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WORKSHOPS IN PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY

Having taught history of philosophy classes with university students for over twenty years, I have made the following observations:

* Students are reluctant to speak up: neither do they formulate their own position on theoretical issues, nor do they pose questions,

* do not see the philosophical problems in the material presented to them,

* Even students in the older years of the philosophy course do not associate philosophical positions with problems, but only with the persons of the creators of these conceptions.

The presented behavior of students seems to be the result of teaching, at all levels, according to the traditional model, in which the main emphasis is on clear, unambiguous transmission and faithful reproduction of information. This leads to the formation of a habit in the audience of passive participation in classes, with all its consequences. Leaving aside the question of to what extent such a model of education meets the basic goals set for modern education, I believed that one should not rely solely on it when teaching philosophy subjects. First of all, because giving students *ex cathedra* a certain pool of philosophical positions, i.e. ready-made solutions to specific problems, obliterates the essential feature of this discipline. For philosophy is not only a collection of ideas and theories about man and the world, but also **the art of thinking and dialogue.**

Thus, concepts and systems should be taught in philosophical education. However, a mere report of other people's views[1], what Heidegger calls "babble" (Gerede), is not enough. In addition to it, it is necessary to provoke students to philosophical thinking and conversation[2].

The question I constantly ask myself is: *How to conduct classes to include all aspects of philosophy?* The following is the result of my years-long search for a solution to this question: a type of class that I have called **a workshop on philosophical inquiry.** They do not constitute

[1] K. Kruszewski in his book *Education in Higher Education. Handbook of didactic skills.* Warsaw 1988, writes: "A lecture is a teaching method by which information from the lecturer's notes is transferred to the students' notes, bypassing the consciousness of both parties."

[2] Cf. W. B. Irvine: *Teaching philosophy without reading the readings.* "Philosophical Education" No. 17/1994; A. Bear: *Readings in philosophy.* "Philosophical Education" No. 17/1994.

panacea for all the ills of philosophy didactics. Thus, they are not meant to replace other classes in the subject, but can only supplement them.

Workshops on philosophical inquiry are not aimed at developing erudition, but solely at training thinking and dialogue skills, which, contrary to appearances, do not automatically improve with the acquisition of information. My idea has two important sources of inspiration: the program "Philosophizing with Children" and the method of workshop work.

The "Philosophy with Children" program was created in the 1970s by philosophy professor Matthew Lipman (Montclair State College, USA)[3]. It is called "a new paradigm in philosophical education" as well as "a new pedagogy of philosophy." This is because it is not a propaedeutic of the discipline, it does not aim to convey any substantive content, but sets itself the task of shaping a certain type of cognitive and social attitudes[5]. Above all, it wants to:

* train the ability to formulate one's own position and argue in favor of it as a result of the habit of critical thinking, which "first, is based on criteria, second, corrects itself, and third, is characterized by sensitivity to context. "[6]
* sustain and develop wonder[7] and cognitive curiosity, which are the motives for striving to understand the world;
* teach group communication.

The tool for achieving the stated goals in this program is dialogue. In it, questions are posed and answers are sought, an attempt is made to understand the position of the partner, an effort is made to recognize its validity or question it, an effort is made to form and express one's own opinion on a given topic and to cite arguments in favor of it. One may wonder whether this is indeed a "new paradigm" in the teaching of philosophy, for it brings irresistibly to mind the majeutic method of Socrates.

[3] The "Philosophy with Children" program, initially implemented in a few American schools, is now used in dozens of countries around the world. It is constantly being improved and adapted to the realities of different societies. This is done by institutions affiliated with ICPIC (International Council for Philosophical Inquiry with Children). In Europe, the main centers are located in Graz, Amsterdam, Madrid, Barcelona, Sofia, Glasgow. They publish their journals, organize congresses and train teachers. In Poland, in 1993, a Postgraduate Study for Teachers was established at the Institute of Philosophy of the Polish Academy of Sciences to promote the program. Currently, the activities of the Study have been incorporated into the work of the Education for Democracy Foundation (00-252 Warsaw, 5/30 Podwale Street, tel/fax 0-22-8277636, e-mail edudemo@ikp. atm. com pl. .).

