

# *Embodied phenomenology (embodied phenomenology)* and the thesis of psychophysical identity

Tomasz Kąkol

(University of Gdańsk,  
Institute of Philosophy)

*[...] how a brain (or anything else that is physical) could manage to be a locus of conscious experience... This is, surely, among the ultimate metaphysical mysteries; don't bet on anybody ever solving it.*

J.A. Fodor

*[...] we will not get very far in giving a scientific account of the relationship between consciousness and the brain unless we have a clear conception what it is that we are trying to relate.*

S. Gallagher, D. Zahavi

## Introduction

In 20th- and 21st-century philosophy of mind, much analysis has been devoted to arguing for and against the thesis of psychophysical identity. However, if one were to ask someone who studied this problem under the guidance of, for example, Saul Kripke, Jaegwon Kim or David Chalmers, how *phenomenology* views this issue, they would probably reply that either they are not interested in this issue, or (more likely) they would reply that they are closer (at least) to the negation of this thesis, since phenomenology has always been an anti-naturalistic current in philosophy.

However, there is a fairly large group of researchers who do not limit themselves to exegesis of the works of Edmund Husserl and his disciples or continuators, but who understand the relevance of their insights to contemporary cognitive science, with which they co-work and not just criticize. This current is most simply described as "*embodied phenomenology*," since the phenomenon of *embodiment* (*embodiment*), described by thinkers such as Edmund Husserl, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Jean-Paul Sartre and Paul Ricoeur, is considered by them to be central to understanding many philosophical problems. I think that researchers working within the analytical philosophy of mind - both supporters and opponents of the thesis of psychophysical identity - may be interested in the fact that the said thesis seems to receive unexpected (in light of the stereotypical understanding of phenomenology) support precisely from the current associated with the most prominent anti-naturalist of the early 20th century: Husserl. In this article, however, I will defend the thesis that this is but a guise: the question of psychophysical identity remains open.

\*

Excerpts from a nearly 700-page collective work edited by the leader of this trend, Shaun Gallagher (and Daniel Schmicking)<sup>1</sup>, seem to leave no doubt: Dorothee Legrand asks rhetorically: "is it possible to be self-conscious without being *a body*?"<sup>2</sup>; below that we read, "*what it feels like to be a body*"<sup>3</sup>, and a little further on, that "the perceiving *self* (*self*) corresponds to the body-like-subject", but "the body-as-subject is the same physical object as the body-as-object"<sup>4</sup>. Similarly, another author, Jean-Luc Petit, writes about the "*experience* (of) being a body"<sup>5</sup>, while David Morris writes bluntly that the "*the mind is the body...the body is the mind*" (subc. in original)<sup>6</sup>. In his other work, Gallagher, along with Dan Zahavi, another prominent representative of

---

<sup>1</sup> *Handbook of Phenomenology and Cognitive Science*, eds. S. Gallagher, D. Schmicking, Springer, Dordrecht-New York-Heidelberg-London 2010. Translated from English unless otherwise noted - T.K.

<sup>2</sup> D. Legrand, *Myself with No Body? Body, Bodily-Consciousness and Self-consciousness*, in *Handbook of Phenomenology and Cognitive Science*, . cit. pp. 181 ff.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid, p. 183.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid, p. 188.

<sup>5</sup> J.-L. Petit, *A Husserlian, Neurophenomenological Approach to Embodiment*, in *Handbook of Phenomenology and Cognitive Science*, op. cit. p. 203.

<sup>6</sup> D. Morris, *Empirical and Phenomenological Studies of Embodied Cognition*, in *Handbook of Phenomenology and Cognitive Science*, op. cit. p. 242.

contemporary phenomenology, they write about "the body as subject, as experiencer, as perpetrator"<sup>7</sup> - i.e., that "*I am it*" (*I am it*), i.e., this body<sup>8</sup> - and, lest there be any doubt, they add: "what we describe as *lived* body from a phenomenological perspective is exactly the same body as the biological body we study from an objective perspective"<sup>9</sup>. Descartes' (and not only Descartes') question "who am I?" thus gains a clear, non-Cartesian answer: I am a (certain) body. But what is the argument for this thesis? Or rather - since we are talking about phenomenology - is it simply a descriptive thesis, reporting on a certain fact?

