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## THE DISPUTE OVER THE PHILOSOPHICAL IDENTITY OF WŁADYSŁAW TATARKIEWICZ

The Lvov-Warsaw School had an indelible impact on the shape and development of 20th century Polish philosophy<sup>1</sup>. Its founder, Kazimierz Twardowski, and his students, collaborators and continuators not only shaped the methodological foundations of contemporary Polish philosophy, but also developed many concepts and solutions that completely changed the face of Polish philosophy and made significant contributions to world science, especially in the field of formal logic<sup>12</sup>. For this reason, it becomes an important problem for historians of Polish philosophy to identify its representatives, especially those whose views still inspire successive generations of continuators of the School's achievements. However, in order to properly grasp the issue of belonging to the Twardowski School, one should first define how the concept of a philosophical school can or should be understood. Then, to relate it to the Lvov-Warsaw School, and finally, to define its temporal scope and range.

**1. The concept of "philosophical school".** In the literal sense, a philosophical school should be understood as a group of people who are connected with direct relationships between teachers (masters) and students. At the same time, it should also be noted that this relationship should also show a certain permanence or continuity in time and be associated with a certain place of origin and field of activity. In a slightly broader perspective, this relationship can pass also to further generations of the school (i.e.

<sup>1</sup> See: J. Jadacki: *Szkola Lwowsko-Warszawska i jej wpływ na filozofię polską drugiej połowy XX wieku*, in: A. Dziedziec, A. Kołakowski, S. Pieróg, P. Ziemiński (eds.): *Historia filozofii polskiej. Dokonania, poszukiwania, projekty*, Warsaw 2007, pp. 137-148.

<sup>2</sup> See: Ibid, p. 137.

students become teachers of subsequent students). Then we will speak of successive generations of the school. In this view, the Lvov School<sup>3</sup> consists of Kazimierz Twardowski (as founder, teacher, master) and his direct disciples (above all: Jan Łukasiewicz and Władysław Witwicki, as well as Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz, Tadeusz Kotarbiński, and Tadeusz Czeżowski), and the students of these students (further generations of the School, such as: Alfred Tarski, Maria Kokoszyńska-Lutmanowa, Izydora Dąbska, Henryk Melhberg, Seweryna Łuszczewska-Rohmanowa, Tadeusz Witwicki)<sup>4</sup>.

In turn, in the broader understanding of the concept of a philosophical school, the interpretive emphasis is on issues of scope and range. In this view, a philosophical school will be equated with a philosophical current. Thus, it will then be understood not only as an intellectual formation bringing together a certain group of people, but also, and perhaps above all, as a formation characterized by a certain methodology and philosophical views. The question of belonging to a philosophical school becomes more flexible then. In this interpretation, the personal composition of the philosophical school may be much more numerous than in the first case. This, in turn, is of particular importance for the questions discussed here. Relating the concept of a philosophical school understood in this way directly to Lvov-Warsaw School, one should take into account the influence and significance of its representatives for various areas of philosophical thought (including those completely independent of the School), which formed itself not only during the period of the School's activity, but also at further stages of their development (including today). Many of the program assumptions of Lvov-Warsaw School, such as specific philosophical concepts of its individual representatives have found their

<sup>3</sup> In the article, I use the School's spelling in capital letters, although opinions are divided on this issue among experts on the subject.

<sup>4</sup> Nowadays, the existence of even a fourth generation of the Lvov-Warsaw School is postulated (recognizing the upstart J. Wolenski as its representative). This is a controversial approach, since Wolenski himself writes that the Lvov School's activity ceased the outbreak of World War II, or was annihilated by the Polish communist system after 1945, when its main representatives dispersed to many academic centers (Torun, Lvov, Poznan, Warsaw, Gdansk, Wroclaw, Lodz, Lublin). See: J. Woleński: *Filozoficzna szkoła lwowsko-warszawska*. Warsaw 1985, footnote 2, p. 9, pp. 42-43.

reflection, development or close reference in the research problems or philosophical views of many thinkers not directly related to the Twardowski School. For example, J. Jadacki points out that the influence of the Lvov-Warsaw School on the state of domestic philosophy at that time is visible in almost all philosophical fields: logic, formal logic, ontology, epistemology, praxeology, methodology, philosophy of science, axiology, aesthetics, and finally axiomatization and formalization of various fields of knowledge<sup>5</sup>. Moreover, he postulates that: "Polish philosophy of the second half of the 20th century was influenced by many factors [...]. However, the decisive influence – at least, on what was most valuable in Polish philosophy of that period – was the Lvov-Warsaw School. Firstly, the most serious workers in the field of philosophy were mostly students of the School's representatives, and many of them declared their direct affiliation with the School. Secondly, the School set the program of scientific philosophy, valid in Poland [...] throughout the 20th century. Thirdly, methods of implementing this program were developed at the School: semantic analysis [...] and formal reconstruction [...]. Fourthly, the problematic issues put forward and taken up by representatives of the first generation of the School – remained the central problematic issues of their successors. Fifthly, the solutions adopted by the leading Polish philosophers of the last half-century most often referred directly to results of the School – either being an improvement on them, or being a counter-proposal growing out of a sound critique of those results"<sup>6</sup>.