[4] *Philosophy - not just for adults.* "Ład" No. 51, 1993.

[5] B. Elwich, A. Łagodzka, R. Piłat: *Philosophy for children. Program* . Warsaw 1996

[6] M. Lipman: *What is critical thinking?* In *Philosophy for children - a selection of articles.* Warsaw 1996, p. 13.

[7] "Your condition, your astonishment are characteristic of the philosopher. For there is no other beginning of philosophy than astonishment" (Plato: *Theaetetus,* 156 cf.).

However, in comparison with it, the originality of the teaching technique in the "Philosophizing with Children" program lies in the departure from the traditional pattern of communication in the teaching process. Communication here does not follow the master-student axis, but its center becomes the group, all participants of which, including the instructor, are equal in speaking. An indispensable technical procedure, in which this equality is manifested and which at the same time promotes its realization, is the elimination of the teacher's physically distinguished place. He is not placed in front of the group, whose participants face him, while their backs are to their colleagues, but all the participants of the class, including teacher, sit in a circle - facing each other.

Another manifestation of the principle of equality is a further specific rule of work in the program under discussion: it is not the instructor who poses the questions considered in class, but the group members. The function of the teacher in this initial phase of the class is to present material that becomes the inspiration for the formulation of problems[8]. In the classic Lipmanian approach this is a text[9]; I much prefer an exercise related to a concrete life experience. I am convinced that the closer this exercise is connected with everyday life, the better it makes visible the close, but so often overlooked by students, connection between philosophy and the world; in other words, it makes clear that "philosophy is a critical consideration of reality and the theorems and theories that claim to provide knowledge about reality. "[10] An indispensable condition for the material presented is to draw attention to some philosophically significant aspect of the world picture. In the next phase of the class, the instructor asks the participants to formulate questions, problems that arise in the context of the presented material. All statements without any selection are recorded on large sheets of paper hung on the board. This documentation, serves many functions. It makes it possible at any time, including in the next class, to recall what has already been said. It allows to systematize and summarize the results of inquiries. It serves as a sub-station for the duty officer to write a report on the course of the class, which is important because workshop students do not take notes on anything.

[8] Those interested in a detailed presentation of the successive steps of the methodology of classes according to the discussed program are referred to the text: W. Kolodziejczak: "Philosophy for Children". - . "Education and Dialogue" No. 4/ 1993.

[9] M. Lipman has prepared a series of didactic novels designed for seven age groups from 6 to 16. They are a source of texts for use in philosophy lessons (See: R. Pilate: *Philosophy for Children.* "Bulletin of the Olympiad of Philosophy" 1992.

[10] E. Nagel: *Naturalism.* In J. Krzywicki (ed.): *American philosophy.* Boston 1958, p. 223.

The stage of collecting questions culminates in deciding which of them the larger part of the group finds most interesting (contrary to my fears, this was never a trivial issue, devoid of important theoretical implications). The chosen issue first becomes the subject of conversation[11]. It begins with the indication of doubts, ambiguities related to the problem under discussion, suggestions are expressed as to its solution, gradually the formulation of views and their clashing occurs. The bargaining coin is arguments, not the magic of an invoked authority or position in the hierarchy of the educational system. Everyone speaks for himself and from himself, it is accepted not to support the names of recognized authors, although the rationale used by them on a given issue can be cited.

