

The Lublin Philosophical School: Its Promising Paradigm of Philosophizing and Social Relevance

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Abstract: The term “Lublin Philosophical School” refers to a mode of philosophizing (which might be called a paradigm) and a teaching programme devised in the 1950s at the Catholic University of Lublin. Against the background of the concept of “school,” the paper first shows the origin of and motives for developing a specific mode of philosophizing as well as phases of the Lublin School’s development. It then discusses some methodological features, indicating that realism, empiricism and accepting the truth as a goal of philosophical cognition are decisive for this mode of philosophizing. In spite of substantive debates within the School, it constitutes the *unitas in pluribus*. The paper then shows that those methodological features, also wisdom-directedness, justify the roles in individual and social life that the School ascribes to philosophy, including its role as a self-consciousness of culture and a basis for dialogue. The paper claims that this mode of philosophizing can take up issues that arise in our contemporary intellectual environment, and it constitutes a promising paradigm for solving them. Thus, even if the Lublin Philosophical School was founded seventy years ago, its methodology and theoretical approaches are of value for us today and therefore it is worthwhile to develop further its achievements.

Key words: Lublin Philosophical School, realism, empiricism, truth, wisdom, philosophy as self-consciousness of culture

1. Origin and Development

The term “Lublin Philosophical School” (other terms are also in use: the Lublin School of Classical Philosophy, the Polish School of Realist Philosophy) refers to the mode of practising philosophy devised in the 1950s by a group of philosophers (not only from the Faculty of Philosophy) from the Catholic University of Lublin (in Polish: Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski – KUL). The name “Lublin School” was used by Jerzy Kalinowski in 1966.¹ It then appeared in the title of an interview

¹ J. Kalinowski, *W związku z tzw. metafizyką egzystencjalną*, “Znak” 1966, Vol. 18, No. 142, p. 452.

conducted by Władysław Stróżewski with Mieczysław A. Krąpiec in 1968: *On the Lublin "Philosophical School"*.² The Faculty of Philosophy was established by a resolution of the Senate on 17 June 1946 and officially opened on 10 November 1946. At that time it was called the Faculty of Christian Philosophy. From that year Stefan Swieżawski, known for his research on 15th-century philosophy, was employed at that Faculty. Rev. Mieczysław A. Krąpiec started his work in 1951, concentrating his research and teaching on metaphysics. Jerzy Kalinowski was employed at the KUL's Faculty of Law and Social Sciences, but after that Faculty had been closed by the communist authorities in 1952, Kalinowski was transferred to the Faculty of Philosophy and specialized in logic. Also Rev. Stanisław Kamiński, initially employed at the Faculty of Law and Social Sciences in 1947, moved to the Faculty of Philosophy in 1950 and developed the methodology of sciences. In 1954, Rev. Karol Wojtyła, encouraged by Stefan Swieżawski, joined the Faculty of Philosophy as an ethicist. These were thinkers who formed the first generation of the Lublin Philosophical School as its founding fathers. They represented various domains of philosophy: Swieżawski – the history of philosophy, Krąpiec – general and particular theory of being (metaphysics), Kalinowski and Kamiński – logic and methodology, Wojtyła – ethics and anthropology. The second generation is usually considered to include: Antoni B. Stępień, Stanisław Majdański, Rev. Andrzej Maryniarczyk, Sister Zofia J. Zdybicka, Rev. Marian Kurdziałek, Tadeusz Styczeń SDS, Andrzej Szostek MIC, and others.³

The mode of practising philosophy of the Lublin School was developed through scholarly cooperation and with awareness of the dangers for people and culture brought by the communist regime. Mieczysław A. Krąpiec and his disciple, Andrzej Maryniarczyk, indicate three main reasons for developing the school. The first was the pressure of Marxism that was administratively imposed on all state universities. "This ideologization of the teaching of philosophy – Krąpiec and Maryniarczyk claim – threatened to shatter the foundations of humanistic culture by breaking the truth about man and the world, by enslaving free philo-

² M.A. Krąpiec, *O filozoficznej "szkole lubelskiej"*, "Tygodnik Powszechny" 1968, No. 42, p. 1.

