In the paper the author considers the problem of solubility of philosophical questions. He tries to substantiate thesis that rational philosophical reflection can allow us to choose between some opposite philosophical hypotheses. In this meaning he accepts philosophy as a positive knowledge. To support this point of view he gives some examples of philosophical theories, which - in his opinion - are prescribed (finitism, apriorism, sensualism and others). He analyses relationship between philosophical knowledge, science and common sense as well.

The human way of living our everyday existence inevitably makes us ask about sense. The question is so intense that it seems to reach to the very sources of life's motivation and becomes its measure. That is why seeking sense and truth can be considered a fundamental orientation of the entire human world. The human being's elementary desire to validate one's existence in the perspective of sense can be called the will for sense. The human being is the will for sense. Such a denotation of the human being is to be understood more broadly than just an attitude of the will. Three elements are involved here: firstly, entirely, i.e. engagement of all man's faculties; secondly the 'a priori', i.e. that which is present in every possible human experience of oneself and the world; and thirdly, a more or less conscious pursuit on the part of human existence of the absolutely Unconditioned, which is ultimately perceived as Transcendence. The idea of the human being as the will for sense provides a justification of the fullness of human life in its flourishing beauty. Temporality deserves such an affirmation in which its sense will not be diminished or utterly nullified by reference to eternity. In order to live the fullness of sense one need not trade temporality for eternity.

In the article the author shows human matters from two points of view. First, as a transcendent duty and law, and second, as inner, free and personal order and choice. Religion, love, and patriotism are considered that way. Finally he proposes to de­liberate quite utopian project, namely - he thinks - politicians should love their native country not for material profits, but for sincere sentiment - like millions of citizens who have a low standard of living.

The author comments are focused on the theory of hegemony presented in the middle 80s by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe. He tries to prove that this conception is weak from both philosophical and political pont of view. It lacks ethical grounds and fails in methodology. he shows that Lackau's and Mouffe's theory is come king of theoretical humbug based on hermetical poststructuralist rhetoric and quasi religious for Marx

The author outlines the situation of philosophy and asks in a practical way: What is to be done? The focus is on the situation of philosophy as a source of knowledge. The author assumes, after Plato and others philosophers, that to know is to have justified true belief. However he argues further that philosophy is incapable of delivering knowledge. The author's argument is based on the justified assumption that justification can only be achieved in accordance with an algorithm. The argument runs as follows. Let us take the classic philosophical problem: Does a physical object exist? The problem of realism can only be resolved by someone who can distinguish between a state of consciousness and of a dream and this is impossible because every test of consciousness can only be made consciously and so on into infinity. The problem of realism cannot therefore be decided. Next the author assumes that each philosophical question has a form, in the end, of the problem of realism, so the procedure of examining must also have one and the same form. This then poses the question of whether a general procedure (algorithm) for deciding philosophical problems exists? Thanks to Alan Turing we know that the so called Turing machine does not exist. Thus a machine which works algorithmically on resolving philosophical problems does not exist. Thus philosophical knowledge does not exist. However as the study of mathematics is worthwhile so must it be worthwhile to study philosophy. Mathematics employs intuition, in the absence of a universal algorithm, as a source of inspiration, as an instrument of insight into concepts and a control mechanism for local algorithms. In other words, it is worth following the example of the mathematicians and enriching the concept of justification. Indeed philosophy engenders hope when it comes closer to mathematics, but it can only inspire pity when it moves away from mathematics.

This paper (1) summarizes the main points of the papers in the volume which demonstrate some of the ways that academic freedom is at odds with recent conservative attacks on the professoriate; (2) argues that some of the conservative attacks from students on faculty are at base a failure to acknowledge their equal personhood, but treat them as inferior beings and thus elicit harmful psychological reactions similar to those found in victims of racist slurs; (3) examines possible solutions, including distincting on the part of faculty, and distributing the burden of crucial thinking among all faculty and college courses, thereby making academic freedom a reality for all.

According to Hannah Arendt, the victory of eternity - prepared by Plato and accomplished by Christianity - over the desired and glorified in the pre-socratic Greece immortality has inverted the prevailing measure of man and human perfection: diminished the value of the individual and exceptional in man (resulting from his mortality) for the sake of what is common and the same in each human being (and, in this case, immediately related to eternity). This paper examines the process and consequences of this revolutionary reversal. The importance is stressed of the two Christian conceptions - the one of the absolute value of each individual human being and the other of the essential equality of all men - which today, though primarily strictly connected to the faith in the eternal, are still quite fundamental to our morality and politics.

Within the context of this paper - in the way of Husserl - the author takles under consideration the effectiveness of the cognition, directed towards the transcendent object. Following all the particular phenomenological reductions he aims to establish the foundation of certainty iof the human knowledge. At first he focuses on the nature of the pure individual phenomenon taken itself - abstractedly as a phenomenon of consciousness - framed as an undoubted data of the cognition. Nevertheless, as the individual phenomenon is not intersubjectively communicated (which is caused its individuality), he is forced farther to refer into the Husserl's conception of the pure phenomenon of general forms, considered as a condition of existing other sciences. At the end of the paper the author revels the new meaning of the transcendence, which is the result of the phenomenological reductions and compares it with the traditional meaning of this term.