Let's first try to take a path seemingly distant from phenomenology - i.e. asking about the reference of nominal expressions in the thesis "[I] am a [certain] body"<sup>10</sup>.

## Irreducibility of the self

What does "I" refer to? At first glance, the matter seems clear: to whatever uttered the sentence (or necessarily the whole sentence?) containing the "I"<sup>11</sup>. What if it is a parrot, a computer, or even a human being who is unaware of this alleged semantic rule<sup>12</sup>? In the latter case, there seems to be no problem: it is enough to distinguish between the reference of the *expression* and the reference of the *user*<sup>13</sup> - the former is defined by the rule given above, while the latter may not even exist (or may be different from the former). Only that such rules are defined by the user or (as in the case of "I") some past users, so we can consider *them*. Here they are - we can assume that they just "invented" the

---

<sup>7</sup> S. Gallagher, D. Zahavi, *The Phenomenological Mind. An Introduction to Philosophy of Mind and Cognitive Science*, Routledge, London-New York 2008, p. 136.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid, p. 143.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid, p. 140.

<sup>10</sup> Rather than explain my understanding of the relationship between analytic philosophy and phenomenology, I will rest my case in the words of David Woodruff Smith: "There may be a cultural gap between these traditions, but there is no philosophical gap between them in terms of the issues I will address here" (D.W. Smith, *The Circle of Acquaintance. Perception, Consciousness, and Empathy*, Kluwer, Dordrecht-Boston-London 1989, p. 2).

<sup>11</sup> Cf. e.g. J. Campbell, *Personal Identity*, in *The Oxford Handbook of The Self*, ed. S. Gallagher, Oxford University Press, New York 2011, p. 344.

<sup>12</sup> Cf. e.g. J. Bremer, *Person - fiction or reality? Identity and unity of the Self in the light of neurological research*, Aureus, Krakow 2008, p. 261.

<sup>13</sup> Cf. S.A. Kripke, *Naming and*, translated by B. Chwedeńczuk, PAX, Warsaw 1988, p. 28 ff, especially note 3.

semantic rules governing words, e.g., "here," "now," "you" and "he," and now it's the turn of "I." Do they reason like this: "let I" refer to anything that utters a sentence or other expression containing "I." Here is a caveman from across the street moaned something like "I". So if he meant what I [*sic!*] mean now, he would refer - according to the rule above - to *himself*. Oh - I just used "I." Thus, I referred to *myself*." This made-up story - made-up in the same sense as the modern stories about the conclusion of the so-called "social contract" long ago - does, however, have a grain of truth in it (similar to those stories): it shows that knowledge of the rule defining *self-reference* presupposes the ability to (refer to oneself)<sup>14</sup>. Another variant of this story could go something like this: "let 'I' refer to anything that utters a sentence or other expression containing 'I.' I have ... Thus, I [*sic!*] referred to *myself*."

Someone will say: "but no, consider such a statement: "Sitting Bull is angry with Sitting Bull" - assuming that there is only one object available to the utterer of this sentence with such a designator. What is the point of this "I" at all? And what is special about self-reference? Nothing more special than in any other reflexive relation. Why, for example, not reflect on the supposedly interesting fact that the chief washes himself?"

Robert Nozick believes that the peculiarity of self-reference is that the referent does not occur just like that, simply, but for some reason, and this reason is the fulfillment of some condition (possession of a certain property)<sup>15</sup>. When we formulate a semantic rule for "I", we ascribe to the referent *the property of use* (utterance) "I": it is due to *it* that the "I" refers to what it refers to. It's just that this property appears *due to* the same act! On the other hand, the same is true of "now", *if* we agree that "now" denotes a time simultaneous with the time of the utterance containing "now"<sup>16</sup>: the moment *t* becomes the referent of "now" due to its simultaneity with the time of the utterance with "now", but to speak of simultaneity is only a verbal complication of a simple situation, since we do not have two moments (and one is simultaneous with the other), but only one (similarly, when we say that Kloss is identic with Moczulski, it does not mean that there are two people, one of whom is identic with the other)<sup>17</sup>.

---

<sup>14</sup> Cf. D. Zahavi, *First-person thoughts and embodied self-awareness: some reflections on the relation between recent analytical philosophy and phenomenology*, "Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences" 2002, Vol. 1, Issue 1, p. 10.

