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PHILOSOPHICAL ARGUMENTATIONS[1]

One could find many statements by philosophers that impressively introduce the problems of philosophical arguments. Here are the words of Friedrich Waismann: *So, the first thing I would like to say is that philosophy, as it is practiced today, is very unlike science, and this in three respects: in philosophy there are no proofs; there are no assertions; and there are no questions that can be resolved Yes or No. When I say that there is no evidence in philosophy, I do not mean that there are no arguments in philosophy. Arguments certainly are, and excellent philosophers are recognized by the originality of their arguments, only that these arguments do not work in the way they do in mathematics or the natural sciences .*[2]

An extended commentary on the above statements would surely have to lead to an extensive monograph (or perhaps many) on metaphilosophical topics. With this caveat, he proceeds to outline the issue of philosophical argumentation as it emerges from Waismann's quoted statement.

Waismann in the issue under consideration here, as in many others, refers to the views of Ludwig Wittgenstein, who in his *Treatise on Logic and Philosophy* said: *Philosophy is not one of the natural sciences. The word "philosophy" must mean something standing above the natural sciences, or below them, but never beside them .*[3]

Although Wittgenstein, in his so-called second philosophy developed by, him in the 1930s and 1940s, rejected a whole series of theses from the Treatise, he maintained the thesis of the radical difference between science and philosophy. In Philosophical Investigations, where the most complete exposition of Wittgenstein's second philosophy is found, he wrote about the nature of philosophizing as follows: It was right that our deliberations (i.e., philosophical deliberations - J.W.) should not be scientific deliberations [...] *Nor must we formulate any theories. There must be nothing hypothetical in our deliberations. All explanation must disappear, and only description should take its place. And this description receives its light, that is, its purpose, from philosophical problems. These are not, of course, empirical problems, since they are solved by insight into the way our Hedgehog works [...] Problems are solved not by gathering new experiences, but by gathering things long known .*[4]

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[1] This article was produced as part of CPBP 08-15.
[2] F. Waismann: *How I see philosophy*. In A. Ayer: (ed.): *Logical Positivism*. New York 1956, p.345.
[3] L. Wittgenstein: *Tractatus logico-philosophicus* (translated by B. Wolniewicz). Warsaw 1970. 4. 111.
[4] L. Wittgenstein: *Philosophical Investigations* (translated by B. Wolniewicz). Warsaw 1972, 109.

I will not discuss here whether Waismann shared unreservedly all of Wittgenstein's more or less detailed metaphilosophical theses. I will only note that

a) Wittgenstein sharply contrasted science and philosophy in both phases of his philosophy;
b) According to the Tractatus, philosophy Is a collection of nonsense, and in the Investigations this conception of philosophy was rejected;
(c) Waismann's metaphilosophical views evolved under Wittgenstein's influence from a denial of philosophy in the style of early logical empiricism (Waismann was a member of the Vienna Circle in the 1920s and 1930s) to a recognition of its ancientism.

The term unscientific has been used above most deliberately, and can be taken as a *terminus technicus* that makes it possible to distinguish between views that maintain that philosophy is unscientific and views according to which philosophical considerations are merely anaerobic. The metaphilosophical turn of the 20th century, and analytic philosophy in particular, completely justifies such a distinction. The philosophers of the Vienna Circle attacked philosophy for its unscientificness, attaching to it the assessment that this lack of scientificness Is something absolutely fatal for philosophy. They considered themselves to be Wittgenstein's continuators in this regard, but all indications are that the neo-positivist interpretation of *the Tractatus* was wrong. Wittgenstein indeed believed that philosophy is not a science, but he also saw nothing wrong with it; this view is characteristic of both the *Treatise* and *the Investigations*. Indeed, statements like: *philosophy stands either above or below science, but never next to science*, or: *it is right that philosophical considerations are not scientific - do not judge, but only constate the differences*. In particular, Wittgenstein does not prejudge whether philosophy is better or worse than science, but only claims that it is something else; the Vienna Circle assumed that Wittgenstein, by saying that philosophical theses are nonsensical, meant precisely the neo-positivist notion of meaninglessness, and this identification is questionable. Well, to say that philosophy is not a science, but without valuing whether this is good or bad, is - according to the convention introduced here - to say that philosophy is unscientific. Waismann is a faithful follower of Wittgenstein on this point: he states that philosophy is unlike science, and by no means holds it against it. So much for the general context of Waismann's metaphilosophical views.

Of particular importance from the point of view of the issue under consideration here is how Waismann contrasts science and philosophy. Well, he says that in philosophy there are no proofs, no theorems and no questions resolvable *Yes* or *No*; I assume that the capital letters in *Yes* and *No* play an ornamental role in Waismann's text, and therefore I will continue to write *Yes* and *No*. *A contrario*, in science there are proofs, assertions and questions resolvable in a positive or negative way. But in philosophy there are arguments that over-validate somehow, since, as Waismann points out, the historical roles of individual philosophers are recognized according to the originality of their arguments. Here we have a clear juxtaposition of proof on the one hand and philosophical argument on the other. Let's try to follow this line.

Unfortunately, Waismann defines neither the notion of proof nor the notion of philosophical argument, and he does not suggest any reasonably unambiguous non-definitional explanation of how he understands these two, after all, key concepts in his deliberations. All that is known is that proofs are some procedures used in the mathematical and natural sciences

to positively or negatively resolve the problems of these sciences. The first interpretation that comes to mind would be to consider that when Waismann speaks of proofs in science, he means deductive and inductive procedures. However, even under the assumption, supremely debatable as it is known, that induction can be satisfactorily defined at all, such an interpretation would be difficult to maintain. For it would imply that philosophers neither use deduction nor induction, a thesis that is false, at least with the standard use of the terms *deduction* and *induction*; I don't think Waismann meant to state about philosophers that they use neither deduction nor induction, especially the former. Waismann apparently conflates three issues: the existence of evidence, the existence of theorems, and the existence of positively or negatively resolvable problems. So, proof is not simply a procedure that has the formal structure of deduction or induction, but a procedure that leads to the resolution of a particular problem by showing that a proposed answer to that problem, i.e., some assertion, is accurate or wrong. The concepts of proof, theorem and positively or negatively resolvable problem are thus a conceptual family in the sense that the explication of one of them leads to the explication of the others, but also presupposes the explication of the others. Doing so would amount to explaining the concept of science. Then it would also be clear what philosophical arguments are. Thus, the difference between proof and (philosophical) argument in Waismann's view ultimately boils down to the difference between science and philosophy. And this one consists in the fact that in science there are proofs, theorems and problems that can be decided yes or no, while in philosophy all this is absent. So we are back to square one.