**2. The problem of the philosophical identity of Władysław Tatarkiewicz.** Currently, there is much controversy among historians of philosophy over the identification of Władysław Tatarkiewicz – a prominent historian of philosophy – to the Lvov-Warsaw School. By many decades, this philosopher was unanimously considered a representative of the School. However, nowadays in the history of philosophy there are more and more opinions claiming that this philosopher should not be considered a disciple of Kazimierz Twardowski and a representative of his School. This issue is important because the inclusion of this philosopher as a representative of the Lvov-Warsaw School

<sup>5</sup> See: J. Jadacki: *Szkoła Lwowsko-Warszawska i jej wpływ...*, pp. 137-148.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid, p. 126.

raises its stature significantly in Polish philosophy, due to his numerous contributions especially in the field of history of philosophy.

**3. Tatarkiewicz as a representative of Lvov-Warsaw School.** In connection with these achievements, the prevailing tendency has been to count this philosopher among the "hard-liners." This tendency is emphasized in a book dedicated to the silhouette of the author of *O bezwzględności dobra* (*On the Ruthlessness of Goodness*) by Czesław Glombik, where he writes as follows: "In Polish literature, Tatarkiewicz's contacts with the creator of the Lvov-Warsaw philosophical school, has been raised and included many times, although it should also be noted that they have not always been presented in a precise and satisfactorily confirmed manner, but as a rule they have been tried to put forward clearly"<sup>7</sup>. This phenomenon can be seen in the texts of many prominent historians of philosophy, with Jan Wolenski at the forefront. This philosopher, as one of the first researchers of the legacy and significance of Lvov-Warsaw School, was for a long time considered an undoubted authority on the knowledge related to the activities of the Twardowski School. Because of this, his publications were referred to by many later historians of philosophy, thus duplicating his view on the issue discussed here.

In his book, *Filozoficzna szkoła lwowsko-warszawska* (*The Lvov-Warsaw Philosophical School*), Woleński writes the following about Władysław Tatarkiewicz's connection with the Twardowski School: "[...] before his habilitation, in 1911, contact with the Lvov School was established by Władysław Tatarkiewicz, who was considered, and considered himself, as I have already mentioned, to be a "Twardowskian" philosopher"<sup>8</sup>. Nevertheless, it should be emphasized that Wolenski cast doubt (albeit only indirectly) on Tatarkiewicz's affiliation with the School. This is because he placed a significant footnote next to the philosopher's name. Although it does not negate his previously stated position on the question of Tatarkiewicz's connection with the "Twardowskians," its content can undoubtedly be a sufficient contribution to further analysis of this problem. It reads as follows: "The presented list of Twardowski's disciples requires some commentary. [...] But - I must admit - I myself have doubts

<sup>7</sup> Cz. Glombik: *Obecność filozofa. Studia historyczno-filozoficzne o Władysławie Tatarkiewiczu*. Katowice 2005, p. 117.

<sup>8</sup> J. Wolenski: *Filozoficzna szkoła lwowsko-warszawska*. Warsaw 1985, p. 17.

doubts as to the determination of the "composition" of the Lvov-Warsaw school"<sup>9</sup>. A position similar to Wolenski's is also presented by, among others: Witold Mackiewicz<sup>10</sup>, Irena Lachman<sup>11</sup> and, interestingly, also students of Tatarkiewicz: Jerzy Pelc<sup>12</sup> and Ryszard Palacz. In their texts dedicated to Tatarkiewicz's intellectual profile or to the activities of the Lvov-Warsaw School they most often admit this philosopher a status of its student. For example, Palacz writes about his teacher as follows: "After receiving his doctorate, he returned to Lvov and spent two years in the entourage of K. Twardowski (1910-1911). Thus, he was among the first students of this philosopher "<sup>13</sup>.

Interestingly, speakers at scientific conferences devoted to representatives of the Lvov-Warsaw School also mentioned Tatarkiewicz's name as one of its representatives. This is indicated, for example, by Tadeusz Banaszczyk in his article, which is a report on the *Scientific Conference to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of Kazimierz Twardowski's death*. He writes as follows: "The first speaker was Dr. Janusz Czerny, presenting a paper: *Orientations of thought of the representatives of the Lvov-Warsaw school [...]*. Dr. Czerny noted that Twardowski's school brought together philosophers and scholars of various fields of knowledge. At least three wings of thinkers of this school can be clearly distinguished: 1) the wing of philosophical psychologists (W. Witwicki, S. Baley, M. Kreutz, L. Blaustein); 2) the wing of logicians (J. Łukasiewicz, S. Lesniewski, A. Tarski), and 3) the wing of philosophers (K. Ajdukiewicz, T. Kotarbinski, W. Tatarkiewicz) "<sup>14</sup>.

In addition, also in the monographs and studies dedicated to the particular representatives of the School, Władysław

<sup>9</sup> Ibid, p. 17, fn. 12.

<sup>10</sup> See: W. Mackiewicz: *Ludzie i idee. Polska filozofia najnowsza*. Warsaw 2003, p. 37.

<sup>11</sup> I. Lachman: The Lvov-Warsaw School and the Vienna Circle, in W. Strzałkowski (ed.): *Filozofia polska na obczyźnie*, 4th ed. London 1987, p. 112.

<sup>12</sup> See: J. Pelc: *Władysław Tatarkiewicz – filozof najwyższych wartości*. "Studia Filozoficzne" 1976, no. 4, p. 89.