<sup>15</sup> R. Nozick, *Philosophical Explanations*, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1981, p. 72.

<sup>16</sup> Of course, as long as "now" is used in the ordinary superposition (below we also assume this condition).

In other words, the moment  $t$  becomes the referent of "now" through the very act of using "now" in  $t$ . Thus, one can say that words similar to "self" or "now" refer directly to their referents<sup>18</sup>. If one thinks they don't, one may get into trouble similar to Nozick, who consistently believes that *the self* (*self*) is *causa sui* - something that calls itself (*nomen omen*) into existence in an act of self-reference [!]<sup>19</sup>. On the other hand, direct reference for many looks "mysteriously": actually how do we know that it is taking place? Don't we proclaim that "I" or "Now" are some kind of "magic" words, that they cannot be "misused" (in the sense of: not referring "as they should")<sup>20</sup>? Unfortunately, many difficult philosophical threads lurk here: the problem of skepticism and conventionalism, for example. Kie- we imagine equipping linguistic signs to refer to the world by formulating semantic rules such as "let 'I' refer to anything that utters a sentence or other expression containing 'I'", it is natural to ask about the rest of the linguistic signs *already* used in this rule – the regress or vicious circle can be eliminated by "breaking " to the world, but this means just recognizing certain signs as "naturally referring"<sup>21</sup>.

Well, but what exactly is the referent of "I" or "now"? Even if these expressions directly refer us to their referents, what characteristics do these referents have? And if it is not clear, perhaps there is no question of any direct reference?

Someone may say, "Consider the word 'here.' It is ambiguous, as can be seen in sentences like "it's dark here" or "here is a splinter." In the first case, the reference rounds out the context – for example, when you enter an underground corridor connecting a network of bunkers, when you found a hatch in the woods that had not been used since the end of the last war in the first one; in the second one, in principle, too - as long as the composition of the

<sup>17</sup> The special theory of relativity introduces complications here, but we start with "everyday." "common sense" analysis. (As for an example, Abwehr officer Hans Kloss turned out to be agent Stanislaw Moczulski in a comic book series popular in the 1970s called *The Adventures of Captain Kloss*.)

<sup>18</sup> As for the self, this was clearly articulated by John McTaggart.

<sup>19</sup> R. Nozick, *Philosophical...*, op. cit. p. 75 What about, for example, time? [!]

<sup>20</sup> Since Sydney Shoemaker, there has been talk of "immunity to the mistake of misidentification" in this case.

<sup>21</sup> See J. Haldane, *The theory of mind-world sameness and the challenge of anti-realism*, translated by S. Judycki, T. Szubka, in *British Philosophy at the End of the 20th Century*, ed. by P. Gutowski, T. Szubka, TN KUL, Lublin 1998, pp. 131, 133; A. Pruss, *One Body*, Notre Dame University Press, Notre Dame 2013, s. 319; A. Chrudzinski, *Roderick Chisholm's theory of intentionality*, "Philosophical Quarterly" 2009, vol. 37, no. 3, p. 78.

context enters, e.g., your finger showing one of the limbs of the deceased in the cabinet of the forensic facility. Without that, the "here" rule would be very obscure, e.g. "a fragment of space around the use of 'here'. Why don't you see 'I' as something similarly unoccupied to 'here'?"

The answer to this is: yes, the example with "here" shows that here (*sic!*) we are also dealing with a phenomenon analogous to that associated with "I". This is because we used in the implicit semantic rule for "here" the expression "in the vicinity of the use of 'here'". How to determine the meaning of the expression "neighborhood" more closely, if not by something similar to the expression "here" or "there"? Similarly, we said above that "moment *t* becomes the referent of "now" through the very act of using the "Now" in *t*" - it is impossible to understand what it means for something to occur at a certain moment without first grasping the referent "now."