Waismann wrote that philosophy is unlike science in such and such respects, three to be exact. From this it by no means follows that philosophy is different from science in every respect. It certainly isn't, since, for example, both are human creations. However, there is a problem here, subtle in my opinion, which is worth pointing out. Evidence is undoubtedly an argument, and moreover, not every argument is evidence. At least, this is how the thing seems to look from a colloquial point of view. Let's assume that in the quoted Waismann text the name argument is shorthand for the expression philosophical argument - the context fully justifies this. In turn, this suggests that we have some general notion of argument, and that philosophical proofs and arguments fall this notion. Although no proof is a philosophical argument and no philosophical argument is a proof, but proofs and philosophical arguments nevertheless have something in common emotionally, since they are species within the One kind, i.e., arguments in the general sense. It is difficult to take a position on this issue on behalf of Waismann, but it seems that considering philosophical proofs and arguments as species within the One Kind would not be in his intentions. He would probably be inclined to consider philosophical proofs and arguments as belonging to entirely different worlds. But he would probably agree that evidence is a species of argument. With this interpretation, philosophical arguments are not a species of arguments. That is, if we take the name *argument* in its colloquial sense, then - assuming that philosophical arguments are not arguments - we get that the *adjective philosophical* in the context of *philosophical argument* functions as a so-called modifier. Incidentally, modifiers do not have to cause negative evaluative connotations at all. Consider the names *artificial gold* and *black gold*. Both adjectives are modifiers because *artificial* gold is not gold and *black* gold is not gold either. However, while the name *artificial gold* evokes, to say the least, mixed feelings, the name *black gold* means something undoubtedly valuable. Even

if we consider scientific arguments to be *gold*, we don't have to consider philosophical arguments to be *artificial gold* for this reason at all. Of course, this still does not determine that they are black bullion. And again we come to the problem of the difference between science and philosophy.

We could easily deal with many metaphilosophical problems by recognizing that philosophers use *quasi-evidence*, formulate *quasi-assertions* and solve *quasi-problems*. This is the path of logical empiricism, too simple and too easy, as it offers a solution that is exclusively negative and, moreover, based on the belief that the concept of science does not raise any serious questions. The philosophy of science of recent years has effectively shaken this belief. Tedy, this simple negative approach to philosophical arguments does not seem very fruitful.

One can also adopt Wittgenstein's position, also shared by Waismann, i.e. that philosophical arguments serve to illuminate thought. Wittgenstein formulated it this way: *the purpose of philosophy is the logical illumination of thought. Philosophy is not a theory, but a certain activity. A philosophical work essentially consists of explanations. The results of philosophy are not "philosophical theses," but the clarity of theses'*[5] *; The results of philosophy are the discoveries of ordinary absurdities and the tumors that reason acquires by attacking the limits of language. They, these tumors, are what make it possible to judge the value of these discoveries*[6] *'.*

And here are Waismann's words: *If there is any truth in this* (Waismann refers here to his previous considerations - J.W.)*, then the relation of logic and philosophy presents itself in a new light. What is at stake here is not a conflict between formal and less formal or informal logic, or the behavior of technical concepts and the behavior of everyday concepts, but something entirely different. It is the difference between introducing a conclusion and seeing Some new aspect or making someone see it .*[7]

This is undoubtedly appealing, as it delimits philosophy from science, while at the same time legitimizing the value of philosophical considerations. Wittgenstein never hid the fact that philosophy has intrinsic values. He put it this way: *Thoughts otherwise obscure and indistinct philosophy should illuminate and sharply demarcate*[8] *. Philosophy is the struggle against the possession of our mind by the means of our language*[9] . It is not the business of philosophy to resolve contradictions through mathematical or logical-mathematical discoveries. It is its business, on the other hand, to make that unsoothing state of mathematics, the state before the resolution of contradictions, transparent (this does not mean that some difficulty is bypassed here) .[10]

While this is an appealing position, it does not solve all problems. Let us note that this logical illumination of thoughts or seeing new aspects is done in verbalized form, that is, words and sentences. This immediately raises the problem of the status of philosophical statements.

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[5] *Treaty*, 4.112
[6] *Investigations*, 119
[7] Waismann: op.cit. , s.376
[8] *Treaty*, 4. 112.
[9] *Investigations*, 109
[10] *Investigations*, 125.

For now, all we know is that they are not theorems, do not function within the framework of evidence, and are not answers to problems. But what are philosophical statements from the positive side? Wittgenstein offered a radical solution in this matter: *My theses bring clarity by the fact that whoever understands me will eventually recognize them as absurd; when through them - after them - he will rise above them (he must, as it were, reject the ladder, having previously climbed it). He must overcome these theses, then the world will present itself to him properly* .[11]

This is a peculiar, yet completely consistent doctrine. Indeed, the view that bringing clarity is done by means of making nonsensical sentences is not contradictory. Nevertheless, it raises a reflexive objection, since the illumination of meaning by means of meaninglessness (absurdity) seems a not very serious occupation. At the same time, the paradoxicality of the solution offered by Wittgenstein can be considerably weakened by assuming multisensibility correlated with different cognitive orders. Suppose we explain the sense of sentence A of Language J by means of sentence B of Language MJ, where MJ is a metalanguage for J. It is free, it seems, to assume that the sense of sentences of Language J is differently constituted than the sense of sentences of Language MJ, and it may even be allowed to say that sentence B is nonsensical, i.e. it is nonsensical from the point of view of sentence A. However, this would be an overly projective explanation of the sense of nonsense, and moreover, and perhaps even more importantly, the solution that assumes a multisense correlated with the hierarchy of languages takes away from Wittgenstein's proposal its charming radicalism. However, whether or not the idea of multisensoriality in the above sense is reconcilable with Wittgenstein's intentions, it should be noted that neither the position of the *treatise* in its literal (radical) sense, nor the more liberal interpretation of the metaphilosophical views of early Wittgenstein by means of the category of multisensoriality solve the problem of the status of statements, because, both are negative: they say what philosophical statements are not - namely, they are not scientific sentences. Late Wittgenstein, i.e., from the period of *the Investigations*, as well as analytic philosophers, e.g., those who paid homage to the so-called philosophy of ordinary language, struggled with this issue, but without much success .[12]

A possible solution to the question under consideration can be outlined in a very general way by delineating some extreme points on the philosophical map. Probably, this can be done in various ways. The following will present one that seems to be well adapted to the problem of arguments.