<sup>13</sup> R. Palacz: *Klasycy filozofii polskiej*. Warsaw-Zielona Góra 1999, p. 388.

<sup>14</sup> T. Banaszczyk: *Konferencja naukowa dla uczczenia pięćdziesiątej rocznicy śmierci Kazimierza Twardowskiego*. "Ruch Filozoficzny" 1989, T. XLVI, no. 3, p. 285.

Tatarkiewicz is often included in the Lvov-Warsaw School. Such a position is found, for example, in Mirosław Chałubiński's book dedicated to Stanisław Ossowski, as well as in the publication describing the silhouette and scientific views of Jan Łukasiewicz by Juliusz Wyznakiewicz. Chałubiński even recognized Tatarkiewicz as one of the leading representatives of the School<sup>15</sup>. In turn, Wyznakiewicz, like Palacz, described Tatarkiewicz as one of Twardowski's earliest disciples, and, importantly, recognized him as a philosopher who significantly contributed to the development and the final constitution of the School. He wrote: "Twardowski's disciples, among whom Łukasiewicz is foremost, made an outstanding contribution to the Lvov-Warsaw school of philosophy. Here are mentioned such famous names from the history of modern Polish philosophy as T. Kotarbinski, K. Ajdukiewicz, T. Czeżowski, S. Leśniewski, Z. Zawirski, Wł. Tatarkiewicz. In 1915, Łukasiewicz and Tatarkiewicz were appointed to philosophical chairs at the (reactivated and quickly forming itself) University of Warsaw, which initiated the transformation of the Lvov school into the national Lvov-Warsaw school of philosophy. They were the first students of Twardowski"<sup>16</sup>.

It is also worth noting the common tendency today, which, in my opinion, also contributes significantly to the identification of the Tatarkiewicz with Lvov-Warsaw School. It is namely that authors of works dedicated to views presented by Lvov-Warsaw School, even though they point out that Tatarkiewicz was not its representative, they also present his views as parallel to "Twardowskians". They do this most often in a way that makes it possible to unequivocally count his intellectual work as part of the School's scientific output. Meanwhile, one should consider his views as independent from, or marginal to this intellectual formation, or ignore them altogether. We find this type of phenomenon in publications e.g. by Ryszard Wisniewski (*The Possibility of Ethical Probabilism. A metaethical study of the evolution of empiricism in Polish ethics*), or

<sup>15</sup> See: M. Chałubiński: *Stanisław Ossowski*. Warsaw 2007. p. 7.

<sup>16</sup> J. Wyznakiewicz: *Teoria nauk formalnych według Jana Łukasiewicza*. Toruń 2001, pp. 17-18.

Anna Drabarek (*Ethics of moderation. The ideal of man and his happiness in the views of the roof of philosophers from the Lvov-Warsaw school*). In the initial part of the book, this author writes as follows: "In addition to those mentioned above, there were thinkers who came under Twardowski's influence rather on the basis of assimilating his style of research work, and not as his disciples. Those included: W. Tatarkiewicz, K. Gansiniec [...]."<sup>17</sup> After which, on further pages of the work, he discusses Tatarkiewicz's definitional findings on the issue of the act. Importantly, the philosopher's views are not presented here at all as independent in relation to the views of the School's representatives. On the contrary, they were presented as one of the ethical positions found in the Lvov-Warsaw School. In turn, due to their importance, they were even discussed first. The author writes as follows: "The concept of an act in ethics in connection with the evaluation of this act constituted a very important and complex set of issues for ethicists from the Lvov-Warsaw School. W. Tatarkiewicz dealt first of all with the clarification and classification of the concept of act in the axiological plane. [...] He also, as well as K. Twardowski, W. Witwicki, and K. Frenkel focused their attention on the problem of moral evaluation. M. Borowski and T. Kotarbinski on the other hand considered the concept of act from the point of view of praxeology"<sup>18</sup>.

Such statements are, in my opinion, not only a certain substantive inconsistency, but also one of the important reasons directly influencing the fact that Tatarkiewicz is still sometimes counted among the representatives of the Lvov-Warsaw School.

**4. Tatarkiewicz and the Lvov-Warsaw School: methodological and substantive similarities and analogies.** Another factor that has a significant impact on Tatarkiewicz's status as a representative of the School is also the certain methodological and substantive affinity that connects him with the Lvov-Warsaw School (both the style of practicing philosophy and scientific as well as research areas or views). As Ryszard Wysokiński points out, "Tatarkiewicz was connected with this current of thought

<sup>17</sup> A. Drabarek: *Etyka umiaru. Ideal człowieka i jego szczęście w poglądach filozofów ze szkoły lwowsko-warszawskiej*. Toruń 2004, p. 30.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid, p. 123.