All statements are meticulously noted. The ideas of the individual are the driving force behind the deliberations, they are supplemented, changed, replaced by others. Almost all voices play a positive role in the inquiry, if only in that they provide a negative reference point, allow the creation of an opposition. The role of the presenter is not to instruct, to evaluate the statements, or to inform what his opinion is on a given issue, but to stimulate the activity of the participants, taking care that each statement is clear, justified, related to other positions already formulated by colleagues. He should also organize the collected statements, encourage them to detail or, conversely, to generalize them. It is desirable that at no stage of the class, including at the end of the class, he should not allow the polemic to be closed, but open it, for example, by pointing out the difficulties associated with the positions presented by the class participants. Therefore, also at the end of the class, the instructor does not present the "correct" solution to the problems raised. He is absolutely bound by the rule: "do not overtake the groups." When I came across the workshop method of teaching[12] I found that its methodology coincides with the rules used in the "Philosophizing with Children" program. Although I have not encountered any reference to workshop didactics in the literature on the latter, it uses this very method. A method in which special emphasis is placed on stimulating the intellectual activity of class participants, their equality,

[11] Often this very issue is identified in the report by the duty officer as the topic of the class. The instructor never begins them by stating the topic, because he simply does not know it. This is because he doesn't know either what problems will emerge or which ones will become the subject of consideration.

[12] The workshop method of teaching was developed in pedagogy and humanistic psychology, which applied processual theories of learning and memory. The first attempts to work with this technique took place in the late 1940s in the US. For those interested in the theory of the workshop *method*, I recommend the book *Workshop Method in the Education of Interpersonal Skills,* collective work. Warsaw 1996.

respect for different opinions and views and to eliminate the element of judgment[13].

A common teaching technique has at its core similarities in goals and assumptions. Both Lipman's program and the workshop method set themselves the task of teaching primarily specific skills, than imparting theoretical content[14]. They are also united by the conviction that group work can be more effective here than individual work, and employ a form of teaching that attempts to use the potential of the group[15]. These potentials are the resources of knowledge, experience and skills of its members, as well as the capabilities of the group as a whole, manifested in the mutual inspiration and motivation of its participants and the creation of a situation for the confrontation of different points of view. In both programs, use techniques that trigger purposeful and spontaneous activity and personal involvement of participants. This is supposed to lead to a situation in which not only the intellect, but also emotions are involved in the learning process. In the case of philosophy classes, the problems taken up during the course are clarified, developed, questioned in the group, they also become "personal matter" of each participant in these inquiries, which is the essence of the "authentic philosophizing..., which is inquiry and response by man himself. "[16] Moreover, both programs make the identical worldview assumption that every individual[17] possesses the ability to think creatively, that activates under favorable conditions.

The latter premise corresponds closely with the understanding of philosophy adopted by the proponents of its "new pedagogy" that philosophy is not only a

[13] Cf. *Method workshop in training interpersonal skills* , collective work. Warsaw 1996, p. 12.

[14] Ibid p. 69.

[15] Cf. [15] B. Elwich, A. Łagodzka, R. Piłat: *Philosophy for children. Program information.* Warsaw 1996. p. 12-18: E. Nęcka: *Collective mind, or group creative thinking* "Psychological Review" No. 2/1985; *Workshop method in training interpersonal skills,* collective work. Warsaw 1996, pp. 37-38.

[16] W. A. Luijpen: *Existential phenomenology.* Warsaw 1972, p. 11.

[17] For the "Philosophizing with Children" program, it is particularly important to grant the ability to philosophize to children. This involves, among other things, making certain assumptions about the nature of the child (cf. E. Martens: *Philosophizing with children as the impetus (though not only) of ethics lessons.* In: *Philosophizing with children - a selection of articles.* Warsaw 1996, p. 41). The concept of childhood is considered socio-culturally (cf. F. Aries: *History of Childhood.* Gdansk 1995). It is shaped both by traditional ideas and the achievements of developmental psychology. Lipman's program refers to the results of contemporary cross-cultural comparative studies. They point to the enormous influence of the environment in the process of developing children's intellectual capabilities (cf. E. Martens. L. Ruch: *Psychology and Life.* Warsaw 1988, p. 186). The impact of this factor was not taken into account in his pioneering research by J. Piaget, which provides grounds for lowering the age ceilings established by him for the given intellectual activities.

knowledge, but also thought activity.[18] We find a similar position in many thinkers from Socrates to Kant to contemporary authors. Wittgenstein declares: "Philosophy is not a theory, but an activity. (...) Thoughts otherwise obscure and indistinct philosophy should illuminate and sharply demarcate "[19].