Any solution to the issue currently under discussion can be placed between radical scientism and radical hermeneutism. The former resolves our issue by denying that there is any essential difference between scientific proofs, claims and problems, on the one hand, and philosophical proofs, claims and problems, on the other; radical scientism thus assumes, to use Waismann's nomenclature, that philosophical arguments are simply scientific proofs, insofar as they obviously satisfy those conditions that are usually imposed on the concept of scientific proof. At the same time, Scientists, moreover, not only the radical ones, demand that

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[11] *Treaty*, 6. 54

[12] Cf. J. Wolenski: *Directions and methods of analytic philosophy*. In: *How to philosophize*? (ed. J. P e r z a n o w s k i e g o). Warsaw 1983.

philosophers should desist from posing certain problems, e.g., too general or concerning such and such issues; the precise meaning of these demands depends on more specific views of the goals and tasks of philosophy. Various concepts of inductive metaphysics (e.g., Hermann Lotze) or deductive metaphysics (e.g., Jan Lukasiewicz or Heinrich Scholz) can illustrate this position[13] . According to these ideas, metaphysics is a science in the same sense as theoretical physics, provided that philosophers practicing metaphysics give up some of the ambitions nourished by philosophers of the past. This version of scientism, although it formulates some sanctioning demands past philosophy, nevertheless preserves, at least in part, its object. Scientism can also consist a fundamental change in the historically formed object of philosophy. This was the path taken by the philosophers of the Vienna Circle. They completely or almost completely rejected philosophy in its previous object-methodological form, and in its place proposed philosophy as a logical analysis of the language of science, As a fully scientific inquiry. Nevertheless, radical scientism as a global option is guided - regardless of the differences among its individual adherents - by the belief that philosophers, under certain additional conditions, formulate theorems, prove them, and therefore settle some of their problems.

At the other end of our metaphilosophical spectrum lies extreme hermeneuticism, which can arguably be attributed to philosophers such as Emanuel Levinas and Jacques Derrida. Philosophers representing this attitude abandon any reference of philosophical arguments to scientific evidence. This any must be understood in the most literal sense, since, according to radical hermeneutics, even saying that philosophical arguments are not scientific evidence introduces an opposition, which, as a rule, is the beginning of a completely wrong recognition of the nature of the philosophical enterprise. This enterprise, on the other hand, consists in the fact that philosophizing consists in carrying out certain understanding activities; the closer characteristics of these activities vary depending on the understanding assumed. Let us note here that, as a rule, hermeneuticians sooner or later find, contrary to their programmatic declarations, that philosophizing consists in activities that have nothing to do with either logic or the procedures used in the empirical sciences; and they assure us that this inconsistency is dictated solely by polemical considerations.

In between these extremes resides quite a number of more or less compromising proposals, including Wittgenstein's views discussed above, at least in certain interpretations of them. Those who consider Aristotle's principle of the golden mean to be more or less reasonable and worth using, at least as a heuristic tool, may derive the following conclusion from the above considerations: in every argument, including philosophical argumentation, there is something of proof in the sense of Waismann and actions of a hermeneutic nature. I will not hide the fact that this kind of position is close to me. The trouble is however, that it is not clear how to determine the proportion between both components of argumentation, and argumentation in particular. It is not even clear what method to use to do so.

As long as we leave aside radical scientism, all other metaphilosophical proposals lead to a more or less sharp demarcation between science and philosophy. This is to be not only a

[13] Cf. the discussion of the so-called axiomatic metaphysics by T. Czeżowski: *On metaphysics, its directions and issues,* Torun 1948.

demarcation expressed in the fact that philosophy is not a science in the sense that, for example, physics is not chemistry or logic, but above all in the fact that there is some fundamental methodological difference that determines the epistemological difference between philosophy and science, the very fact that philosophical arguments work differently (partially or completely) from scientific evidence. So it's about deep differences that go beyond bibliographic and cataloging issues.

A whole series of arguments can be given for the fact that such profound differences between science and philosophy do indeed exist. The crowning rationale to support *the demarcation* position is, of course, the notorious unsolvability of philosophical problems. It is pointed out that the basic arsenal of philosophical problems was established back in ancient times, and little, if anything, has changed in philosophy in this regard since then. In ancient times, too, the basic possibilities for solving philosophical problems and related philosophical disputes were determined, and the further development of philosophy has been barren rather than creative in this regard. This situation was succinctly summarized in Alfred Whitehead's famous saying that the history of philosophy is reduced to nothing more than a series of commentaries on Plato's dialogues. The epistemological situation of philosophy is reflected in the social context of philosophy, as there is a lack of consensus among professionals practicing philosophy, and even on fundamental matters; there is no consensus on detailed matters either.

In contrast, the opposite situation is noted in the field of science. The stock of scientific problems is changing, and this is in an undoubtedly positive direction: scientific problems are constantly increasing. They are solved in a standard way, and the results of certain solutions are subject to the consensus of scientific communities, at least within the framework of some specific historical periods. This consensus is one of the main attributes of the socio-historical knitting of science.