³ For the history of the School, see M.A. Krąpiec, A. Maryniarczyk, *The Lublin Philosophical School*, Polskie Towarzystwo Tomasza z Akwinu, Lublin 2010; A. Lekka-Kowalik, P. Gondek, eds., *The Lublin Philosophical School: History – Conceptions – Disputes*, transl. M. Garbowski, Wydawnictwo KUL, Lublin 2020 (e-book); S. Janeczek, *Lubelska szkoła filozofii klasycznej*, "Idea. Studia nad strukturą i rozwojem pojęć filozoficznych" 2006, No. 18, pp. 143–159, <https://doi.org/10.15290/idea.2006.18.10>.

sophical thought by ideology.⁴ The second reason was the fact that other modes of philosophizing existed: phenomenology, neopositivism, and various schools of analytic philosophy. If philosophy is taken seriously, this fact is a problem to be explained but also faced by arguing for a particular philosophy. The third reason was the need “to develop an updated conception of classical realistic philosophy (which was deformed by Suarezian neoscholasticism and the essentialism of Christian Wolff and Joseph Kleutgen).”⁵ The members of the school were convinced that classical thinkers have the most to say in philosophy, and, therefore, we should return to their original texts.

The mode of philosophizing was closely connected to the teaching programme with its emphasis on educating students on the one hand in the history of philosophy and general logic that embraced semiotics, formal logic, and the methodology of science, and on the other hand in basic philosophical disciplines: metaphysics with anthropology, theory of knowledge (epistemology), and ethics. More particular disciplines were added later, such as, for example, philosophy of nature and philosophy of culture. Philosophical disciplines were presented against the background of the history of various conceptions, but arguments were always provided for concrete solutions to fundamental problems of those disciplines. Thus, the school unified into one programme the way of developing philosophy and its substantive theses and the way and content of teaching philosophy. One is then justified in saying that it was a school, even if the term “school of philosophy” is difficult to define. Stanisław Janeczek claims that a school of philosophy is formed around the personality of a master (a school in a narrow sense), or it is a group of people cooperating in a particular place and time, who formulate at least a partially unified programme and/or methods (a school in a broader sense).⁶ Antoni B. Stępień specifies: “In a narrower (precise) sense a philosophical school, I believe, is a basic unit (centre, factor) in the social and historical development of philosophy that crystallizes around the personality of a teacher who provides it its substantive and formal direction; at the same time there is an awareness of

⁴ M.A. Krąpiec, A. Maryniarczyk, *The Lublin Philosophical School: Founders, Motives, Characteristics*, “*Studia Gilsoniana*” 2015, Vol. 4, No. 4, p. 407. Cf. M.A. Krąpiec, A. Maryniarczyk, *The Lublin Philosophical School: Historical Development and Future Prospects*, “*Studia Gilsoniana*” 2015, Vol. 4, No. 4, pp. 423–441.

⁵ M.A. Krąpiec, A. Maryniarczyk, *The Lublin Philosophical School: Founders, Motives, Characteristics*, op. cit., p. 407.

⁶ S. Janeczek, *Lubelska szkoła filozofii klasycznej*, op. cit., p. 143.

belonging to a particular school.”⁷ A.B. Stępień agrees with Janeczek that the Lublin Philosophical School is a school in the broader sense.⁸ A basic agreement as to the programme and methodology did not exclude disputes within the school, as will be shown in the third section of this paper.

There are various proposals of periodizing the Lublin School’s history. For example, Andrzej Maryniarczyk, using as a criterion the relationship between fields of inquiry and metaphysics, distinguishes three stages: 1) between 1950 and 1966 the school is being developed; 2) 1967–1980: the first generation of its students were active and they continued the research and teaching directions set by the founders; 3) from 1981: fields of inquiry became autonomous and the School’s unity was shaken.⁹ Other proposals, built with different criteria of periodization,¹⁰ also agree that the process of the School’s disintegration took place around the end of the last century. Yet, *The Universal Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Powszechna Encyklopedia Filozofii)*, an enterprise initiated by Krąpiec and carried on by Maryniarczyk, played a re-unifying role, since in many entries it presents the intellectual heritage of the Lublin School. It has also built among younger faculty members the awareness of belonging to a strong philosophical tradition. As Rev. Andrzej Bronk, a student of Kamiński claims, “any development (progress) in culture always occurred as a result of referring to the cognitive achievements of the predecessors. [...] This process, called the formation of culture, is particularly visible in the case of scientific knowledge, where subsequent generations of scientists, employing achievements of their forerunners, build upon that what has already been accomplished, that is, on an earlier scientific tradition, even if it is linked with overcoming it. Contemporary knowledge and, thanks to it, the world of today, are built upon the knowledge acquired in the past.”¹¹ Building on