Nozick asks: if knowledge of the self occurs solely through some referential tool (designator, expression), how can we know that this tool relates to *me* (or: that *I* relate to *myself* through it)?<sup>22</sup> Is it possible to answer that it follows that we have some pre-linguistic access to , such as "mute" (self-)observation? But how do we know that we are observing *ourselves*? The American philosopher considers the hypothesis that the self is a kind of placeholder replacing its referent, which he finds *prima facie* paradoxical ("must the referent carrier always be a language-like object?" - he asks rhetorically<sup>23</sup>), but when one looks closer, it is not so different from the concept of direct reference. The question remains, however, in his view, *how do I* know that this "carrier" (i.e., the self) refers to itself. I perform a certain act. Ba, hidden in the end of the verb is already "I"<sup>24</sup>, so there is a certain perpetrator (subject, carrier) of this act. But how do I know, asks Nozick, that the carrier preceded the act, that it existed before the act? Why not assume that it came into existence *with the act*<sup>25</sup>? It seems that retentive consciousness, so artfully described by Husserl<sup>26</sup>, would be a good answer.

---

<sup>22</sup> Cf. R. Nozick, *Philosophical...*, op. cit. p. 81.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid, p. 82.

<sup>24</sup> Perhaps this is why Nozick considers the hypothesis suggested above to be *prima facie* paradoxical, because indeed, it is false, someone will say, that Thomas Kąkol is hidden in the ending of the verb "I make" (when this Thomas utters it). Someone will say that we have made a trivial confusion between language and metalanguage - well, no, since, according to the hypothesis considered by Nozick, the "I" is, as it were, a "empty space" on me just now.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid, p. 87.

<sup>26</sup> E. Husserl, *Lectures on the Phenomenology of the Inner Consciousness of Time*, translated by J. Sidorek, PWN, Warszawa 1989.

They address the doubts about the possible non-existence of the self before the act; however, in order to make sure that the solution that Nozick ultimately proposes is unacceptable, let us briefly study the nodal points of the American philosopher's theory.

First, Nozick goes further than "merely" postulating the existence of the self "in the moment" of performing (by what?) an act of reflexive (or first-person) autoreference<sup>27</sup>: he writes of an act relating to the self, like Aristotle's self-reflective thought or the anti-nomian sentence of the liar's paradox. I with Wojciech Žižek that such a thing is impossible, just like a hand drawing itself<sup>28</sup>. It is not true that only in the case of such a "self-drawing" self can the astonishing immunity of the self to misreference be explained. Nozick considers the related objection of the "momentality" of the self, but his answer is wrong. Consciousness or self-consciousness, we argue (following Husserl, but the primary consideration is, of course, factual, not authority), is not given other than, among other things, in the retentive horizon. This, among other things, *makes* reflection or reflexive self-reference *possible* at all, and *does not* interfere with explaining the immunity of the self to ! Nozick attempts to "temporally extend" his "momentary" self by saying that the *self* also constitutes or "builds into itself" "some past stage of *self*"<sup>29</sup> - the only question is, which "*self*" (*self*) does he mean? All the more so since the reference there is to "the *past self* of my [!] *past self*" (*my past self's past self*) and, as one might guess, subsequent iterations. "On the future side," it's no better either: "the self decides which of the various future entities [...] will be it [!]"<sup>30</sup>. Nozick, of course, is aware of the limitations on "self-creativity" of the self, although he is reluctant, one might say, to mention them - for example, on p. 667 (note 54) he discusses the possibility that the constitution of the self depends on interactions within the community - nor

<sup>27</sup> In the case of "Sitting Bull is Angry at Sitting Bull," theoretically, i.e., purely linguistically patently, we could have had a non-reflexive, : third-person, self-reference, but the chief most likely refers to himself in first-person, perhaps he just lacked the linguistic tools to express it.

<sup>28</sup> I am reminded here of a famous graphic by Maurits Escher: two hands drawing each other. See. W. Zlezaniec, *On the Non-Paradoxality of the Veridic*, "Phenomenology" 2014, no. 12, pp. 77-85. I za- mark that Zlezaniec does not claim that every self-reference is apparent - this is not the case, for example, with a purely linguistic self-reference like "this sentence is written in Polish" (ibid., p. 83). Incidentally, Nozick is aware of the "indigestibility" of his solution when he writes: "can the rabbit be pulled out of the rabbit?" (not "hat", since *causa sui*!; R. Nozick, *Philosophical...*, op. cit., p. 89), ultimately contenting himself, unfortunately, with merely invoking Fichte's authority ("the self establishes itself in this very act of establishing itself, and establishes itself as establishing, etc.").

