The paper is an attempt of drawing the conceptual horizon of philosophical and religious thought of the XVII. and XVIII. centuries. This horizon is a frame of reference of Kant’s philosophy of religion. The point is to confront traditional views of God, world, and man with new developing natural sciences and to consider the possibility of justifying religious claims by reference to the statements and results of the natural sciences. A part of greater whole.

The problem of the possibility of metaphysics is considered from the perspective of the correspondence truth category. The considerations reveal that in the contemporarily elaborated versions of the correspondence theory of truth (that is, the structural version, Tarski’s semantic conception, “symbolic” version which I proposed in an earlier work) the metaphysical access is problematic and mediated. In particular, from the point of view of the symbolic version, the very goal of metaphysics should be significantly weakened: the reality is hidden behind symbolic forms, so metaphysics reveals only its “shades”, and not the reality in itself.

The paper deals with the elementary considerations of the notions of zero and an empty set which, on the grounds of mathematics, can be treated as an ‘equivalent’ of the metaphysical notion of non existence.

Zero - in everyday thinking - is treated as an equivalent of the notion ‘nothing’, therefore, qualitatively, it seems to be different from the remaining numbers. In everyday life, in conventional applications of numbers, we don’t need to use zero (we say I don’t have money, and not I have zero zloties).

Customarily, we understand a set as some ‘accumulating’ or ‘assembling’ things of one kind into one unity. This is a notion which appeals to the practice of everyday life. In this way we understand a chain as a set of links and a library as a set of books.

In this sense of understanding the notion of ‘set’, the notion of an empty set seems paradoxical, connected with non-existence, nonentity. How can a set exist which ‘collects’ nothing or which is composed of ‘nothing’.

It appears that in contemporary mathematics the notions of zero and an empty set function as ordinary elements of a broader mathematical structure and hence they have a sense devoid of metaphysical contexts.

Fate is a combination of two forces, both outside human control: destiny and chance. These are not independent: there is chance in destiny, and destiny in chance. There layers of personality are sketched out - elastic, plastic, and rigid - and their bearing on a person’s fate discussed. Anyhow, the idea of fate is a deeply religious one.

In the paper I criticize the base of school curriculum for philosophy teaching in senior high schools that is currently in force. I argue that its radical encyclopedic character will cause total defeat of this longawaited educational innovation, namely the return of philosophy to Polish schools.

The text refers to Prof. Marian Przełęcki’s article "Are people good?". In the critical part of the text, the author points out some conceptual problems of Przełęcki’s conception of human nature. In the analytical one, some analyses of human behavior in ethical context are proposed.

The following reservations to Przełęck's conception are mentioned. Firstly, Przełęcki’s explication of the thesis “All people are good” seems to be to week with respect to «natural» moral intuitions. Secondly, the relation between compassion and goodness is in this conception not clear. Thirdly, excusing interpretation of sadists’ actions seems to be misleading.

In the analytical part, the author proposes a kind of classification of human actions - into: economical actions (motivated by vengeance and gratitude), self-interested actions, egoistic and altruistic actions and, finely, disinterested ones. The latter influences the quality of moral life to the highest degree. It is also pointed that if our moral intuition is to be satisfied, the human nature is neither good, nor bad.

In the end, the author contrasts the Przełęcki’s «optimistic» postulate: “Act in such a way as if there were some good in every person” - with another, «pessimistic» one: “Expect rather evil than bad”. In author’s opinion, the latter one causes less disappointments.

Let us agree that moral qualification of human actions depends on intentions of this action. Every action which intention is to create a vital good - is morally good. Every action which intention is to create a vital evil - is morally bad. Persons whose action is morally good (resp. morally bad) are accidentally morally good persons (resp. accidentally morally bad persons). Persons such that every their action is morally good (resp. morally bad) are absolutely good (resp. absolutely bad) persons.

Data of introspection enables us to conclude that there are neither absolutely good, nor absolutely bad people. However, there are people which are sometimes (accidentally) good and sometimes (accidentally) bad. This is the only sufficiently justified ethical thesis.