⁷ A.B. Stępień, *Rola ks. prof. Stanisława Kamińskiego w rozwoju środowiska filozoficznego KUL*, in: A.B. Stępień, *Studia i szkice filozoficzne*, Vol. 2, ed. A. Gut, RW KUL, Lublin 2001, p. 188. Unless otherwise stated, all Polish citations are translated by the paper’s author.

⁸ A.B. Stępień, *Kilka uwag uzupełniających do dyskusji*, “Roczniki Filozoficzne” 1997, Vol. 45, No. 1, pp. 193–194.

⁹ M.A. Krąpiec, A. Maryniarczyk, *The Lublin Philosophical School*, op. cit., pp. 45ff.

¹⁰ See J. Czerkawski, *Lubelska szkoła filozoficzna na tle sytuacji filozofii w powojennej Polsce*, “Roczniki Filozoficzne” 1997, Vol. 45, No. 1, pp. 166–190; S. Janeczek, *Filozofia na KUL-u. Nurty – osoby – idee*, RW KUL, Lublin 2001; S. Janeczek, *Wydział Filozofii*, in: *Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. 90 lat istnienia*, eds. G. Kramarek, E. Ziemann, TN KUL, Lublin 2008, pp. 89–106.

¹¹ A. Bronk, *Poznawcza rola tradycji*, in: *Metodologia. Tradycja i perspektywy*, ed. M. Walczak, TN KUL, Lublin 2010, p. 21.

that tradition, the Lublin Philosophical School may engage in dialogue with the contemporary world.

2. Methodological Characteristics of the Lublin Mode of Philosophizing

The Lublin Philosophical School specified very clearly its goals, objects, and methods of philosophizing. In this sense we can say that it constitutes a paradigm of philosophy, different from others, against the background of which – as indicated in the previous section – it developed. The School accepts two assumptions: the intelligibility of the world (it is a cosmos, not chaos) and the possibility of cognitive access to it. The School's philosophy is not then totally assumptionless, but it is not an objection, for the possibility of building a philosophy without any assumptions is itself a meta-philosophical assumption.

The crucial feature of the Lublin philosophy is realism: everything that exists – in the language of the School's metaphysics called being – may become an object of research. This explains why truth classically understood is the goal of philosophical cognition. In its epistemic sense, the truth is the *adequatio intellectus et rei* – when we wish to cognize a being, we must “adjust” our intellect to that being. Thus, when we formulate a proposition about a given being – we attempt to say how things are. This allows us to distinguish cognition from cognitive errors, imagination, projection, or lying. We need to remember, however, that human cognition is aspectual and, for example, metaphysical cognition investigates being only *qua* being. So formulating a proposition about a being, only an aspect of that being is captured in the proposition, not the whole truth about that being.

The second feature – empiricism – follows from the acceptance of reality as an object and arbiter of cognition. That is, the starting point of philosophizing is experience broadly understood. Stanisław Kamiński claims that “the theory of being is to be an objective and purely realistic philosophy, and therefore, in its starting point it has to get in contact with the existing, concrete reality.”¹² This contact is called “experience.” Human experience is of various kinds, and there

¹² S. Kamiński, *The Methods of Contemporary Metaphysics*, in: S. Kamiński, *On the Methods of Contemporary Metaphysics*, transl. M.B. Stępień, Polskie Towarzystwo Tomasza z Akwinu, Società Internazionale Tommaso d'Aquino, Lublin–Roma 2019, p. 290.

are no reasons to limit *a priori* the scope of that term to that what empirical sciences called “experience.” The empirical starting point of philosophizing and a broad understanding of experience guarantee the openness of philosophy to the ever-changing reality. Anything existing may become an object of investigation, even if no classical thinker thought of it, a “classical” understanding of an object might be deepened or modified, and new categories might be introduced. Empiricism and openness are accompanied by a radicalized concept of cognition: the only direct cognition is captured in the existential judgement “something exists,” but what it is and how it exists requires research.¹³ Subjecting the philosophizing mind to reality indicates that objectivity is a governing principle.