It is also pointed out that science and technology, on the one hand, and philosophy and, for example, art, on the other, differ in their relationship to the passage of historical time. Well, it is supposed to be the case that scientific ideas and technical achievements are constantly superseded by the novelties of science and technology. According to a figurative comparison, a modern doctor by no means needs to read the *Corpus Hippocraticum* to learn the secrets of medical knowledge, when he can use the knowledge contained in modern medical compendia, a modern astronomer does not need to use *the Almagest* to deepen his knowledge of planetary motion, and a modern man does not need to use a kerosene lamp to read in the evening, when he has electric light at his disposal. *The Corpus Hippocraticum*, *the Almagest* and the kerosene lamp have, from the point of view of the modern development of science and technology, only historical value; more precisely, they acquired this value immediately when they were replaced by something. Philosophical works, on the other hand, are in this respect more like works of art than monuments of science and technology. Philosophical works do not age in the same way as scientific ideas and technical inventions, and are not superseded by later philosophical works. While modern creators of science and technology, in order to do their work well, do not need to know the history of their fields or read the works (even the most important ones) of their predecessors, according to a very widespread opinion, a modern philosopher (not only a historian of philosophy) cannot do without a thorough knowledge of the history of philosophy,

and reading recently published textbooks will by no means replace him reading the great works of the past, such as Plato's dialogues, to refer again to those writings particularly meritorious for the development of philosophy. Thus, the situation in the field of philosophy should be just as it is in the field of art, where aesthetic contemplation of contemporary works is by no means a substitute for communing with the art of the past. One would like to say, following Kuhn, that science is notoriously in the paradigmatic stage, while philosophy - in the pre-paradigmatic stage.

The above diagnoses can be shared by both scientists and hermeneuticians, since the registration of differences between science and philosophy can stimulate both attempts to un-scientify philosophy and its continuation as a hermeneutical enterprise. Scientists can always argue that the unsolvability of philosophical problems to date does not logically imply that they will not be solved in the near or distant future, and thus that philosophy will move from the pre-paradigmatic period to the paradigmatic stage. Hermeneutics, on the other hand, is inclined to that the very use of the term pre-paradigmatic stage imposes, as it were, this contested optic of comparing philosophy with science, since the sense of the name is apparently that the paradigmatic stage is expected after the pre-paradigmatic one. Meanwhile, according to hermeneutics, the thing is that philosophy cannot exist in any stage at all, if the name *paradigmatic stage* is to mean something essential to the functioning of science. Since philosophy cannot exist paradigmatically in Kuhn's sense, it must not be said that it currently exists in a pre-paradigmatic stage, and someday this will change so that it will be in a paradigmatic stage. At most, hermeneutics could agree that this pre-paradigmatic state of philosophy in the sense of the Scientists is its paradigmatic, i.e. normal, state, and there is no reason to lament it.

However, there are grounds for arguing that the arguments for a sharp demarcation of science and philosophy discussed above are exaggerated, that science is framed too idyllicly and philosophy too pessimistically. Here is an example suitable, in my opinion, well as an introduction to the comments on the relativity of the opposition between science and philosophy. It had been known for years that Zygmunt Zawirski had compiled a comprehensive philosophical dictionary during the war. It was even in the announcements of a Polish publishing house in the late 1940s, but the winds of history at the time blocked the publication of this work. Dealing with the Lviv-Warsaw school, of which Zawirski was a prominent representative, I searched for a long time for this dictionary, until I finally managed to find the typescript by accident, as often happens in such situations. Zawirski was a great erudite man, and one could expect a lot from the philosophical dictionary he compiled. It is indeed a highly interesting work, in a sense a sort of monument to the Polish philosophical culture of the interwar period, or, to put it more crudely, to that philosophical culture which Kazimierz Twardowski and his school created in Poland. The philosophical editors of PWN suggested to me to consider publishing this dictionary, but as a contemporary philosophical dictionary, possibly with some additions. However, this turned out to be impossible, at least for me. Reading a text written roughly 45-50 years ago, a text in addition, about which I have not the slightest doubt, very modern at the time, however, left no doubt that philosophy, however, has somehow changed over these several decades. Philosophical dictionaries always turn out to be barometers of the philosophical "aura". Thus, philosophy is aging much faster than is usually

assumed. This suggests rethinking the differences between science and philosophy, even if one does not intend to question them globally.

The example with Zawirski's dictionary indicates that philosophy is not stable in contrast to mobile science. This statement by no means implies that philosophy is changing in a progressive way, with progress marked above as an increment of problems and their solutions. On the other hand, the thesis of the progress of science is by no means as obvious now as it has been thought so far; here I mean epistemological progress, not axiological progress. There is no direct evidence that science is moving in any particular epistemological direction, e.g., that it is becoming closer to Truth in Popper's sense; we may believe this, but it is not at all so certain. What is certain, on the other hand, is that the history of science to date is a history of mistakes and even fat errors. Each new theory raises a whole host of new unsolved problems, and it is not clear what is really coming: knowledge or ignorance. The scientific evidence that so captivated Waismann is full of gaps, and susceptibility to change is an inalienable attribute of scientific claims. In this situation, one can doubt whether anything in science has really been resolved to yes or no; at most, one can argue that the proposed resolutions are overly provisional. I by no means intend to claim that in the aspect of problem solvability there is no significant difference between science and philosophy. I share the opinion of those who point out that philosophers have not resolved anything in the manner notorious in science. I only point out that the settlements within science are not as pantry-perfect as Waismann suggested. I could not, however, agree that philosophy is completely stable from the point of view of the increment of its problematics, i.e., that the increment is exactly zero. Although the growth of philosophical problematics is not as rapid as it is in science, but it certainly exists. It is enough here to recall the emergence of new philosophical problems against the background of medieval theology or the development of modern medicine. But problem changes do not consist only in the fact that new issues appear. These changes also consist in a different distribution of interest in old problems. The so-called psychophysical problem was one of the dominant ones in the 19th century, and today it functions on the periphery of philosophy, and yet it is a problem change of a fundamental nature. Well, I would argue that it is precisely such problem shifts that are very characteristic of philosophy, and they determine the fact that, for example, a philosophical dictionary expressing the philosophical culture of a given era or a given philosophical circle turns out to be obsolete after several decades in another era, in another circle, or even in the same . So the difference between science and philosophy in terms of the mobility of the subject matter is not so great at all.