<sup>29</sup> R. Nozick, *Philosophical...*, op. cit. p. 91.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid, p. 105.

miss different selves<sup>31</sup>! Does this mean that the "first selves" had more freedom in "au-creation"? Or, conversely, do these interactions enable freedom? Not to say that the charge of circularity has to be answered somehow, although, on the other hand, it's hard to expect it, since the self-creation of the self is already a glaring example of circular reasoning. After all, Nozick recognizes that the self is a certain *property*, not a subject of property [!]<sup>32</sup>. This seems to further confuse the issue rather than clarify it, especially when we consider what we already supposedly know about the self-thanks to Nozick. What/who am I? I am a property. What is it? The I, relatively being the I or - more nicely linguistically – *being me*. You are also the same property as to type, though not as to copy, hence I say you are *being you*. And the subject of this property? It is... the body [!]<sup>33</sup>. Sitting here in front of the computer is a certain body that has the property of... *being me*? This seems to subscribe to the theory of psycho-physical identity, which, after all, is contradicted on almost every page by Nozick's theory. So one would rather have to say that this sizable body has the property of being me. I am the property of this here body. Although Nozick writes, as if laughing in the face of Leibniz and others, about property traveling from subject to subject<sup>34</sup>, one can suppose that it (this property) is a temporary property of this body and perishes with it. How is it constituted? Through an act of reflexive self-reference? Or is she rather that act? But is such identification consistent? The questions could be multiplied.

A more moderate position seems to be taken by Lynne Rudder Baker, who distinguishes several degrees, as she calls them, of first-person phenomena (or perspectives)<sup>35</sup>. The weakest of these, in her view, is the possession of a point of view (perspective). Possessing mental states of the type of belief can occur even in the absence of more sophisticated abilities than possessing perspective [!]. A linguistic expression of the perceptual state of, say, a cat would be something like, say, "[I] see a mouse," but equally well, according to Baker, this state could be expressed by "here is a mouse." This is because the role of "I" in such a case would be that of "here" (or "here and now"). However, this seems to blur a difference: the state of "here is a mouse," if it can occur in a cat, can occur

---

<sup>31</sup> Again, this was a popular theme with German idealists.

<sup>32</sup> Ibid, p. 111.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid, p. 112.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid. As for Leibniz, he is referring to the famous §7 of *the Monadology*.

<sup>35</sup> L.R. Baker, "*The First-Person Perspective: A Test for Naturalism*," *American Philosophical Quarterly* 1998, Vol. 35, No. 4, pp. 327-348.



Without the state of "you can see the mouse"<sup>36</sup>. Second, and more importantly, a belief is probably more than a perceptual state. If one assumes, as Baker does, a cat's belief, one would have to express a rather similar one to the one evoked by, for example, "I am convinced that here is a mouse," only what then to do with "I?" Is it possible to paraphrase this alleged belief by "here is the belief that here is the mouse?". I think this position would be a bit more plausible if it proclaimed that the weakest first-person phenomenon is the possession of perspective, which is related to the occurrence of perceptual states whose linguistic expression would include spatial and/or temporal occasional expressions. In contrast, a strong first-person phenomenon, which Baker argues poses a particular challenge to reductive naturalism, is not even self-reference, but *the attribution* (to others or to oneself) of self-reference<sup>37</sup>. This thesis is actually not so different from Nozick's, for if we say that it is reflexive or first-person self-reference, Baker should, I think, agree that it is an equally strong phenomenon. The belief expressed in the sentence "I am tall" (or: the sentence "I am tall," insofar as it is an expression of a relevant belief) not only bears witness to the accomplishment of a reflexive self-reference, but also includes, contrary to Baker, the attribution of such a belief - for since the *belief* in question is "I am convinced that I am tall," its full expression is "I am convinced that I am tall," that is, I attribute to *myself* a belief (or what we shall call this mental state) with the content expressed by "I," and this already implies self-attribution of self-reference<sup>38</sup>.

Like Nozick, Baker argues very suggestively for the need to take into account reflexive self-reference (in its terminology: full or strong first-person perspective): The blinding of the mythical Oedipus cannot be explained by reasoning like "1. Whoever killed Laius should be blinded. 2. Oedipus killed Laius. *Ergo*: 3. Oedipus should be blinded," without taking into account his terrifying realization that it was *he himself who* killed him ("I killed him!")<sup>39</sup>.