Przełęcki's general ethical thesis, even very weakly interpreted, is not enough justified. Moreover, one may accept Przełęcki’s practical directives without accepting his general thesis concerning human nature.

Answering the objections of Anna Brożek and Jacek Jadacki, the author clarifies some points of his argumentation.

Firstly, he admits that if this thesis is to be accepted without spontaneous objections, it should be weakened and sound: “There are good people and bad people but even in bad people there is an ability to good actions”.

Secondly, he reminds that he concentrated only on altruistic and egoistic actions, conditioning that altruistic action is motivated by the will of lightening/removing suffer of another person. Such actions are morally warranted only if this removing suffer surpasses the suffer of the subject of action which is the cost of it.

Thirdly, the author emphasizes that the essence of good actions lays in intentional aims of these actions, not in compassion accompanying them. Compassion only enables us to act altruistically.

The subject of the paper is the presentation and discussion of logical pluralism. Logical pluralism is the view according to which there is more than one correct logic. A recent articulation of this view has been developed by G. Restall and JC Beall in terms of quantification over different cases: classical logic emerges from consistent and complete cases; constructive logic from consistent and incomplete cases, and paraconsistent logic from inconsistent and complete cases.

Philosophy is cognitively ineffective, i. e. ineffective as the source of knowledge. To describe this situation more accurately I construct a concept of the cognitive culture. It has two parts - conceptual culture and propositional culture. The former determines our realm of concepts, the later - our realm of informations. In both we do have more or less obligatory rules of cognitive admissibility.

Now, intellectual tools of philosophy do not satisfy these requirements. So, philosophy is on the margin of the contemporary cognitive culture. It is on the margin of the social life, as well.

Why? Because tools of philosophy are either insufficient to solve problems residing in it or are no tools at all. And the problems of philosophy belong either to science (being overtly or potentially scientific) or are pseudoproblems.

Finally, discussing two objections - that I am dogmatic positivist and the adherent of the ideology of scientism - I do refute them, and stay there where I must stand.

The XX century was a period of rapid changes in physics, chemistry and biology. The process of their development is now continuing. The question appears what are the limits of the conceptual and experimental development of natural sciences. The analysis of the present state of science shows, that most of its fields are stable and almost complete. Inside them there is no need nor place for revolutionary changes. Only elementary particle physics and cosmology are now in the period of deep crisis therefore scientists try to formulate new revolutionary theories. Such theories would change the general scientific picture of the material world, however their influence on other fields of science would be rather small. Science is aging and small part of it is creative and open to new ideas.

The article presents certain attempt to indicate various intuitive elements, that occur in formal deductive sciences. First kind of intuitions underlies formal theories, second sort of intuitions appears within the development process of those theories; and other sort of intuitions occurs within applications of formal deductive sciences. Problem of intuition is examined here from the viewpoint of philosophy of sciences an not from the viewpoint of psychology or mathematics. In general, intuition is considered here as certain bridge that connects observations (interpreted in a wide sense) with a strictly decuctive reasoning.

The paper analyses the idea of justice presented in Habermas’ s work „Between facts and norms”. The author discusses relations which, according to Habermas, connect values, ethics and law. She also highlights the interdependence of justice and solidarity. Furthermore, the author points out the mistake of interpreting justice in distributive categories. The paper underlines the importance of communicative action regarded by Habermas as essential for social integration and building a just society. Finally, the author strives to formulate her own opinions on several important issues (for example the question: does Habermas ignore or even deny the reality of institution?).

The article describes the phenomenon of philosophical cafes. The reader can find there the description of typical subjects disscussed during meetings at “Cafe Philo” - the first French philosophical cafe created by M. Sautet, and the “Socrates Cafe” - the chain of philosophical cafes launched by Ch. Phillips - is also described.

The first part of the article is ended with a short comparison of both types of philosophical cafes activities.