There is not the slightest doubt that the attitude of philosophers to the history of philosophy is different than that of representatives of the so-called detailed disciplines to the history of science. Someone might point out, that it does not at all follow from this that this must always be the case. However, I do not want to use such an argument for the similarity of science and philosophy. For I share the view that an appeal to history is some important component of any philosophical endeavor. Almost every philosopher looks to the past for inspiration, and returns to the arguments offered by thinkers of the past. Therefore, each philosophical era reproduces not only the views and philosophical positions of the past, but also the past arguments for those positions. Today, the dispute over universals discusses not only the arguments formulated on the basis of the theory of multiplicity, but also the original rationales

of Plato, Aristotle and Roscelin justifying the classical positions they took in this dispute. This is undoubtedly a peculiarity of philosophy compared to science, for example, physicists never return to Aristotle's physics.

Nevertheless, the issue currently under consideration should not be exaggeratedly sharpened. For it is not true that the detailed sciences are completely ahistorical. Scientists, although they do not go very far into history, always refer both to the current state of knowledge and to its state in the immediate past. Thus, it is not the case that history in general is absent from the deliberations of scientists. It is present in them, but, compared to philosophy, this applies almost exclusively to recent history. On the other hand, it is by no means true that philosophers are totally "possessed" by the history of philosophy. Knowledge of the history of philosophy is certainly more necessary for the practice of philosophy than knowledge of the history of science - for the practice of science. This is true, but also the statistical philosopher's historical knowledge is incomplete and basically limited to what he happens to be interested in; in many cases, scientists' knowledge of history is greater than philosophers' knowledge of the history of philosophy. It is interesting to observe the evolution of demands for the historical education of philosophers. Just a few decades ago, it was demanded that every philosopher should be a competent historian of philosophy 1 as a result, it was unthinkable that philosophers should not study the works of the past in the original languages; in many memoirs there is a statement, uttered with undisguised pride, that *at the philosophy seminar I belonged to, philosophical works were always read in the original language*. Today, such postulations have been abandoned. Those feeling nostalgic for that golden age when every professionally trained philosopher was automatically a historian of philosophy will probably say that languages, especially classical languages, were taught well back then and therefore all philosophers could be historians of philosophy. However, there is no direct *iunctim* between knowledge of classical (or any other) languages and competence in the history of philosophy. It can be argued that the postulate expressed by the equation *every philosopher = historian of philosophy* has been abandoned as the requirements for historians of philosophy have increased; today's evaluations of many ancient translations of philosophical works apparently prove that not every philosopher (even those with a good command of foreign languages) was a good historian of philosophy.

I mentioned above the argument pointing out the differences between science and philosophy due to their different relationship to historical time. And here it is necessary to point out the circumstances that tone down the sharpness of this argument. In the previous paragraph I noted that philosophers no longer read philosophical classics in original language versions as often as they to. As it seems, the lion's share of the statistical philosopher's historical knowledge does not come from reading so-called sources at all, whether they are translations or not. Again, it should be noted that the statistical philosopher reads those philosophers (in the original or in translation) that interest him for one reason or another (usually professional) in a special way. The rest of his knowledge of the history of philosophy comes from textbooks and monographs. Someone will say that the described situation is unfavorable, and, moreover, that it is a manifestation of a certain degeneration of philosophical education caused by excessive specialization, which has not bypassed philosophy. Perhaps the attitude of modern philosophers

to historical sources should be evaluated negatively. But the interesting thing is that philosophy, as it turns out, is subject to the same sociological regularities (specialization) as science. Moreover, it is not at all certain that the philosophers of the past learned the history of philosophy differently than we do. I suspect that their historical-philosophical knowledge came mainly from textbooks, not from sources. It's even hard to imagine otherwise. Therefore, the problem of how the philosophical works of the past, even the great ones, last historically, presents itself not quite as straightforward as the proponents of the thesis that these works are not consumed by the achievements of the next generations of philosophers. They are certainly not consumed as ruthlessly as works of science and technical inventions, but it cannot be said that the monuments of history are at all insensitive to the passage of time. Plato's dialogues analyzed today are not the same works (leaving aside philosophical problems, if they can be separated from philosophical matters at all) as, say, 100 years ago. The modern philosopher perceives them through centuries of their interpretation, and it is clear that the most recent interpretations are particularly important. The perception of philosophical works of the past is quite similar to the reading of monuments to the history of science. After all, there is not the slightest doubt that *Newton's Principia* were interpreted differently before Einstein, and differently in light of the theory of relativity. And one more similarity between science and philosophy must be registered in this context. The history of philosophy is much denser than the history of philosophy textbooks portray it. By this I mean that there have been many more philosophers and their works in history than the historical-philosophical compendia inform us. The history of philosophy is as ruthless as the history of science: a large, perhaps even an overwhelming part, of the results of scientific and philosophical efforts are forgotten. It happens, both in science and philosophy, wrongly. But nothing can be done about it. And it's hard to even say: *unfortunately*, because if everything had to be remembered, any appeal to history would be impossible

The sociological circumstances discussed above regarding the historical context of philosophy are important, but more important, in my opinion, is the conclusion drawn from reflection on the methodological role of the appeal to the history of philosophy in the work of a philosopher. It is true that philosophers are subject to inspiration from the past. They are not only subject to them, but also seek them out. Nevertheless, the views and arguments of philosophers of the past are precisely inspirations, not canons to be slavishly imitated. Of course, it happens that one or another master of the philosophical art says: *a hundred times I'd rather lose with X than gain with Y* - assuming in advance that Y's arguments can in no way violate X's doctrine. Such an attitude is referred to as dogmatism and is considered a manifestation of intellectual pathology. Dogmatism also occurs in science, less frequently than in philosophy, but it occurs nonetheless. A philosopher who rejects dogmatism will accept X's views not because they come from X, but because they can be justified somehow, especially with rationales drawn from the present. I do not deny that belonging to one or another school or philosophical tradition weighs on philosophers' particular resistance to arguments coming from outside their circles of thought, but the history of science also knows of such cases. In philosophy, as in science, one has to distinguish between inspiration and justification, and then it turns out that the boundary between science and philosophy is at many points relative.

