Dieter Henrich is one of the philosophers since the 1950s who conceived an independent philosophical approach. Applying the term “school” to the philosophers from Heidelberg is justified by the fact that several generations have been involved in the continuation of the group’s work since 1970. In the meantime, another generation has established itself, which calls itself the New Heidelbergs, whose members have been continuing and innovating what is called “Dieter Henrich’s original insight.” In this article, first, Henrich’s insight is characterized in a way which justifies the use of the term Heidelberg School. Second, a treatment of Henrich’s research programme at the beginning of the 1970s would be too one-sided. Third, it is argued that the epistemological interest in dealing with this school is not of a historical nature. Finally, an outlook on the progress of Henrich’s enduring insight is given. Without the “continuation by innovation” of the school and “Henrich’s original insight,” the research programme of the New Heidelbergs cannot be adequately grasped.

The article analyses the concept of present assumed in classical spacetime and problems faced by its application to Minkowski spacetime. The author of the paper shows that preservation of the classical notion of present is possible when the concept of point present is adopted. The text proposes a general scheme of the point approach to present in Special Theory of Relativity and presents its consequences for objects located in Minkowski space-time.

The aim of the article is to discuss the beginnings of interest in the temporal aspects of obligations in deontic logic. The analyzed period is the years 1951–1981. First, the author presents a discussion on conditional oughts. There he also singles out the first aspect: the time of the oughtness. Later, he characterizes the views of Patricia Greenspan, who explicitly used this aspect in her attempt to solve the Chisholm paradox. Then, the author discusses the views of Héctor-Neri Castaneda, who highlighted other aspects: the time of the action one ought to do, the time of utterance or of the making of an ought-statement, and the time of the truth of an ought-statement. Next, the author discusses Thomason Richmond’s views, who presented a formal system of deontic logic based on temporal logic. At the end, he summarizes the changes in interest in temporal aspects in analyzed period.

The article provides a review of selected arguments against Gregory Currie’s theory of fictional truths. I begin by recalling the basic assumptions of this theory, in particular the postulate of establishing an entity referred to as a fictional author. Then I proceed to critically analyze seven objections from the literature on the issue of the fictional author in order to propose a distinction between three modes of argumentation: epistemic, ontological and explanatory. I argue that while the distinguished epistemic and explanatory arguments are misguided, criticism from ontological positions at least forces a revision of the view under discussion.

In 2022, 50 years have passed since the death of Antoni Kępiński, an outstanding psychiatrist from Krakow. Against representatives of his field, he distinguished himself by emphasizing the subjective treatment of the patient, maintaining partnership with him based on mutual trust and honesty and seeing the causes of mental illness primarily in disturbances in the hierarchy of values. His ideas were an important inspiration not only for the medical community, but also for the humanities. He was one of the first authors who recognizes the importance of Kępiński’s anthropological reflection was Józef Tischner. The aim of the article is therefore to show in what philosophical perspectives he placed the intellectual output of the Krakow psychiatrist, how he developed the threads present in it, and how he used them when developing his own philosophical concepts.

The following paper deals with the Polish discussion of the principle of non-contradiction from the perspective of the lack of official participation of Jan Łukasiewicz and Stanisław Jaśkowski. These philosophers were representatives of the analytic tradition, and their pioneering works on the concept of (non-)contradiction are nowadays considered foundational to this field of research. The aim of this paper is to point out those features of the Polish discussion (as well as its later summaries) that contributed to this exclusion. The conclusions reached are not only local in nature, but also provide more important metaphilosophical remarks.