by a sobriety reflections, concern for language and the analysis of meanings"<sup>19</sup>. The reflection of these methodological assumptions can be seen, among other things, in his habilitation dissertation *O bezwzględności dobra* (obtained at the University of Lvov). As Fr. Jan Popiel notes: "Its form is concise, almost scholastic, the dissection clear and transparent. The posing of the problem, the ordering of positions, the criticism, the choice of one's own position, the arguments, the refutation of possible difficulties, and all this framed in extremely concise language shows a striving for far-reaching exactness [...]"<sup>20</sup>. These regularities in the form and style of expression are also evident, according to this author, in Tatarkiewicz's next book *On Happiness*. Popiel concludes as follows: "The form, on the one hand, is essayistic, on the other, with all the freedom of style and lightness of language, clear and concise, adapted to the requirements of philosophical exactitude, because under the robe of freedom there is hidden a great discipline of thought"<sup>21</sup>. A similar conviction with regard to the first of the mentioned Tatarkiewicz's dissertations is also held by Czesław Glombik, who writes about it as follows: "(...) it bears on it the easily recognizable marks of the scientific work of the Lvov-Warsaw School, and above all of the way of understanding philosophy that its founder promoted. These influences are so clear that a reader less familiar with the historical circumstances of the creation of the book *On the Absoluteness of Goodness* and the intellectual pedigree of its author is ready to count it among the School's achievements. The visible conciseness of the form of expression, the clear, systematic dissection of the content, the observance of the requirement of communicativeness of language, the ordering of the statements referred to and the simultaneous clarification of one's own thought, the reliability in criticism, and at the same time the constant striving for a good argumentation of the views defended – these are the characteristic features of this book"<sup>22</sup>. And Tatarkiewicz himself, in summing up his life and scientific activity,

<sup>19</sup> R. Wysokiński: *Władysław Tatarkiewicz*, in W. Mackiewicz (ed.): *Polska filozofia powojenna*, vol. II. Warsaw 2001, p. 325.

<sup>20</sup> Rev. J. Popiel: *Filozofia Władysława Tatarkiewicza. Próba charakterystyki*, in T. Chezhovski (ed.): *Charisteria: rozprawy filozoficzne złożone w darze Władysławowi Tatarkiewiczowi w siedemdziesiątą rocznicę urodzin*. Warsaw 1960, p. 11.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid, p. 12.

<sup>22</sup> See: Cz. Glombik: *Obecność filozofa...*, p. 130.



has thus described his objectives and methodological assumptions: "I have as my duty as a writer: first, to lay out the thing straightforwardly and clearly"<sup>23</sup>. And further, "The great qualities of the mind are both the gift of an individual, new view of things, and the gift of order. [...] It is not necessary to expect brilliant ideas from a scientist, but one can and should expect and demand order."<sup>24</sup> As Cz. Głombik points out, these words could be easily attributed to Kazimierz Twardowski, who, among other things, proclaimed the following as the main methodological postulates: the postulate of reliability, accuracy and exactness of philosophical argument. He also recommended strict construction of thought and removal of verbal misunderstandings arising from words' ambiguity. In the treatise *On the Absoluteness of the Good*<sup>26</sup>, close substantive ties that connect its author with "Twardowskian" ideas are also apparent. This is indicated, among others, by Stanisław Borzym, writing that Tatarkiewicz in this work continued, in a sense, the anti-relativist ideas of Twardowski. This is because, as philosophical historicists pointed out, one of the important axiological issues considered by the "Twardowskians" was the question of avoiding the relativism of moral values. As Anna Drabarek points out: "To counter all relativistic tendencies, Twardowski developed a system of analogies, which, in his opinion, occurred between feelings involving moral valuation and acts of theoretical knowledge. This way of reasoning led him to the conclusion that since the absolute rules of logic apply in the realm of judgments, they are also possible in the realm of moral values. Analogous to truth and falsity in logic, there are values of good and evil in volitional actions. Good, like truth, must be objective."<sup>27</sup> The consequence of this philosopher's anti-relativist position was therefore the conviction that

<sup>23</sup> T. and W. Tatarkiewicz: *Wspomnienia*, p. 216.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid, pp. 220-221.

<sup>25</sup> Importantly, as Czesław Głombik points out, this dissertation was written and took its final shape precisely in contacts (mostly by correspondence) with Twardowski. See: Cz. Głombik: *Obecność filozofa...*, p. 124.

<sup>26</sup> See: S. Borzym: *Filozofia międzywojenna (1918-1939). Przegląd stanowisk*, in S. Borzym, H. Floryńska, B. Skarga, A. Walicki (eds.): *Zarys dziejów filozofii polskiej 1815-1918*. Warsaw 1983, p. 524.

<sup>27</sup> A. Drabarek: *Etyka umiaru...*, p. 103.

nance that the good has an absolute and objective character. A similar anti-relativist position is evident in Tatarkiewicz's treatise. This philosopher, having previously analyzed and criticized various varieties of relativism and subjectivism, came to the conclusion that good and evil are absolute and objective features<sup>28</sup>. Inconsistencies in judgments about good and evil, on the other hand, are due to human fallibility. The difference in value judgments, therefore, is not due to the nature of good or evil, but has to do with the different degrees of knowing them<sup>29</sup>. A similar correspondence of programs between philosophers was also noted by Richard Jadczyk, who wrote as follows: "Twardowski was of the opinion that, the only correct position to truth in general and moral truths in particular, is objectivism and ethical absolutism. In proving this thesis, he used an unusual method. Here he considered that by proving the falsity of subjectivism, one would thereby prove the truth of objectivism. The same path was taken by Władysław Tatarkiewicz in his *The work O absoluteness of the good* (1919)<sup>31</sup>. Further, in support of this thesis, the author quoted the following words of the philosopher: "Other proof of the veracity of objectivism than proof of the falsity of subjectivism is not needed. For in proving the falsity of subjectivism I prove that good and evil are independent of the subject, and by this alone proves the veracity of Objectivism" <sup>31</sup>.