Both presented didactic programs have another common feature, namely the universality of their application. The experience of psychologists shows that the workshop method is suitable for working with anyone, regardless of age, education, occupation or intelligence quotient, they can be high-level professionals, as well as people with learning disabilities.[20] Also methodology of classes promoted by the program of "philosophizing with children" is successfully applied at different levels of education: in pre-school[21], in elementary[22] and high school[23], in regular and post-graduate studies. This adaptation to different ages and levels of is made possible by the fact that the group always talks about a topic of interest to them (they themselves formulate the problem they are discussing) and considers the problem at their own intellectual and linguistic level (the topic is developed by the class participants, not by the teacher).

The parallels presented above between the "Philosophizing with Children" program and the workshop method, as well as the fact that the presented methodology is useful at all levels of philosophical education, and not only for classes with children, make the term **"philosophical inquiry workshop"** seem to be an adequate name for this type of philosophy classes**.**

I will emphasize again that the workshop on philosophical inquiry is not meant to replace all philosophy classes. It is clear that neither can philosophy be professionally practiced without knowledge of its history, nor the course of the subject. "The history of philosophy" should not go without presenting problems, figures and texts representative of European thought. However, "In philosophy it is not (...) just about knowing how others solve problems,

[18] D. G. Camhy, G. Iberer. *Teaching "Philosophy for Children". Research on the mental and personal development of students.* "Philosophical Education" No. 5/1988, p. 183; J. Machnacz: *Philosophizing with children "*Universal Review" No. 2, 1992, p. 307; D. G. Cahmy: *Philosophieren mit Kindern und Jugendlichen.* "Information Philosophie" No. 2/1994, p. 70.

[19] L. Wittgenstein: *Tractatus logico-philosophicus.* Warsaw 1970.

[20] *Workshop method in interpersonal skills training,* collective work. Warsaw 1996, p. 85.

[21] *Already in kindergarten. But not yet in school.* "Forum" No. 11/1994.

[22] M. Nowicka-Kozioł: *Philosophizing in elementary school.* "New School," No. 4; R. Pilat: *"Philosophizing with Children" by M. Lipman as an ethics program for elementary schools.* "Ethics," No. 26/1993; J. de Brujin: *How is philosophy taught to children in Europe?* "Philosophical Education," no. 15/1993.

[23] See D. Kurczab: *Lesson reports.* In: *Lesson outlines. Supporting materials for the program "Philosophy at School."* Warsaw 1994.

but about posing problems on one's own and seeking appropriate resolutions. "[24] The classes in question serve precisely to awaken a personal approach to philosophy and to train the ability to undertake philosophical reflection on one's own. They are well suited for courses that are a first encounter with philosophy (then we avoid the problem of whether the group understands what is being said to them), they work well as an "introduction to philosophy" for philosophy students. They function well in exercises on the history of philosophy as an "interlude" explicating the issues discussed[25].

Below are reports of several workshops on philosophical inquiry that I conducted. The reports were made by the students, participants in the classes, who acted as duty bearers, i.e. they recorded the next methodical steps and the statements of their colleagues, without censoring anything. The statements of the students were also not corrected by the instructor, as – let me emphasize it again – these activities are not about cleverly guiding the group into preplanned tracks and positions, but about provoking them to formulate a problem and think about it together.

Lodz, November 1997

COVERAGE OF THE CLASS *INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY* FOR STUDENTS OF THE FIRST YEAR OF PHILOSOPHY 1996/1997

The class began with an exercise.

