A characteristic feature of moral wobbliness is primary the fact that in spite of differentiation between internal or external qualities, the moral core embedded in the human nature remains untouched in its foundations.
Mass problem of euthanasia which derives from the development of biotechnology, is connected with an isue of mutual love to persons. Aware euthanasia of dying people needs assistance. Hence, the general question arises: who should assist in agony? Only those who love the moribund person, and who are nominated by the same. Custom of and right to euthanasia that respect such state of affairs would establish a reliable criterion of selection in love. This in turn would prevent the family crisis. Under preasure of “senile endless dying” people shall join pairs in consideration of total reciprocal trust (in other way - they just shall not pair) entrusting each other their own death, and consequently also the lot and life in general.
In Marian Przełęcki’s paper "Are people good?" (“Edukacja Filozoficzna” 49/2010) the tenet of pejorism is wrongly taken to be “some people are incapable of doing anything good”, where as in fact it is merely “some people are capable of doing wrong deliberately” - i.e. just common sense.
Polish logician and philosopher Jan Łukasiewicz formulated around 1920 a threevalued logic, which had a very explicit philosophical background, namely indeterminism. Łukasiewicz believed that we have to reject classical logic in order to maintain indeterminism, which is a necessary condition for the existence of freedom and other phenomena desirable from the pragmatic point of view. In the paper I argue thet Lukasiewicz’s conceptions face significant problems. Particularly I am trying to show that indeterminism affirmed by the philosopher leads to consequences highly unwelcome from the pragmatic approach taken by Łukasiewicz.
Human memory is like human conscience: both are variable and fleeting. Memory, like everything, is various and relative. It takes on merely very small part of human experiences, whose - sooner and later - go into oblivion. This is why writing down of human experiences and experiments is a field of rich abuses.
The real, physical existence implies a possibility of active involvement in self-experiencing and establishing contacts with the surrounding world. In this context the body becomes the basic category of being. Caring for one’s body should be the basic concern of the man aiming at enriching and sustaining earthly existence. Undertaking various activities relating to the surrounding world is associated with a number of threats; both inactivity and over activity are dangerous to the man. Each person has the right to choose his or her own way of living. One should also be free to make bodily choices. Human involvement with the physical culture is based on satisfying safety level. Taking responsibility for personal involvement with physical culture is its cardinal value that delineates the space in which reasonable activity creates spiritual and physical wellness in their broad sense.
Pro-didactic anti-handbook or on how to make teaching philosophy more attractive (a duet).
This essay is made by two authors. Their goal is to rise the problem of how to make teaching of philosophy attractive without lowering educational standards. The context of this discussion is critical analysis of recently issued in Poland Micheal Onfrys "Anti-handbook of philosophy". Andrzej Stepnik is presenting more theoretical analysis: pointing out good (as using modern context and modern issues to show philosophical problems) and bad (as single-trackness and triviality) sides of this book. Tomasz Mazur presents the practical consequences of working with "Anti-handbook". He was using this book one semester with one group of students. He noticed several good and bad sides of it. Overall evaluation of a book is that it can be used successfully, but with specific kind of the students and in a very specific way by a teacher.
Truth of first principles of cognition is a very interesting topic in a Thomas Aquinas’ philosophical thought. In this topic Aquinas borrows concepts derived from two great philosophical traditions: Aristotelianism and Augustinism. The element of Aristotle’s tradition is a conviction that whole intellectual knowledge begins in a sensual perception. The element of St. Augustine’ thought is the theory of eternal truths which exist in every human mind by an God’s illumination. Bishop of Hippone taught the human intellect estimates all things in a light of eternal truths, which don’t begin in the sensual perception.
According to St. Thomas first principles seem eternal truths. First principles of cognition, for example Aristotle’s principle of non-contradiction and a principle of excluded middle, are true forever and they exist in the human intellect in an initiative form of knowledge. However an appreciation of them is an effect of real cognition of being. The cognition of being is a process which consists elements of sensual perceptions and intellectual apprehensions. So the human intellect discovers first principles of cognition in real things by an induction. These are two aspects of Aquinas’ theory: a) the human intellect has an initiative knowledge of first principles which are true forever and seem Augustine’s eternal truths; b) the human intellect achieves a complete knowledge of them by induction.
Our primary task is on investigation of the certain deontic modal system, namely the LP system.
Firstly, we ask what is or what isn’t the theorem of this system and next are that theorems agree with our intuition from the field of morality.
In the next part we show completeness theorem for the LP system useing neighborhood semantics and how this system is represented in the certain alethic modal logic (in the Kangeran-style reduction).
Finally, we present the conception of semantical description for the multimodal deontico-ethical system to make possible formalization of mutuality relation between conceptions of ought and good.
The paper examines the character of the object of philosophical investigations of science. The view is defended that ideas of science, not the science as it is (the very phrase is meaningless on a closer inspection), are those objects. The idea of science, i.e., science as it is viewed in philosophy, is a construction founded in an accepted philosophical conception, subordinated to programmatic theses and, then, to the postulated worldview.