But why, in the light of the above, is it permissible to say that philosophers do not solve their problems in the way that scientists do? The answer I would like to suggest, in a very general (and perhaps even overly general) way, can be presented as follows. The task of philosophy is not to resolve philosophical problems in the way that scientists resolve scientific problems. On the other hand, the task of philosophy is to reproduce standard positions in each era. It happened once, because it probably had to happen at some point, that philosophy reached such a stage of development that positions considered standard appeared. We can assume that this happened thanks to Plato and Aristotle. In this sense, Whitehead's remark that the history of philosophy is merely a series of commentaries on Plato's dialogues is somewhat accurate. However, the reproduction of philosophical problems and positions is not merely a mechanical reproduction of them. For philosophical reproduction is characterized by the fact that it is written in the language of its epoch and, what is more important, based on the arguments of that epoch. The indeterminism proclaimed on the basis of modern physics is a reproduction of the indeterminism of the Epicureans, but formulated in the language of our epoch and justified using contemporary arguments. The word reproduction is perhaps even inappropriate here, since it connotes far-reaching fidelity to some original; perhaps it would be better to speak of versions of views considered standard. In any case, when I speak of versions or reproductions, I mean philosophical results that can be highly creative. Hegel's metaphysics was certainly a highly innovative creation, and therefore a creative theory, but it was just another version (reproduction) of objective idealism. And the same can be said of many other results of philosophical toil reproductions or versions are certainly to some extent commentaries. But not only that, and that's why this remark by Whitehead is only "somewhat" accurate; in my opinion, less than more

If one wishes, one can compare philosophy to art, since *the reproductive* nature of philosophy brings it closer to art than the manner of its existence in historical time discussed above. For it is a feature of art that artists reproduce the same content over and over again in different aesthetic codes; this observation goes some way to explaining the sense in which I use the term *reproduction*. But there is also a major difference between philosophy and art, since the concept of argument has no use in describing art. After all, it is nonsense to say that artist X used such and such an argument in his creative work. On the other hand, the description of philosophical activity is impossible without the concept of argument. And so we are back to the question of philosophical arguments again.

The metaphilosophical position outlined above explains, in my opinion, a whole series of peculiarities of philosophy, most notably the fact that philosophers, on the one hand, use arguments and, on the other, their arguments resolve in a scientific sense. This is, as one can easily see, an expression of some compromise between scientism and hermeneutism. Extreme hermeneutism is, from the point of view of this compromise, wrong, because it essentially denies the argumentative character of philosophy, while radical scientism because it acquaints the reproductive character of philosophy. The hermeneutic character of philosophy seems to consist in this, that the philosopher's inscription in one or another philosophical tradition is essentially an activity of an understanding (hermeneutic) character. Thus, we can reiterate once again that in every philosophical argumentation there is something of proof in Waismann's sense and Some hermeneutic element. And also that it is not known what the proportions of proof and

hermeneutics are and how they could be strictly defined. Nevertheless, it is clear why philosophical arguments do not settle like scientific arguments: there is too "much" hermeneutics in philosophical arguments. But it can also be seen that philosophical arguments cannot be completely opposed to scientific evidence, since philosophers nevertheless put forward some theses and try to argue for them in a methodologically regulated way, and it is this last circumstance that justifies undertaking an analysis of philosophical arguments from the point of view of logic. Such an analysis requires first of all to clarify, or rather to recall, certain concepts.

In the first instance, it is appropriate to deal with the word *argument*. In doing so, I point out that further analysis will be independent of Waismann's distinction of scientific evidence and philosophical argumentation discussed above. It fulfilled the heuristic role above as one of the introductory tools the problem of philosophical arguments.

In mathematical logic, an argument is understood as a sequence of sentence formulas (hereafter, I will simply refer to sentences as components of arguments) $A_1 .... A_n$ such that A_1, . , $An_{-1}+A_n$, where the sentences $A_1.....A_{n-1}$ are the premises of argument A, the sentence A_n - its conclusion (inference), and the symbol 1 - denotes the relations of deductive derivability; arguments are thus simply proofs in the sense of mathematics. Although derivability (a syntactic concept) is not the same as logical resultability (a semantic concept), and even, from a general point of view, the two concepts are different, we can, however, in the context of further analysis, speak of logical resultability instead of derivability. Ultimately, we will say that an argument in the sense of mathematical logic is a sequence of sentences such that the last word of this sequence is the conclusion of the argument, the preceding words are the premises of the argument, and the conclusion of the argument follows logically from its premises. So here we have the equality*: argument = deductive argument*. An argument would be, with this understanding of arguments, any deduction, and the name deductive *argument* is then a pleonasm. Let us note that the name *bad deduction* does not imply some kind of deduction, because bad deduction is not a deduction at all; the adjective *bad* in the name *bad deduction* plays the role of a modifier. However, from a colloquial point of view, neither the name *deductive argument* is pleonastic, nor is the word *bad* in the name *bad deduction* a modifier, or at least it does not have to be understood that way in this context.

The colloquial practice of argumentation probably allows for various interpretations, but according to a fairly common view, arguments in the colloquial sense are by no means limited to deduction. They can be of an inductive or analogical nature, for example. Then, the metamathematical understanding of the argument discussed above is too narrow 1 should be generalized, for example, in the form of a scheme (*) (P, K, R), where P Is the set of premises of the argument, K - its conclusion, and R - some principle of argumentation; logical result would then be a special case of the relation R, and inductive derivability K from P - another special case. Concepts of this kind were developed in the methodological literature, especially in the Polish literature in the works of Jan Łukasiewicz, Tadeusz Czeżowski, Tadeusz Kotarbiński and Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz[14] . The well-known divisions into deductive and

[14] Cf. discussion in J. Wolenski: *Classifications of reasoning*. "Philosophical Education" 1988, vol.5.

reductive reasoning (Łukasiewicz, Kotarbiński, Czeżowski) or into deductive, probabilistic ^ce and logically worthless inference (Ajdukiewicz) are classifications due to the nature of R relations. Referential generalization is very simple at first glance, but in reality it leads to very perplexing problems, first of all to the question of necessary and sufficient conditions for the occurrence of various special cases of relation R. The famous dispute over induction initiated by Hume and renewed today by Karl Popper and his followers is a good illustration of the problems associated with non-deductive arguments. I will not consider this issue further in this sketch.