The presenter handed everyone the same picture (3 x 5cm), a piece of a larger photocopy, and a blank sheet of A-4 paper, and instructed:

Play the whole of which the passage is a part.

We got down to work, each drawing the whole thing on his sheet of paper. After a short time, we began to present our compositions to the group. We took turns saying what they represented. The ideas were varied and none were repeated. There was a corrida, an eastern city building, a wall, a street genre scene, an abstract painting - not depicting, a maze, a mosaic, a piece of decorative tape, etc.

We received another order:

Think about what procedure you performed in reconstructing the whole based on the fragment.

[24] J. Tischner: Introduction. In W. Diemer: *An elementary course in philosophy - Philosophical Anthropology*.

[25] One of the peculiarities of the workshop method is the difficulty of measurable evaluation of its effects. First, it is not easy to assess changes in the thinking process, activity, engagement, intellectual openness, etc. Secondly, the effects are not necessarily immediate, but may occur only after some time.

We made treatments that can be boiled down to:

* enlarging the fragment,
* duplication of the fragment motif,
* to add a meaningful picture inspired only by some aspect of the fragment,
* to create a situation in which the entire inflicted fragment played a significant role,
* construction of an abstract image, in which our fragment played a marginal role.

The presenter gave us copies from which the fragment came. The whole depicted a picture of a Gothic cathedral, and the cut-out fragment was part of a portal.

Then we formulated questions (problems) that arose for us in connection with the exercise. Here they are:

1. What situation do we find in when learning about reality?
2. Can we know reality?
3. Isn't our cognition a search in the dark?
4. What do we call a whole and what do we call a fragment?
5. Can the whole be reconstructed on the basis of knowledge of a fragment?
6. What do you need to know to recreate the whole thing?

Question 5 was chosen first for consideration.

Is it possible to reconstruct the whole based on knowledge of the fragment?

There were statements:

* Based on a fragment, one cannot arrive at the truth about the whole,
* Knowing the ticker, everyone has different associations,
* Fragments are different from each other; the size and importance of the fragment determines the correctness of the association of the whole,
* A person does not always search in the dark, sometimes he already has some knowledge and experience on the subject,
* It is not so much the size of a fragment that determines the accurate reconstruction of the whole, but the knowledge of its function in this whole,
* Important is the arrangement of the whole, its structure,
* Yes, knowing the structure is very important, it determines what the whole is, then we may be wrong about the details of the whole, but we will reconstruct the whole.
* In order to reconstruct the whole we must first know it, for example, having a porcelain ear - we will reconstruct the cup, because we know it, but after all, it may be an ear for another vessel, which we do not know.

We moved on to about the problem:

What kind of situation do we find in when learning about reality?

Statements were made:

* From what position do we learn about reality?

* Knowing reality, we have no point of reference,
* What is the totality here? What framework determines wholeness?
* How can we know that what we call the whole is not some puzzle of another larger puzzle, we always use fragments of reality,
* The cognizer himself determines what is a whole and what is a fragment,
* But after all, he doesn't do it completely arbitrarily,
* What is guiding the designation of the whole?
* One cognition influences the other; do we improve our views?
* Entity that has a vision of the "whole" would be the Absolute,
* What conditions must be met to be an Absolute?
* Can the Absolutes be many?
* AND is there an Absolute at all?

That was the end the class, the discussion was moved to the backstage area.

PROSEMINAR REPORT
WORKSHOPS IN PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY
FOR THIRD-YEAR PHILOSOPHY STUDENTS 1997/1998

The class began with an exercise reminiscent of the game of "Chinese whispers" the modification being that information was passed to the next person out loud, and the whole group listened to the messages. Four people participated in the game, the others were observers. Three people (I, II, III) left the room, and the fourth (IV), along with the rest of the group, listened to a newspaper text about a bandit attack on a cab driver. Then we asked one of the people (I) staying in the hall and colleague IV told her the text she had heard. In turn, the person who had just listened to the oral report was to pass it on to the next person staying behind the door. After a while, the situation was repeated. When, at the end of the game, the last person repeated aloud the information heard, we compared it with the original. The information had changed, which we were already aware of in the course of the game, because with our "own ears" we heard what transformations each reporter had made....