The third feature is cognitive maximalism. According to the School, the goal of philosophy is the true and ultimate explanation of being grasped in experience. Thus, philosophy is satisfied neither with critical analysis of knowledge, nor with any reflection on the content of consciousness, nor with any interpretation of signs – it is an object-oriented type of cognition. Any explanation is an answer to the question of “why.” The philosophical explanation of being should indicate the ultimate and irrefutable causes of the cognized ontic order. The technical term for this procedure is decontradification.¹⁴ As Mieczysław A. Krąpiec indicates, such a philosophy is the “one, unified cognitive discipline, with a distinct method and purpose. If the object of philosophical cognition is the being in the aspect of its existence, then the immanent task of this cognition is to point to such factors which decontradictify the fact of the world’s existence (that is, its fundamental domains), the negation of which is absurd or leads to an aporia.”¹⁵ Hence, at least some philosophical theses must have a status of general, substantial necessary truths.¹⁶ Such philosophizing is subjected to logico-methodological rigour and criticism; its assertions must be intersubjectively communicable and justifiable. That is, philosophizing must respect the basic tenets of rationality.

¹³ Not all representatives of the School agree with such an understanding of direct cognition. See A. Lekka-Kowalik, *Amicus Plato, sed Magis Amica Veritas... On Philosophical Disputes within the Lublin School of Classical Philosophy*, in: *The Lublin Philosophical School: History – Conceptions – Disputes*, transl. M. Garbowski, eds. A. Lekka-Kowalik, P. Gondek, Wydawnictwo KUL, Lublin 2020, pp. 217–258.

¹⁴ For details, see S. Kamiński, *Explanation in Metaphysics*, in: S. Kamiński, *On the Methodology of Metaphysics*, transl. M.B. Stępień, Polskie Towarzystwo Tomasza z Akwinu, Società Internazionale Tommaso d’Aquino, Lublin–Roma 2018, pp. 192–195.

¹⁵ M.A. Krąpiec, *Metafizyka – ale jaka?*, “Roczniki Filozoficzne” 1969, Vol. 17, No. 1, p. 60.

¹⁶ See S. Kamiński, *Czy możliwe są ogólne i konieczne twierdzenia rzeczowe?*, in: M.A. Krąpiec, S. Kamiński, *Z teorii i metodologii metafizyki*, TN KUL, Lublin 1994, pp. 295–307.

The fourth feature is called historicism.¹⁷ The term refers to a methodological rule and the fact that in research one should take into account the history of problems, which allows one to discover – despite conceptual differentiation – within particular philosophical systems permanent aspects of problems as well as the influence which accepted assumptions, research methods, employed models of explanation and justification exert on problems' interpretation. This allows one to grasp the nature of a problem and discover ways of finding a satisfactory solution to it.

Two other features are autonomy and unity. In relation to natural and social sciences, the humanities, and theology, philosophy is autonomous, for it has its own empirical starting point and its own set of data to be explained. Its starting point cannot be data provided by any scholarly discipline, for such data are already grasped in the language of theories of a concrete discipline. Such scientific data may, of course, become an object of philosophical research as any existing being. The contact with reality allows us to develop various disciplines: general metaphysics, epistemology, anthropology, ethics, philosophy of science, etc. Each has its own empirical starting point, and in this sense they are methodologically independent of each other. If a new kind of being occurs, philosophy may develop a new discipline. The methodological autonomy of philosophy's disciplines does not preclude the unity of philosophy: each domain has the same goal, that is, to provide an ultimate explanation of the investigated kind of being, and in searching for such an explanation, one refers ultimately to the ontic structure of that being. This is the reason why metaphysics is the centre of the Lublin School's philosophy. This, in turn, brings wisdom-directedness: the search for the understanding of the foundation of reality, of the place of human beings in that reality and the meaning of human life, finding the truth about what is good, and taking the side of the good (theoretical and practical wisdom). Here one thing must be stressed: the good is objective and we may find what is good for me and other people in a particular situation, and moral good/evil should be distinguished from physical good/evil. I will not develop that point as it is not a methodological but a substantive issue. Yet, it is important, for it allows one to ascribe truth-values (true/false) not only to descriptive judgements but also to value judgements.