I mentioned above the equality *argument = deductive argument*. From a metamathematical point of view, it can be completed to the following form: *argument = deductive argument = correct argument*, since an incorrect = (wrong) deductive argument is not a deductive argument at all. Meanwhile, in the methodology of sciences, there is talk about correct, incorrect, formally correct, formally incorrect, materially correct and materially incorrect arguments, and these terms are also used in the analysis of deductive arguments. Thus, a deductive argument is called formally correct when its conclusion follows logically from its premises, and formally incorrect when it does not. A deductive argument is materially correct when its premises and conclusion are true, and materially incorrect when the premises or conclusion are false; the definition of material correctness is such that it is completely independent of formal correctness, i.e. arguments can be formally correct without being materially correct, and vice versa. Finally, a deductive argument is correct if and only if it is both formally and correct at the same time; by the way, they will note that in no case should one speak of the truthfulness of arguments, since arguments are not sentences, but sequences of sentences. However, these elementary terms are blatantly incompatible with the mathematical understanding of an argument; strictly speaking, this applies only to formal correctness. The matter is immediately clarified, however, if we introduce the distinction between argument as a product and argument as an action[15] . An argument as a product is a realization of some abstract logical structure and either has certain pre-set formal properties or does not have them, i.e., its conclusion follows logically from its premises or it does not. The verbal form of an argument may contain some words characteristic of deduction, such as the word *so*, but unless the conclusion follows logically from the premises, the used do not express deduction at all. It is quite different in the case of arguments understood as actions. This is because it may happen that the arguer was convinced that he had made a deductive argument, but this belief in fact turned out to be wrong. In such a case, it can be ruled that the act of deduction was performed incorrectly, that is, that the argument (understood as an action) is incorrect. Now, the relationship between arguments as actions and arguments as actions is very simple, and it is that arguments as creations (or rather, their abstract schemes) provide criteria for evaluating the correctness of arguments as actions.

I mentioned above that argumentation is simply the execution of an argument, with this remark made in the context of the metamathematical understanding of arguments. With an extended view, based on the scheme (*), argumentation will be the performance (making, using)

[15] This is a special case of the distinction between activities and products introduced by Kazimierz Twardowski and very popular in Polish philosophy, especially in the Iwowsko-Warsaw school.

of an argument. In this situation, an argument is simply an argument as an action, that is, an argument in the pragmatic sense. It is now clear that in order to determine the correctness of non-deductive arguments, it is necessary to first carefully establish the formal conditions for the occurrence of induction or analogy.

Arguments in the pragmatic sense are undoubtedly closer to argumentative practice, and not only colloquial. But nevertheless, one can doubt whether the understanding of argumentation assumed above is not too restrictive after all. Be that as it may, in connection with the scheme, every argument is a realization of some abstract logical structure. Many authors point out that an even more pragmatic understanding of argumentation is needed than can be achieved on the basis of the concept of argument correlated only with logic. It is emphasized that arguments always play out within the framework of some audience, and their purpose is to convince this audience (in whole or in part) of some thesis. The purpose of argumentation is thus clearly persuasive. Argumentation is always led by someone and directed at someone else. Arguments consist of arguments in the sense outlined above, i.e. reasoning in the terminology of Lukasiewicz-Kotarbiński-Czeżowski or inference in the terminology of Ajdukiewicz, but not only, as arguments also include arguments that are not inferential at all. One has in mind here, for example, various rhetorical tricks, such as *argumentum ad hominem*. Recently it has become fashionable to analyze arguments and argumentation as games. Here is an example: *a logical dialogue game is a broader model of argument* (compared to the inferential model – J.W.). *Accordingly, an argument can be understood as a collection of statements (containing statements, questions, and perhaps other statements as well). Each utterance is indexed by a participant in the game, with the participant being able to develop an utterance only in connection with certain rules of dialogue*[16] doing so, Walton apparently seems to think that a far-reaching formalization of such dialogues or rather *n-logs* is possible. It cannot be ruled out, of course, that Walton is right, but past attempts to formalize argumentative *n-logs* do not warrant much optimism. Nonetheless, considering argumentation as games, and arguments as moves in argumentation games, is undoubtedly legitimate even with a rather metaphorical understanding of the word *game*. The theorist's account of argumentation is perhaps particularly useful for philosophy, as it makes it possible not only to record the formal logical means used in arguments, but also to trace the hermeneutical procedures designed to serve philosophical understanding.

The role of logic in argumentative moves may firstly consist in the fact that the components of argumentation (as games) are inferences of one kind or another. The relation between an argumentation and the inferences belonging to it is simply the relation of parts to the whole. If inferences are components of philosophical arguments at all, then those arguments in which there are incorrect inferences cannot be considered correct. Incidentally, extreme hermeneutism is generally inconsistent, since it simultaneously recognizes that philosophers make inferences and denies the need for their correctness. Logic can also be used in philosophy as a hermeneutic source in such a way that abstract logical constructs become a tool for explicating philosophical problems, e.g., the theory of logical types is sometimes used to legitimize or negate ontological constructs. This function of logic will be illustrated using the

[16] D. Walton: *Logical Dialogue-Games and Fallacies*. New York 1984, p. 3.

example of the so-called argument of the third man (ATC), which first appeared in Plato's dialogue *Parmenides*; the name *argument of the third man* comes from Aristotle. The argument is regarded as a manifestation of the fundamental difficulties of Plato's theory of ideas. Here are excerpts from the dialogue (translated by W. Witwicki) relevant to the ATC; the passage containing this argument is marked with curly brackets *{...}*.

{And such a thing tell me. It seems to thee, as thou sayest, that there are characters certain in which these here other things participate, and hence have their names; for example, those that participate in likeness are called likeness, in greatness great, and in beauty and justice are just and beautiful?

That's right," says Socrates.

Not true; either in the whole form or in some part of it participates that which participates? Can there be any participation other than that?

Well, how so? - he says.

So, does it seem to you that the whole character is in each of the many items, staying one, or what?

Well, what hinders, Parmenides," said Socrates, "what hinders her from being all in them?

So she, being something One and thus in numerous objects separated from her, will be all in them and thus ready to be separated from herself.

Well, no, he says; - if it were like the day, which, being one and the same, is in many places at the same time and is not at all separated from itself thanks to this; maybe in this way and every character can be one in all at the same time and remain the same.