Tatarkiewicz also shared many other views of the "Twardovskians". It is worth mentioning here, for example, the attitude to truth as the supreme value in science. The postulate of a reliable pursuit of objective truth

<sup>28</sup> A representative of the Lvov-Warsaw School, Tadeusz Czeżowski, wrote similarly about the dissertation in the following words: "When, still during the First World War and the German occupation of Warsaw, a Polish university was re-established [...], Tatarkiewicz took up lectures in philosophy there in 1915 [...]. These lectures gave rise to a beautiful book *O bezwzględności dobra* [...], in which the author conducts a detailed analysis of ethical relativism and subjectivism, and after demonstrating the errors with which these theories are burdened, supports the thesis of the absoluteness of good T. Czeżowski, *Filozofia i sztuki piękne (Rzecz o Władysławie Tatarkiewiczu)*. "Studia Filozoficzne" 1971, no. 2, p. 49.

<sup>29</sup> See: Ibid. pp. 105-107.

<sup>30</sup> R. Jadczyk: *Człowiek szukający etyki. Filozofia moralna Kazimierza Twardowskiego*. Toruń 1993, p. 92.

<sup>31</sup> W. Tatarkiewicz: *O bezwzględności dobra [On the Absoluteness of Good]*, in: tenże: *Droga do filozofii*. Warsaw 1971, s. 265, after R. Jadczyk, ibid, p. 93.

for the representatives of the School constituted the most important goal of scientific work. Truth was understood here as an absolute and objective value, constituting the basic good of mankind. As Tadeusz Kotarbinski wrote: "And there are those whose main job is to think which includes writing as a particular case. About those [people] I talk here, and in short I will call them people of words or humanistic intelligentsia. And here is the question: what are their swollen needs? These are the needs of the humanist intelligentsia, not the common ones [...]. The answer is: to be able to proclaim the truth, in this everything is summarized"<sup>32</sup>. Thus, the author of the *Treatise on Good Work* argued that philosopher should never proclaim untruth and always act on behalf of truth. He must not be a conformist in this regard. He argued as follows: "A philosopher is willing to make painful sacrifices for the sake of effective interaction. However, he is neither willing nor able, and neither willing nor able, to give up professing what appears to him as truth. He wishes, therefore, that he and other philosophers would be allowed everywhere and always to proclaim the truth and speak a word in its defense"<sup>33</sup>. Tatarkiewicz, subscribing to Kotarbinski's views, also believed that scientific work should serve the supreme value, which is truth, although it is often simple and indifferent to human feelings, and at the same time not very impressive and not necessarily profound<sup>34</sup>. Another noteworthy feature of the scientific attitude shared by Tatarkiewicz and the School's representatives was tolerance towards different scientific attitudes and views. As A. Dylus: "The representatives of the discussed school, while taking the attitude of tolerance themselves, recognized it at the same time as a duty of every scholar. One must, according to Twardowski [...] study all ideas without prejudice, because the truth is scattered everywhere [...]"<sup>35</sup>. Such an attitude was also held by Tatarkiewicz. As the cited author further argues, writing about Tatarkiewicz: "If he quoted other people's views, he never manifested

<sup>32</sup> T. Kotarbinski: *Ludzie słowa*, in: tenże: *Pisma etyczne*, ed. by P. J. Smoczyński. Wrocław-Warsaw-Cracow-Gdańsk-Lodz 1987, p. 423.

<sup>33</sup> T. Kotarbinski, *Upragnione fantazmaty*, in the same author: *Pisma etyczne*, p. 430.

<sup>34</sup> See: A. Dylus: *Problematyka etyki nauki...*, pp. 62-63.

<sup>35</sup> Ibid, pp. 103, 104.

aggressiveness or a note of superiority towards them. He did not depreciate anyone's achievements"<sup>36</sup>.

A cognitively interesting position represented by Tatarkiewicz and simultaneously reflected in the views of Jan Lukasiewicz, one of Twardowski's disciples, is also the approach to intuition. Despite the anti-intuitional attitude commonly ascribed to the School, Lukasiewicz in the recommended philosophical method (the method of mathematical logic, based on deduction and axioms) took into account the intuitive element, giving to it a significant importance. He pointed out that in scientific research work, one should rely on "sentences as far as possible intuitively clear and certain, and take such sentences as axioms." Moreover, he also pointed out that the results obtained by the proposed method should be "constantly checked against the data of intuition"<sup>37</sup>. A similar position in his ethical views was adopted also by Władysław Tatarkiewicz. He presented a conception of ethics based on the assumption that the basis of ethical reasoning must be a priori, general and abstract sentences of the type "a is good", "b is evil". Sentences of this type can be proven only on the basis of other sentences about good and evil. As he argued: "it is impossible to derive value sentences from sentences, which are not value sentences themselves." However, since it is impossible to justify sentences of this type indefinitely, "one must stop at some sentence about the good, having accepted it without proof"<sup>38</sup>. Indeed, justification for sentences of this type is not provided by appealing to sentences about facts either, since: "Sentences about facts are sentences stating that someone recognizes something as a value or feels it as a value; but from the fact that someone recognizes something as a value or feels it as a value, it does not follow that this something is a value"<sup>39</sup>. It is also doomed to fail to, according to Tatarkiewicz, appeal to definitions in justifying sentences on good or evil, since such

<sup>36</sup> Ibid, p. 108.