¹⁷ The term used in many texts on the Lublin School is "historicism." Yet, this term is heavily burdened with philosophical history, including connections to relativism. In order to avoid misunderstandings, I use the term "historicism."

3. The Role of Philosophy in Life

The acceptance of the object-directed and wisdom-directed nature of philosophy explains why the School ascribes such important roles to it, both in individual and social life and in culture. The roles of philosophy stem from human nature. Kamiński writes: “Everyone philosophizes in one way or another, regardless of whether one is aware of that or not. At any rate, it is impossible for a human being not to philosophize, for the human by his/her own nature wants to investigate the most profound reasons for everything, especially the reasons and meaning of the world, and human activity within it. Particularly in the decisive moments of one’s life the human being confronts questions for which he/she does not find an answer in any science, art, or life practice.”¹⁸ Moreover, Krąpiec notices that each human being, even small children, poses questions with some significant philosophical content as soon as they start manifesting the use of intellect. The question “why” – so the search for explanation – in a way constitutes the essence of questionness.¹⁹

The same refers to social life. Kamiński explains: “The most profound and substantively accurate cognition of the world and the hierarchy of values, is indispensable for a proper human, culture-formative activity. Philosophy should serve as a guide in this endeavor, as it indicates and ultimately justifies in the ontic order, why one should prefer certain value-forming behaviors, uniformly solves issues outside the scope of particular domains of culture (religion, morality, science, and art). Finally, it also provides the means of understanding the transformations of culture, together with the criteria of evaluation of cultural achievements. Philosophy is therefore self-consciousness, as it were, of culture. It permeates culture, but it is not reduced to any of its domains, merging them – through theory – in ways which enable human beings to perfect themselves in a harmonious and complete manner. Human beings are creators of culture, but they themselves are also being formed by it. And for this reason, philosophy should contribute to the personalistic character of culture, that is demonstrate in which way culture can be worthy of human beings and serve their development

¹⁸ S. Kamiński, *Wstęp*, in: S. Kamiński, *Jak filozofować?*, ed. T. Szubka, TN KUL, Lublin 1989, p. 11.

¹⁹ Cf. M.A. Krąpiec, *What Is Classical Philosophy*, in: *The Lublin Philosophical School: History – Conceptions – Disputes*, transl. M. Garbowski, eds. A. Lekka-Kowalik, P. Gondek, Wydawnictwo KUL, Lublin 2020, pp. 285–294.

the best.”²⁰ This role is an argument for the return to classical thinkers and historicism: “if philosophy has an enormous influence on human thinking and acting, and the human being is forced to philosophize, then he/she should do it in a responsible manner, making use of the accomplishments of the greatest thinkers.”²¹

When asking such questions of ultimate importance for individual and social life, the human being searches for answers that are true, that is, they state how things really are – after all no one would like to have their life be based on falsehood or ideology. The Lublin School’s philosophy with its faithfulness to the truth understood as *adequatio intellectus et rei* and therefore subjecting mind to reality can be the basis for answering those questions. Those questions have not disappeared as the development of philosophical counselling²² testifies, and so the Lublin School’s paradigm of philosophizing is relevant for the contemporary intellectual and cultural milieu.²³

Faithfulness to the truth and faithfulness to reality also explain why dialogue is a way of developing philosophy and why philosophy developed in the Lublin School might be a basis for social dialogue. As mentioned earlier, within the Lublin School there were intensive debates on crucial issues. Among them, for example: on the status of the theory of cognition and its relation to metaphysics, that is, the issue of what domain of philosophy constitutes “the first philosophy” (basically between Krąpiec and Stępień); on the object of ethical cognition and the primary norm for morality, that is, whether the norm is *bonum est faciendum* or *persona est affirmanda* (between Krąpiec and Styczeń); on the object and purpose of metaphysics (between Krąpiec and Kalinowski). There were many others,²⁴ for debates were a persistent element of philosophizing in the Lublin School, and allies in one dispute were opponents in another. Kalinowski claims that carrying on debates is the imperative of the “philosophical conscience.”²⁵ A.B. Stępień

²⁰ S. Kamiński, *On the Nature of Philosophy*, in: S. Kamiński, *On the Metaphysical Cognition*, transl. M.B. Stępień, Polskie Towarzystwo Tomasza z Akwinu, Società Internazionale Tommaso d’Aquino, Lublin–Roma 2020, p. 206.