It is very sympathetic, Socrates," he says, "that you put one and the same thing at the same time in many places; quite as if you were spreading one sail over many people and saying that here is one, and it is all over many. Don't you think you're claiming something like that?

It can be," he says.

And then would the whole sail be over everyone, or would a different part of it be over everyone?

Well part.

Therefore, Socrates," he says, "divisible are the characters themselves and those objects which participate in the character, each in some part of it, and no longer will the whole character be woven into each, but a part of each character.

It seems to be.

And would you like, Socrates," he says, "for one character to really divide into parts and remain something One?

In no way," he says.

After all, see," he says. - If you divide the greatness itself and each of the two is great due to a particle of greatness, smaller than the greatness itself, doesn't it seem senseless?

Yes," he says.

Well, and if each gets a small fraction of equality, what will it have that would make it equal to anything if it has something less than equality itself?

Impossible.

Or one of us will have a particle of smallness. And from it the smallness will be greater. And to whom the particle subtracted would be useful, he will become smaller and not bigger than before.

And god forbid," he says, "something too!

Then in what way, Socrates," says Parmenides, "will other objects participate in the characters with you, if they cannot participate in them either partially or wholly?

No, by Zeus," he says, "I don't think it's an easy thing to establish such a thing in any way.

Well, what are you going to do about it?

With what?

I have the impression that it seems to you, for such a reason, that every figure is one. When you think that there are many some great objects, it may be, it seems to you, when you look at all of them, that there is someone and the same idea, and therefore you think that what is great is something One.

You speak the truth," he says.

And what when you look at greatness itself and at these other great objects, if you view it all together in the same way with the eyes of the soul, won't someone greatness appear to you again, due to which it all must appear great?

I think it is.

So a new, different form of greatness will show up, in addition to greatness itself and those objects that participate in it. And in addition to all of these, another one, which will make these all great. And in this way you will never have one figure in any case, but you will get an infinite number of them.

And Socrates says: Parmenides, and perhaps every character is a thought of these things, and it cannot reside anywhere else but in the souls. In this way each would be something One, and Already would not happen to it what was now spoken of}.

At first glance, it might seem that Parmenides is accusing Plato that his theory of ideas simply falls into *regressus ad infinitum*. However, this would be a rather weak accusation, since *regressus ad infinitum* is a bad thing *in* itself. This is not the case, however, unless one assumes in advance the accuracy of a radically monistic metaphysics. It is possible that in some dispute

between the Platonists and the Eleatics, ATC was part of Parmenides' version of the defense of monism, but it turned out that the argument works without the need to appeal to the thesis proclaiming that being is indivisible.

According to Plato, there are individual things and their ideas, with some kind of relationship between things and ideas; in *Parmenides*, things are said participate in ideas. An important component of Platonic theory is the thesis that if *a, b, c,* . are things and *I* is the corresponding idea, then *I* is the One; it is this thesis that Parmenides criticizes. In the first part of the quoted passage, he argues that the participation of things in ideas cannot be understood in a physicalistic way, because then it is impossible to assume that ideas are something One, or more precisely, that every idea IS something One. There remains the possibility of a logical-epistemological interpretation of this participation of things in ideas. With this interpretation, things participate in ideas in such a way that they fall under ideas, e.g. people fall under the idea of man, i.e. under Man. This appropriateness, however, continues Parmenides, requires another idea of man, say Man*, which is precisely the third man next to any representative of the human race and Man - hence the name of the argument. Thus, humans correspond to Man because humans and Man correspond to Man*; the reasoning can be repeated, leading to Man**, and further to an infinite hierarchy of ideas of Man. Since the argument applies to any idea, the thesis that any idea is One is false. Socrates counter-argued that ideas exist in our souls. Such an explicit conceptualist solution was not seriously considered by Plato, and Parmenides was very quick to counter it. Indeed, Plato neither in *Parmenides* nor in his other dialogues answered the ATC convincingly.

Plato's language is not entirely unambiguous. Certainly we can find in him justification for the sentence: *Justice is just*, and perhaps *even Greatness is great*, while somehow the sentence: Man is man sounds unnatural, the capital letters in the above sentences marring that they are talking about ideas. If we now allow that these sentences are in order, we have, for example, when considering Greatness, that there must be some idea which Greatness is great. From this, however, it does not at all follow that this idea has to be Greatness*, since Greatness can be great due to Greatness, that is, due to itself. Such a defense of the theory of ideas presupposes the admissibility of self-conversion, but self-conversion sentences will already issue, as Gregory Vlastos pointed out, in the ATC formulation[17] . Let's call sentences such as those considered recently - Platonic sentences. If we allow them as legitimate, then ATC violates (this is Vlastos' position) the principles of type theory, but these principles are also violated by the Platonic theory of ideas. Already Aristotle noted that ATC is based on the assumption that the subjects of Platonic sentences are individual names, while they denote secondary substances. The same was emphasized by Russell when he claimed that Plato according to ATC mixed up the sentences *Socrates is a man* and *Man is a man* .[18]

ATC can be countered as follows. Assume that Platonic sentences are fallacious. Therefore, it is not allowed to formulate the sentence: *Greatness is Great*, nor the sentence:

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[17] G. Vlastos: *The third man argument in the "Parmenides*". "The Philosophical Review" 1954, no. 63; an analysis and critique (not very convincing in my opinion) of Vlastos' views is given in Penner: *The Ascent from Nominalism*. Dordrecht 1987.

[18] B. Russell: *History of Western Philosophy*. London 1945, pp.148-149.

Greatness is Great. What is permissible, however, is the sentence: *Greatness Is Great** and subsequent sentences like I^{n-1} is $I^{n}*$, where the number of asterisks in the subject is one less than the number of asterisks in the predicate. From a formal point of view, there is no reason to assume that for some n, $I^{n-1} = I^{n}*$, although ontologically the matter is not so simple. The price for this is the exclusion of Platonic sentences, including the sentence: Good is good, thus a sentence very important in Plato's system.

The formal structure of the ATC is simple, but its meaning, as it turned out, is overly complex. The use of logical constructs in the analysis of the ATC proved to be of great help in its interpretation. This is an example of the non-trivial, I think, hermeneutical role of logic in philosophy.