The presenter posed the question:

How has the information changed?

We found that it has been shortened. A lot of details were gone. Locations were missing. The age of the characters was blurred (the text referred to teenagers, oral accounts included the term "men," which that the criminals were adults). The motives of the act, its circumstances and context were omitted (report from the prosecutor's office). The qualification of an act was changed (the text proclaimed that the cab driver was stabbed, the last verbal message

suggested, he was killed). There was a confusion of facts, their change. A modernization of the situation was made (in the original there was a million-dollar bill, in the message it became a hundred-dollar bill). New details appeared. The emotional coloring of the story changed.

Then we got a question:

What was the reason for these changes?

We have listed a dozen reasons: poor comprehension, inattention, lack of concentration, poor memory, tendency to fill memory gaps with new details, lack of awareness of the purpose for which the knowledge of the text listened to will be used, fantasy; different emotional attitudes, different experience of the listeners, different value systems (paying attention to certain facts and considering them important, emphasizing particular facts and downplaying others).

In conclusion, we found that each successive transmission (and reception) bore the stamp of subjectivity of the respective sender (and receiver). All transformations of the text were made unconsciously, unintentionally.

We were instructed to formulate questions and problems that arise for us in the context of the above situation. The questions that arose were:

* Is this how a rumor is created?
* Is this a common situation?
* Where does the subjectification of the message not happening?
* What is information?
* Is there objective information?
* What do we mean by "subjective" and "objective"?
* To start the conversation, we chose a problem:

Where does the subjectification of the message not happen?

Someone said that information recorded on tape does not get transformed when played back. Another person pointed out that technical errors can occur on the tape, part of the information can be erased, distorting the whole.

They began to wonder what it is like for a good translator translate a text into languages. The conclusion was clear: translation is individualized, a particular word in a given language can be translated differently (for example, translations by different authors); through translation, different meanings can be given to the original.

Then someone pointed out that mathematical equations can be conveyed without subjectivizing the message. However, here, too, there were doubts, because specific equations can be placed in different contexts, systems and will have a different meaning. It was difficult for us to point out a message that cannot and is not subjectivized. The question arose: aren't the facts objectified? We began to consider:

What is an objective fact?

Two positions have emerged. According to one – a fact is an event, something that happens outside of us, but everyone understands it in his own way. Thus, there are no objective facts.

The second option maintained that there are objective facts. They function in science, are verified there, certified by scientists according to certain criteria.

A counter-argument has been made against the last position: why suppose that the criteria are objective if they change. They are not individual, but group-determined, but does that mean they are absolute? Probably not. In fact, the difference between a fact and its description is blurred, because what is a fact if no one talks about it? On the other hand, it is spoken using language, and this very mechanism already subjectifies the description. When we say "actually" we mean "really", but we don't notice that we ourselves define what that fact was.

Supporters of the second position defended themselves that, after all, there are objective facts, for example, that there was a battle then and there.

The determination of the [battle's] date has been questioned; it can be given in different calendars. Secondly, there are doubts whether the transmission of the date is accurate. Thirdly, one could say that it is not a battle but just a skirmish.

The class was coming to an end. We did one more exercise. The instructor asked each of us to objectively describe on a piece of paper the event we had observed (this was an activity done by the instructor). After reading the descriptions, it turned out that no two were identical. They differed as to what action was performed (throwing, dropping, placing), how it was performed (gently, vigorously), what was the object of the action (notebook, notebook pad, organizer).

The final conclusion was that it is undeniable that something had happened at some point.

REPORT ON EXERCISES IN THE *HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY* FOR FOURTH-YEAR BIOLOGY STUDENTS 1996/1997

As we sat in a circle, the presenter put a chair in the middle of the room and said:

Please provide the features of this item.