²¹ S. Kamiński, *Wstęp*, op. cit., p. 11.

²² See H. Kistelska, *Doradztwo filozoficzne. Problemy – tezy – kontrowersje*, PhD dissertation, Lublin 2019.

²³ For discussions between the Lublin School and other philosophical currents, see J. Wojtysiak, Z. Wróblewski, A. Gut, eds., *Lublin School of Philosophy: A Comparative Perspective*, Wydawnictwo KUL, Lublin 2020.

²⁴ See A. Lekka-Kowalik, *Amicus Plato, sed Magis Amica Veritas...*, op. cit.

²⁵ J. Kalinowski, *A propos de la méta-éthique. Discussion avec Tadeusz Styczen*, “Rivista di filosofia neoscolastica” 1973, Vol. 65, pp. 794–806.

claims, in turn, that “every entry into a discussion in philosophy is, nonetheless, a form of cooperation.”²⁶ For any real debate has as its foundation faithfulness to the truth and reality. This is why Styczeń claims that a scholar might arrive at a statement and in result “one has to have against oneself those whom one would want to have on his side, that one even has to – in order to be faithful towards ‘reality’ – question the views of a famous and renowned author.”²⁷ For reality is the final arbiter in our philosophical debates, and this is why antidogmatism is a feature of the Lublin paradigm of philosophizing. Arriving at necessary truths – by research and arguments – is not a form of dogmatism but a realization of the goal of philosophy – providing the ultimate explanation. Treating that as a form of dogmatism follows – I put that forward as a hypotheses – from equating the epistemic status of philosophical theses with that of particular sciences. Andrzej Szostek, a student of Karol Wojtyła and Tadeusz Styczeń, summarizes well the creative role of debates: “A discussion between philosophers is not a boxing match and it is not supposed to result in designating as a winner the one who dealt more accurate blows. It is rather climbing together a peak desired by all of its participants. The adversaries are thus particularly valuable allies for each other, because they can ‘pull’ each other to their own ‘positions’ and bring them closer to their desired goal: the full truth.”²⁸ Krąpiec then writes: “If anybody asks what philosophy is for, then ultimately the answer is: it is the attempt to ultimately understand reality.”²⁹ The dispute is an efficient tool to fulfil this purpose.

This last claim explains why philosophy can be a basis for any efficient dialogue and action in other spheres of social life: it attempts to provide an understanding of how things are. In this perspective, as Szostek stresses, an opponent is an ally. Knowing how things are and correcting and deepening our knowledge through debates faithful to the truth allows us to at least try to build a better world. Of course, Bronk is right that “a philosopher does not have ready recipes to organize the world. Although instant practical rebuilding of the world is not a task for philosophy comprehended as the Greek *theoria*, a philosophical point

²⁶ A.B. Stępień, *O dorobku badawczym Wydziału Filozofii*, in: A.B. Stępień, *Studia i szkice filozoficzne*, Vol. 2, ed. A. Gut, RW KUL, Lublin 2001, p. 197.

²⁷ T. Styczeń, *Spór z eudajmonizmem czy o eudajmonizm w etyce?*, “Roczniki Filozoficzne” 1983, Vol. 31, No. 2, p. 72.

²⁸ A. Szostek, *Wokół afirmacji osoby: Próby uściśleń inspirowane dyskusją nad koncepcją etyki ks. Tadeusza Stycznia*, “Roczniki Filozoficzne” 1984, Vol. 32, No. 2, p. 149.

²⁹ M.A. Krąpiec, *O rozumienie filozofii*, RW KUL, Lublin 1991, p. 308.

of view can turn out to be important and helpful. The impact of philosophy is long-term and in the field of the consciousness rather than in outright practice.³⁰ Yet, without the consciousness of how things are, our efforts would eventually be doomed to fail.