<sup>37</sup> J. Lukasiewicz, *O metodę w filozofii*. "Philosophical Review" 1928, vol. 31, no. 1-2, p. 4.

<sup>38</sup> W. Tatarkiewicz: *O bezwzględności dobra [On the Absoluteness of the Good]*, in: *Pisma z etyki i teorii szczęścia*, selection, compilation, and ed. schol. P. J. Smoczyński. Wrocław, Warsaw, Krakow 1992, p. 47.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid, p. 47.

simply do not exist<sup>40</sup>. Therefore, the philosopher proclaimed the view that: "We accept sentences which have the value of simple characteristics without proof [...] as 'intuitive' axioms. Our intuitions support that these sentences are self-evident: they are true and do not require justification. [...] Other ethical sentences are based on such simple, self-evident sentences. These sentences are the first premises of ethical reasoning and the measure of the truthfulness of the results of such reasoning"<sup>41</sup>.

Presented examples of methodological and substantive similarities and analogies present between Tatarkiewicz and the Lvov-Warsaw School not only show how wide the ideological reach of the School was, but also reveal why some historians of philosophy still do not hesitate to consider this philosopher as a representative of the School. Especially if one disregards biographical and archival facts, this position seems somewhat justified and understandable for many reasons<sup>42</sup>.

**5. Negation of Tatarkiewicz's affiliation with the Lvov-Warsaw School.** At present, however, the position, in which the author of *On the Absoluteness of Good* is included in the Lvov-Warsaw School, in the light of the already well-known facts of Tatarkiewicz's life, is difficult to maintain. The strongest counter-argument, however, comes from the philosopher himself. In his memoir<sup>43</sup> he wrote the following about his

<sup>40</sup> See: L. Hostynski: *Układacz...*, p. 260; See: R. Wisniewski, *Możliwość probabilizmu etycznego. Studium metaetyczne ewolucji empiryzmu w etyce polskiej*. Toruń, 1992, p. 11.

<sup>41</sup> W. Tatarkiewicz: *O bezwzględności dobra [On the Absoluteness of Good]*, p. 48.

<sup>42</sup> Also M. Jaworski, summing up the scientific and research attitude of W. Tatarkiewicz, pointed out qualities that could be boldly attributed to K. Twardowski. He wrote: "For Władysław Tatarkiewicz always combined in himself the highest qualifications and vocation of a researcher and historian, the exactness and precision of the scientific workshop - with the kindness, tolerance and understanding of an educator and teacher, whose invariable favor and interest in his students and co-workers won him their friendship and devotion" (M. Jaworski: *Władysław Tatarkiewicz*. Warszawa 1975, p. 9).

<sup>43</sup> It is worth noting here that *Memoirs* of Teresa and Władysław Tatarkiewicz were first published in 1979, then in 1981, and in 1998, while Richard Palacz's book was published a year after the third edition (which I refer to directly here), that is, in 1999. This makes this historian of philosophy's position on the question of Tatarkiewicz's relationship with Kazimierz Twardowski and, consequently, with his School all the more puzzling.

presence in the Lvov environment: "After my doctorate I went to Lvov – I wanted to find out how Poles work. I immediately found out that they work differently and better: the Twardowski School taught just how to work scientifically. Unfortunately, it was the summer of 1910; the Ukrainian turmoil caused the suspension of lectures, and I only managed to attend two lectures and two exercises of the master"<sup>44</sup>. Tatarkiewicz's words illustrate, undoubtedly, that his stay at the University of Lvov was a brief episode in his life. This was also pointed out by Marek Jaworski as early as in the 1970s. He wrote about it as follows: "Twardowski's activity, the momentum of his scientific and organizational endeavors were quite quickly acclaimed by publicity that went beyond the borders of Lvov. No wonder, then, that after completing his studies abroad, Tatarkiewicz soon headed there. [...] Tatarkiewicz's stay in Lvov was not long. After spending 1911/1912 in Paris, he returned to his home in Warsaw"<sup>45</sup>.

Relevant resolutions in the presented issue are given also by Czesław Glombik. In the already mentioned publication, while discussing the relationship between this philosopher and Kazimierz Twardowski, he devoted a separate chapter (*Kazimierz Twardowski - a teacher by God's grace*) to the issue of Tatarkiewicz's affiliation with the Lvov-Warsaw School. In his view, it is certainly possible, and even necessary, to deny Tatarkiewicz the status of a student of Lvov-Warsaw School. A number of important biographical facts support this position, but for various reasons they have not been taken into account in different periods of the history of philosophy. Moreover, as Glombik argues, it was the lack of knowledge about them that underpinned the misconception that Tatarkiewicz belonged to the Twardowski School. Summarizing the hitherto views of historians of philosophy, regarding Tatarkiewicz's relationship linking him to the Lvov School, Glombik writes: "Events have been subjected to excessive generalizations in these accounts. Facts were mixed up with something that does not belong to facts. The goodwill of the writers constantly filled in the gaps in the then available

<sup>44</sup> T. and W. Tatarkiewicz: *Wspomnienia*, 3rd expanded ed. Gdańsk 1998, p. 155.

