force which could destroy an individual. For the authoress Socrates is an adherent of such kind of reflexive attitude - and thanks to his moral autonomy - is also a patron of human rights discours at all.

The text shows the relation between German philosophers: Feuerbach and Buber, in the light of not widely known roots of the philosophy of dialogue which was Feuerbach's concept of Me-You. Both authors appreciate the crucial role of religion, even though Feuerbach was consider an atheist and Buber - an eulogist of Hasssids.

For the past few years we have witnessed the discussion among philosophers arguing about the sense of teaching the aestetics as an obligatory subject in teaching philosophy. We have two excluding opinions here: the firm sceptical, treating the aestetics as peripheral field for the philosophy itself. Since the aestetics has problems with deciding the basic matters, fundamental for the discipline, such as nature of beauty, ontological status of art, nature of aestetical and artistic experience, social and individual impact of art or the rules for verification of aestetical thesis. Even defining the subject of aestetical research itself, that is art, until today has been and still is a problem, especially in the last decade.

The author tries to present personalistic philosopy of Spanish scientist and thinker Pedro Lain Entralgo in the fifth anniversary of his death. His investigations concern the material included in Lain's philosophical books - from 'La espera y la esperanza' (1957) to 'Que es le hombre. Evolucion y sentido de la vida' ( 1998) - and the most important remarks of his Spanish critics. He divides the creation of Pedro Lain Entralgo into two periods. The first one is related with neothomistic thought that are presented in books form 50's, 60's and 70's. He examines the antropology of hope proposed first of all in 'La espera y la esperanza' and the problem of another man analysed in two volumenes of 'Teoria y realidad del otro'. The second period's monistic philosophy is based on the thought of Xavier Zubiri - maestro of Latin - and courageous attempts of employing results of particular sciences. The author's main purpose was the most possibly exhaustive presentation of achivements of Spanish philosopher and calling the attention to consequences of that manner of philosophical thinking.

In the followig article the basis outlines of terms present in the reflection of 'the godfather' of Russian religious philosopy are shown (Nietzsche). A lot of attention was paid to evaluation of contemporary culture and reasons of is't failure, highlighting his admiration of Ancient Greece and resembling of the idea of superman (upperman) and dionisian creativity. Nikolai Berdaev second of the presented philosophers was the representative of the 'Rusian silver age of philosophy'. In his reflection on European culture we can find influence of the German philosopher what is evidenced in their similiar evaluation of culture or in appeals to creativity. These afterthoughts showing similarities and highlighting differences should show the path through Nietzsche's nihilism to Berdaev's spirit aristocracy as still important message for contemporary Christians as the creators of culture.

The aim of this essay is tho show the source of the knowledge of 'myself'. How do we know ourselves? The negative answer sounds: we do not know that on the basis of private experience. The way to know our 'own' psychological content runs round about: it goes through the other people. To know that I think, feel pain, or hope we have to know that other people think, feel pain, or hope. The place we find ourselves is the place of finding others. The source of understanding what is thinking, feeling - is primitive reactions, which include the other people as well.

The author reconstructs and critcally examines Richard Hare's 'Principles of of Universalizability of Supervenience' and contrasts it with another principle defended by the author of the 'Language of Morals' - the principle of supervenience. It is argued that Hare's views regarding the former underwent a very significant but unjustified change in 'Moral Thinking' as compared with their exposition in his earilier 'Freedom and Reason'. The change considered in a transition from regarding preference utilitarinism as one of many possible normative systems that can be accepted in conformity with universalizability of moral judgments, to treating it as the only normative theory bearing this characteristic. It is also shown that Hare's point of departure chosen in 'Freedom and Reason' allows him to reach merely the principle of universalizability that is equivalent to weak supervenience (according to J. Kim's classification) admitting of singular terms, and that only the latter principle can by recongized as analytically true in moral language.

The author reconstructs and estimates the William James' attitude to classical conception of truth. James considers some epistemological and ontological problems conntected with the classical theory of truth, and comes to a conclusion that the theory of truth must be epistemic by theory of rational acceptance. But in his pragmatic theory of truth James keeps some intuitions linked with the classical conception. First, classical formula is a starting point of the pragmatist's consideration. Second, in the case of knowledge by acquaintance Jemes uses the meaning of truth as a correspondence. And third, the truths in classical meaning are regarded as asymptotes, to which all human beliefs come.