The main part of the article is dedicated to the “Socrates Cafe” movement in Poland. The reader can find there the description of the rules and conduct during meetings as well as the detailed description of activities of the Warsaw-based “Socrates Cafe”. The deliberations are concluded with the question of impact of philosophical cafes on a process of change to the stereotyped image of philosophy, a symptom of which is a divergence from the academic perception of philosophy.

The articles also lists numerous web sites, thanks to which a reader may become acquainted with activities of particular philosophical cafes from all over the world.

Many readers who delve upon Nietzsche frequently overlook the fact that the author of the "Will to Power or the Beyond Good and Evil", "The Origins of Morals", "Thus Spoke Zarathustra" or the "Gaya Scienza" often deliberately refers to such concepts as landscape, space, desert, abyss, mountain tops etc. The paper tries to show that, according to Nietzsche, they are fundamental and irreducible to our thinking, to human nature, to our knowledge and even to our sensual perceptions, let alone our moral and aesthetic judgements. These spatial connotations make the framework of Nietzsche’s feelings which he attempts to metaphorically express when he praises natural instinct, and blames the logic of reason. They reach deep into sense (or bottom) of Human essence. The same holds for the ‘above’ and ‘below’, ‘higher’ and ‘lower’ in his specific (once real, once metaphoric) usage of these words. The paper is based on the analysis of Nietzsche’s original insights, and tries to reveal and expose the - often overlooked or ignored - metaphoric, many-level meanings of ‘landscape’ (which determines our entire life) and ‘dsert’ (nihilism) which - according to Nietzsche - grows around us, and in us, driving us deeper and deeper into the abyss of nothingness.

The aim of the article is to compare two monographs: Willard van Orman Quine’s "Philosophy of Logic" (New York 1970), and Susan Haack’s "Philosophy of Logics" (Cambridge 1978). Four aspects are taken to comparison: 1) what is a logic and what is the philosophy of logic(s)?, 2) what is the scope of logic?, 3) how can we divide all logics? and 4) is there just one correct logical system or could there be several which are equally correct? what ‘correct’ mean in this context?

Living in history as the way of behaviour, which has been shown during the twentieth century, considered by plan of epistemology, brings some problem of historical relativity and leads to reversal of man, who is designated by non historical values and senses. This article appeals to Karl Jaspers philosophy and to his thoughts. The main clue of this article is showing how reflection taken up according to philosophy of existence changes sense of idea living in history, and how it shows its practical and existence aspect. It means that here is taken up this problem, it is transformated and it is showed that the problem of living in history is much deeper than everybody thinks.

The paper is an attempt at analysis of logical aspects of description of a change. The existing temporal logic calculi and And Next calculus by G. H. von Wright cannot completely characterise a change. Józef Wajszczyk was the precursor of the logic of dichotomic changes (LZD). LZD is a kind of non-classical logic which introduce specific operators: “previously...”, “following...”. The paper presents two calculi of the logic of dichotomic changes: LZD in dense models of time and LZD in discrete models of time.

Vincent Buczyński was born in 1789 at Hirowka near Mohylev (now in Belarus). He entered the Jesuit Order in 1805. He studied philosophy in the Połock Jesuit College (1806-1809) and theology in the Połock Academy (1815-1818) and he obtained there the degrees of Master of Philosophy and Doctor of Theology. He taught philosophy and theology in several countries: in Połock, Tarnopol (now in Ukraine), Nowy Sącz (Poland), Graz, Linz (Austria), Namur and Louvain (Belgium). He published a three-part work entitled "Institutiones philosophicae" (I-III, Vienna, 1843-1844), and a book "Institutiones doctrinae religionis" (Vienna, 1842).

Buczyński was a representative of the Aristotelian-Thomist tradition, enriched by some views adopted from modern trends, especially in the natural philosophy (cosmology). He was also a supporter of some ideas of Suarez. Buczyński should be counted among the forerunners of the Thomist revival long before the publication of the encyclical Aeterni Patris (1879).

Witold Mackiewicz (opracowanie)

Paweł Okołowski (opracowanie)