<sup>45</sup> M. Jaworski: *Władysław Tatarkiewicz*, pp. 36-37.

material of historical testimony. "<sup>46</sup> And he further argues as follows: "The reason for these ambiguities, which, it must be admitted, are minor, but at the same time ambiguously presenting a picture of the relations between the scholars, is easy to explain: when in the 1970s and later, Tatarkiewicz's scientific youth was written about, the Professor's memoirs, his *Notes to an Autobiography*, were not yet known, even in the somewhat abbreviated form in which they appeared in the "Quarterly of the History of Science and Technology". On the other hand, the archives after Twardowski, fortunately saved during the war, and in 1957 brought from Lvov to Warsaw [...], still had to wait several decades for accessibility "<sup>47</sup>. Letters of Twardowski (including those exchanged directly with Tatarkiewicz) needed to be processed, catalogued and described in advance. The situation was similar in the case of his *Diaries*, which were to be made available (in accordance with the will of their author) only 50 years after his death, that is, after 1988. All this influenced the fact that these materials became more widely available for analysis and research studies only in the 1990s<sup>48</sup>.

Indeed, these facts seem to largely justify the inaccuracies that appear in descriptions of the relationship linking Tatarkiewicz to the "Twardowskians". But how to explain the statements of historians of philosophy counting Tatarkiewicz among Twardowski's disciples from later years (after the 1990s up to the present)? Is this only the result of duplication of established views, underdevelopment of the workshop (failure to take into account the textual sources already available), or the unwillingness to oppose the authorities in the history of philosophy? Whatever the reasons behind such a state of affairs, it is worth remembering that it does not reflect the contemporary state of knowledge in the history of philosophy on the issue at hand.

Glombik's views denying Tatarkiewicz's affiliation with the School are shared by an increasing number of historians of philosophy. For example, Ryszard Jadczyk wrote about it in his book dedicated to Twardowski: *The Master and His Students*, in the following words: "Although Władysław Tatarkiewicz

<sup>46</sup> Cz. Glombik: *Obecność filozofa...*, p. 117.

<sup>47</sup> Ibid, p. 118.

<sup>48</sup> See: Ibid, p. 118.

[...] was not a disciple of Kazimierz Twardowski in the strict sense of the word, nevertheless the relationship between the two philosophers was very close for many years. "<sup>49</sup> In a similar vein, Stanisław Borzym already expressed himself in the 1980s, when writing: "In addition to representatives of the Warsaw School<sup>50</sup>, also scholars of other philosophicla orientations were active, chief of all, Władysław Tatarkiewicz – an alumnus of the Marburg School"<sup>51</sup>.

Interestingly, there are also voices regarding Tatarkiewicz's relations with the Twardowski School, which could be considered indirect. This is because they reconcile, to some extent, the substantive ties linking Tatarkiewicz with Lvov-Warsaw School, (speaking in favor of his affiliation with it), and facts that indisputably exclude Tatarkiewicz from being a representative of the School. For, on the one hand, their representatives actually deny the author of *On the Absoluteness of Goodness* the status of a student or representative of the School, while on the other hand, they emphasize that he was a thinker closely associated with it, sharing the methodological assumptions, style of work, or important views of its leading representatives. This can be seen, for example, in the publication of Aniela Dylus, who writes: "Władysław Tatarkiewicz [...] studied in Zurich, Paris, Berlin, Marburg [...]. After arriving in Lvov in 1910, he came into contact with Twardowski and his students, became close to them and drew close in his method of philosophical work to requirements of careful conceptual analysis prevailing there"<sup>52</sup>. And further, "Like other thinkers from the circle of the Lvov-Warsaw School, he was not only an outstanding scholar, but also an excellent academic teacher[...]"<sup>53</sup>. Ryszard Wisniewski also writes in a similar vein. In his book we read: "In the circle of the Lvov-Warsaw school, Władysław Tatarkiewicz practiced ethics. Although he himself refused to be counted among the representatives of the School"<sup>54</sup>,

<sup>49</sup> R. Jadcak: *Mistrz i jego uczniowie*. Warsaw 1997, p. 181.

<sup>50</sup> It should be specified that S. Borzym gave a separate discussion of the Lvov School (headed by Twardowski) and the Warsaw School (headed by Twardowski's disciples: Lukaszewicz, Lesniewski and Kotarbinski).

<sup>51</sup> S. Borzym: *Filozofia międzywojenna...*, p. 523.

<sup>52</sup> A. Dylus: *Problematyka etyki nauki u przedstawicieli szkoły lwowsko-warszawskiej*. Warsaw 1987, p. 19.

<sup>53</sup> Ibid, p. 20.

<sup>54</sup> It is worth noting here that this is an oppositional view to that propounded by J. Wolenski, who, as already noted, wrote that Tatarkiewicz considered himself a representative of the School.



The analysis of the terms used in the treatise "On the Absoluteness of Goodness" (1919), draws the author closer to the "Twardowskian school"<sup>55</sup>. In another of his publications, Wiśniewski, while recognizing Tatarkiewicz as a representative of the Lvov-Warsaw circle, at the same time defines a quite significant (from the point of view of the issues considered here), broad and, at the same time, fluid understanding of the Lvov-Warsaw circle, according to which, the circle of the School includes not only Twardowski's direct disciples, but also philosophers who were significantly influenced by his philosophical and methodological convictions, and who recognized his authority. Wisniewski writes as follows: "Thus, the problem of the "circle" has a somewhat fluid character: we are talking, therefore, about discussions within the circle and around the school. I accept here a broad concept of the school circle, such as not only closest disciples of Twardowski (Tadeusz Czeżowski, Izydora Dąbska, Tadeusz Kotarbiński), fit in there that, but also more distant ones, who recognized method and authority of Twardowski (Władysław Tatarkiewicz), as well as the next generation [...]"<sup>56</sup>.