4. Conclusions

The paper discussed the paradigm of philosophizing developed at the KUL and known as the Lublin Philosophical School or the Lublin School of Classical Philosophy. In spite of hot inner debates, the School constitutes the *unitas in pluribus*, as Katarzyna Stępień observes.³¹ Its methodological characteristic includes, first of all, realism, empiricism, cognitive maximalism, autonomy with regard to all kinds of particular sciences, also theology, and the unity of philosophical disciplines in spite of the fact that each has its own starting point in experience. Realism and empiricism guarantee openness to any new experience and any new being; and understanding reality leads to theoretical – and finally also practical – wisdom. Such philosophy plays the role of, as it were, self-consciousness of human culture, allowing us to analyze and evaluate its developmental trends and particular solutions through the lenses of personhood. This is possible, for one of the substantive theses of the Lublin philosophy is that the human being – a creator and consumer of culture – is a free and rational person with their dignity and potentialities to be developed to their fullness. Of course, this thesis is also formulated on the basis of experience – experience of self (“I”) and of other human beings as other “Is” – and ultimately explained by the reference to one’s ontic structure. Since this philosophy must be faithful to reality, it is self-correcting in response to experience, and it aims at assertions that are adequate to the investigated aspect of the world. As such, it may provide answers to fundamental human questions. As argued elsewhere, this philosophy may provide a promising framework for other scholarly and practical disciplines. There is a general agreement that science makes philosophical presuppositions including value judgements (in the language of the School: philosophy constitutes an external basis for science).

³⁰ A. Bronk, *Zrozumieć świat współczesny*, TN KUL, Lublin 1998, p. 113.

³¹ K. Stępień, *Unitas in Pluribus: On the History of the Lublin Philosophical School*, in: *The Lublin Philosophical School: History – Conceptions – Disputes*, transl. M. Garbowski, eds. A. Lekka-Kowalik, P. Gondek, Wydawnictwo KUL, Lublin 2020, pp. 23–50.

The Lublin paradigm of philosophizing shares with science realism and empiricism, and so its theses are not, in terms of their origin, methodologically different from scientific theses.³² This also suggests the unity of human knowledge, but this topic deserves separate considerations. It may also provide a useful paradigm for research ethics, as it offers a conception of the human person and norm *persona est affirmanda* which subjects methodological principles of doing science to that norm.³³ It provides a promising framework for developing so-called technology assessment, as it explains the value-ladenness of technology, objectivity of value-judgements, and the ontological primacy of the human person. For technology is not a value-neutral enterprise, and introducing a new technology brings consequences that can be evaluated in terms of human good.³⁴ The Lublin philosophy's understanding of human mind and its orientation towards truth as *adequatio* allows one to consider – and respond to – contemporary post-truth conditions. I have named but a few issues for which the Lublin philosophy provides a promising framework for considerations. There are many other such contemporary theoretically and practically important questions that the School is able to take up and propose solutions to. Thus, the Lublin Philosophical School was founded seventy years ago but its methodology and content are of value for us today. Thus, it is worthwhile to develop further its achievements.

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³² See, for example, A. Lekka-Kowalik, *Discovering the Axiological Dimension of Science*, Wydawnictwo KUL, Lublin 2009, ch. 4.

³³ A. Lekka-Kowalik, *On the Need of Developing Research Ethics as a Domain of Classical Philosophy*, in: *Studies in Logic and Theory of Knowledge*, eds. S. Kiczuk, J. Herbut, A.B. Stępień, TN KUL, Lublin 2006, pp. 235–255, <https://doi.org/10.2478/mape-2021-0038>.

³⁴ R.A. Lizut, *Technika a wartości. Spór o aksjologiczną neutralność artefaktów*, Wydawnictwo Naukowe Akademicon, Lublin 2014; A. Lekka-Kowalik, *Technology Analysis and the Need of a Value Framework*, in: *Multidisciplinary Aspects of Production Engineering: Monograph Part 2. Social Sciences*, ed. P. Hąbek, Sciendo (de Gruyter Poland), Warszawa 2021, pp. 421–430.

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