The program of naturalization of epistemology, which postulates the eliminative reduction of epistemology in science, cannot be realized. It ignores the very nature of epistemology. Naturalization of epistemology require philosophically autonomous elements drawn from the speculative knowledge.
In this article author discusses argument against the reality of time due to J.M. McTaggart. He finds McTaggart's argumentation questionable and declares for realistic interpretaion of tenses (time).
The consideration presented in the paper are an attempt to revitalise the Chisholmian categorisations of objects 'via entia per se' and 'entia successiva'. The paper contains a critical survey of the theory of mereological essentialism: it deals with some more important arguments against it and answers as well. The author tries to show that in defense of the categorisation in question the applicability of the doctrine of mereological essentialism must be somehow limited. He suggests that the best way to preserve a relevance of the above categorisation is to restrict theses of mereological essentialism either only to objects 'qua occurrents' or only to objects 'qua continuats' or only to persons.
This article sets forth the analysis of significant properties of the processing of linguistic information and mental processing of information on the world. Consequently, a thesis has been advanced according to which the structure of both processes has certain cognitive elements in common, namely inductive and deductive reasoning. Moreover, it has been suggested that the above mentined types of reasoning are activated in the processing of both linguistic information and knowledge on the world and serve analogous purposes, namely a) the purpose of simplifying the identification of linguistic information and information of the world reaching the cognitive system; b) the purpose of simplifying the acquistion of this type of information from the long-term memory resources; and c) the purposes of imporving mental operations performed on the premises of reasoning. However, unlike the processing of information on the world, the linguistic information processing is subject to specific linguistic knowledge. At the same time, linguistic knowledge establishes relations with the knowledge on the other spheres of reality. This type of interdependence is shaped as the words activate both the knowledge on language and the concepts concerning the elements of the world.
In the paper author tries to find the source of human nature, human dignity and human rights in contemporary civilisation. That nowadays scientific and technical civilisation seems to be, as never before and apart from the apparent cultural progress, non-human indeed.
The author tries to show similarities and distinctnesses between two conceptions of the 20-th century philosophy of dialogue formulated by Martin Buber and Franz Rosenzweig. Regardless of common elements in thoughts of both friend-thinkers there are some differents, what provokes into comparison their positions. We can also inquire of reasons, which make level discrepancies impossible. The main subject of Buber's consideration is double-image of reality as a consequence of twofold way of meeting with it. The first type of 'relation' (the proper one (Beziehung)) takes place when man attitude links to fundamental word 'Me-You' (Ich-Du). Second type of relation is called by Buber 'connection' (Verhaeltnis). It implements when man attitude links to word 'Me-It' (Ich-Es). The difference between these words (and similarily - between two attitudes) is evident. The word 'Me-It' makes the subject, involves concepts. By means of them a man builts conceptions of reality, but he doesn't experience its presence. Rosenzweig raises objections to this conception.
In his book 'Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature' Richard Rorty claims that some projects of philosophy or philosophy -as theory of knowledge, as he calls it, are optional and contingent. In the first place, the author tries to show Rorty's strategy which leads him to that thesis. Secondly, he attempts to critically investigate his 'crucial premise' according to which the adequate model of knowledge is not a model of 'confrontation' but of 'conversation'. In the end he also considers a perspective in which both models do not rule out each other, but become two equally important aspects of knowledge.
N. Hartmann is a representative of 20-th century absolutism in axiology. The author analyses his arguments against ethical realtivism. These are: emotional cognition of values, its apriorical nature, demarcation of values and their validity and a distniction between relativism and relationism. It turns out that a historical change of valuation is a change of validity and not of the value itself.
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