This notion has already been marked at the beginning of the article, where I put in front (as one of the possibilities) the understanding of the philosophical school as a philosophical trend. This is an important approach, as it completely changes the optics of looking at the issue of Tatarkiewicz's relationship with the Twardowski School. This is because it makes it possible to reconcile, to a large extent, the views of both opponents and supporters of the conviction that Tatarkiewicz belongs to the Lvov-Warsaw School. It is also worth noting here an important phenomenon related to the methodology of the work of the philosophical historian. Namely, Wisniewski's position reveals how far the adopted assumptions adopted can influence the interpretation of biographical and historical facts. The problem of attributing Władysław Tatarkiewicz to the Lvov-Warsaw School is heading increasingly into the denial of his

<sup>55</sup> R. Wisniewski: *Możliwość probabilizmu etycznego. Studium metaetyczne ewolucji empiryzmu w etyce polskiej*. Toruń 2002, p. 123.

<sup>56</sup> R. Wisniewski: *Dyskusje metaetyczne w kręgu i wokół Szkoły Lwowsko-Warszawskiej*, in: W. Tyburski, R. Wisniewski (eds.): *Polska filozofia analityczna. W kręgu Szkoły Lwowsko-Warszawskiej*. Toruń 1999, p. 108.

affiliation with the School. Validity and legitimacy of this position is supported primarily by archival and biographical-historical facts and the statement of philosopher itself. Moreover, if one considers the genetic factor as one of the important factors determining the distinctive character of the Lvov-Warsaw School, then Tatarkiewicz was certainly not a "Twardowskian" either. For this factor boils down to the recognition of the existence of a common bond among the representatives of the School, formed on the basis of activities initiated by its founder and continued by his students. Moreover, an important element of it is also the manifestation of students' identification with the School, showing a sense of belonging to it as well as distinctiveness to oppositional schools and currents of philosophy. Therefore, is it possible to see any such ties here between Tatarkiewicz (who stayed in Lvov for less than a year and attended only a few of the Master's lectures) and the "Twardowskians" (who trained for years under Twardowski's tutelage)? Finally, despite many parallels in views, as well as the close relationship linking Tatarkiewicz and Twardowski, can we speak about any identification of this philosopher with the School?

Also, a geographic factor, determining the location of chief centers of scientific and research activity of the School (Lvov – the Jan Kazimierz University, Warsaw – the University of Warsaw) does not constitute a factor linking the author of *On the Absoluteness of Goodness* with the Twardowski School (his short stay in Lvov, his scientific independence during his work at the University of Warsaw in relation to the "Twardowskians" working there). It seems that only the substantive factor (the framework program of the School, the stock of common ideas, views and shared methodology) can speak in favor of the opposite position; and only if one takes into account the broad understanding of the concept of a philosophical school (as a philosophical trend or circle). As already mentioned, Tatarkiewicz shared not only the main methodological assumptions (the way of practicing philosophy), but also referred to and developed many of the philosophical views of the School's representatives (above all, metaethical views of Twardowski). In this regard,

the philosopher can be considered a thinker from Lvov-Warsaw circle.

In spite of Władysław Tatarkiewicz's now questionable academic affiliation to the Kazimierz Twardowski School, it must be admitted with certainty that he is a philosopher whose fate in the history of Polish philosophy, as well as his philosophical views and views on practicing philosophy, have been permanently intertwined with Lvov-Warsaw School. This is perfectly illustrated by the statement of one of its representatives, Tadeusz Czeżowski, who wrote the following words in a text devoted to the academic profile of the author of *On the Absoluteness of Goodness*: "In 1910, Władysław Tatarkiewicz arrived in Lvov with a freshly obtained doctoral degree in philosophy from Marburg, in order to come into contact with the Lvov philosophical community, which was then flourishing under the guidance of Kazimierz Twardowski. Apart from Twardowski, two young assistant professors, Władysław Witwicki and Jan Lukasiewicz, were active in Lvov, and among numerous group of philosophical academics, Tadeusz Kotarbinski, Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz and a newly arrived doctoral student, Stanisław Leśniewski, stood out. Thus, he quickly became close to this group and approached in his method of philosophical work the requirements of careful conceptual analysis that prevailed there, all the more so because it corresponded to his own inclinations"<sup>57</sup>.

Therefore, although not fully legitimate today, it is to some extent understandable and justified for historians of Polish philosophy to inscribe Tatarkiewicz into the tradition of the Lvov-Warsaw School.

### Summary

The article presents an issue of Władysław Tatarkiewicz's affiliation to Lvov-Warsaw School. This question has recently aroused many controversies among historians of Polish philosophy. For many decades this philosopher was unanimously considered a representative of Twardowski's School. Yet now, the problem of Władysław Tatarkiewicz's affiliation to Lvov-Warsaw School is aiming more and more in the direction of negation of his connection with the School. Archival, historical and biographical facts, and Tatarkiewicz himself in his *Remembrances* speak for reasonableness and validity of this position.

**Key words:** affiliation, connection, biographical fact.

<sup>57</sup> T. Czeżowski: *Filozofia i sztuki piękne...*, p. 49