The answers were:

* brown
* bolted
* is backed
* scratched
* has a registration number
* has a seat

* has transverse rungs
* four legs
* wooden

We were instructed to do a thought experiment and ask ourselves **how the object would change if these characteristics were changed.**

One by one we considered. If the object was not brown but, for example, green, it would still be the same object i.e. a chair, but not the same. Similarly, it was the same with the bolt-on feature. It is different with the feature of having a backrest. If the object in question had no backrest it would cease to be a chair and become a stool. Having a seat or not having scratches and an evidence number did not prevent the object from being a chair. It was different with the seat, without it the object ceased to be a chair. The number of seats possessed was also important, namely, with only one seat it was a chair, while a greater number would make the object a bench. Changing the number or eliminating the rungs did not affect the fact that we were dealing with a chair, just a slightly different one. The feature of having four legs turned out to be problematic: to be a chair, the object does not need to have this number of legs (it could have three or one, for example), but it needs some kind of support, because without it, it would not be a chair, but a seat on the floor. We have established that it needs "footedness" to be a chair. The last characteristic we discussed – being wooden – also turned out to be irrelevant to whether an object is a chair; after all, there can be wooden chairs, plastic chairs, wicker chairs.

We concluded the exercise by saying that we can distinguish two groups of features of the object. One is such that it determines that it is a chair, that is, it belongs to the species of chairs. The second are those that do not affect its species membership, but are inherent to the individual.

We then considered how to name the two groups of features:

We proposed:

TYPICAL	OR	INDIVIDUAL
GROUP	OR	INDIVIDUAL

Once again, we have reiterated what these characteristics determine: species characteristics determine what an object is, individual characteristics determine the individuality of an object, distinguish it from other exemplars of a given species, tell what an object is like.

We were asked the question:

Does the separation of genre and individual characteristics apply only to this chair we are discussing, or does it have a broader dimension?

The answers were:

* has a broader dimension,

* all animals and plants belong to a species and have individual characteristics,

* not only living beings, but all objects have these two types of characteristics; we were talking about a chair here, but we could talk about a bench or a shoe,

* it seems that if one were to find an object that is in a single exemplar, there would be a problem with the separation of these features,

* but what exists in a single copy? and even if it did, you would describe it in by the characteristics you know,

* maybe so, but one wouldn't know which are genre and which are individual features,

* God is one,

* and the gods of other religions?

* after all, these are not Gods, but totems,

* but what qualities does God really have?

* in truth, there is no God, but if there really was one and we knew his qualities, they could not be separated into species and individual,

* a Sun,

* come on, the Sun is one of the stars after all,

* the cosmos is one,

* precisely, also there is no difference between its

features. The next question we received was:

Is the separation of traits into species and individuals an invention of philosophers, or do we use it in everyday life?

We answered:

* we use it in everyday life, for example, when I go to the store to buy a **chair,** I don't always know specifically what it will be,

* the same when I go to buy shoes,

* I don't have to buy anything, but I think about what to make for **dinner,**

* we refer to specific characteristics when we talk about a particular individual, e.g. my colleague Mariola K.

The presenter set a new task:

Can species characteristics change, and if so, in what situation?

* they can during evolution,

* but then you are dealing with a new species, the old characteristics have not changed, there is a new species and an old species,

* what if a species goes extinct?

* dinosaurs became extinct, but we know their species characteristics, they have not changed,
* and if humans became extinct, what about the species characteristics of dinosaurs?
* they would cease to exist, would disappear,
* And if dinosaurs were alive and there were no humans?
* there would be genre features,
* or there would be no species traits, because only humans know which traits are species and which are individual,
* and does God know which traits are species and which are individual? Even if there were no dinosaurs and no humans, species traits would exist in God's mind,
* God does not exist, species characteristics exist only in the consciousness of man,
* But after all, there were animal species before the appearance of man?

With this question our class ended.