---

<sup>36</sup> Cf. John Perry's amusing paraphrase of a certain practical syllogism according to Baker's prescription: "Up front in this cup is hot coffee; here is thirst and caffeine deprivation; so drink" (J. Perry, *On Knowing One's Self*, in *The Oxford Handbook...*, op. cit., p. 382).

<sup>37</sup> L.R. Baker, *The First-Person...*, op. cit. p. 330 et seq.

<sup>38</sup> Ibid, pp. 328, 330.

<sup>39</sup> See R. Nozick, *Philosophical...*, op. cit. p. 72 et .; L. R. Baker, *The First-Person...*, op. cit, s. 337 (Baker mistakenly thinks that instead of "Oedipus" one might as well insert "I" everywhere).

Finally, self-consciousness presupposes, according to Baker, first-person phenomena (full self-consciousness – full first-person perspective)<sup>40</sup>. Putting aside the issue of consciousness, the American author wants to prove the irreducibility of (full) *self-consciousness* through the irreducibility of reflective self-reference (relatively to the state of current knowledge, of course). She is not satisfied, for example, with postulating some additional, "special [...] first-person mode of representation" by which certain organisms can reflexively refer to themselves, because without further details, in particular - without proposing a mechanism for the emergence of such a mode, we will not advance in the explanation, we will only stop at another verbalization of the problem<sup>41</sup>. Adding that Baker ultimately adopts the convention to call "first-person perspective" only its "full" version<sup>42</sup>.

According to Zahavi, Baker erroneously describes perceptual states; this applies to both extraspection and proprioception<sup>43</sup>. In the first case, one "here" is distinguished, namely the perceptor. In the second, on the other hand, we have something very similar to "immunity to misidentification": it is impossible to mistake whether I am moving my foot or another's, although I can mistake whether I am watching my foot or my wife's<sup>44</sup>. Besides, when we consider that proprioceptive and kinesthetic sensations - leaving aside pathological cases - co-occur with extraspection, it turns out that already "ordinary" perception requires a certain self-awareness. On the one hand, it seems that the dispute is verbal, because Baker, as we mentioned, clearly writes about the gradability of self-awareness. According to Zahavi, however, he fails to take into account the specificity of perceptual states and the fact that what he reserves the name "first-person perspective" for is acquired through the experience of other subjects. The latter is a very delicate point. Classical phenomenologists are notoriously hesitant to argue that the so-called cognition of other minds is direct cognition, not some kind of inference<sup>45</sup>. Moreover, they claim that it is through grasping the Other,

<sup>40</sup> L.R. Baker, *The First-Person...*, op. cit. p. 327 et seq.

<sup>41</sup> Ibid, pp. 327, 341, 343, 346, fn. 30.

<sup>42</sup> Ibid, p. 332.

<sup>43</sup> See D. Zahavi, *First-person thoughts...*, op. cit. p. 11 et seq.

<sup>44</sup> E.g., when it is still quite dark in the room and our faintly visible feet are sticking out from under the quilt.

<sup>45</sup> The same is also true of phenomenologists from the "embodied" movement. See, for example, D. Zahavi, *Subjectivity and Selfhood. Investigating the First-Person Perspective*, Bradford Book/MIT Press, Cambridge, MA 2005, pp. 186-189; S. Gallagher, D. Zahavi, *The Phenomenological Mind...*, op. cit. pp. 178- 180, 186 et seq. Cf. also T. Kąkol, *On empathy. E. Stein and R. Ingarden vs cognitive psychology*,

we only come to *treat*<sup>46</sup> our "living here" (referring to Husserl's jargon<sup>47</sup>) as one of many fragments of space<sup>48</sup>. But how did these other subjects become subjects if they have a full first-person perspective? This can be called the problem of the First Subject. Zahavi tries to solve it by explaining the grasping of other minds by means of a kind of prior self-perception, so to speak, i.e. *Einfühlung-type* perception directed at one's body experienced in a first-person perspective<sup>49</sup>. But can it be said that self-feeling *generates* or *explains* reflexive self-reference? I think it rather presupposes it.

The conclusion would be that some form of reflexive self-reference is already present in the case of "ordinary" perceptual being in the world. Perhaps it would be misleading to use the word "reflexive" here, since there is no mention of reflection in the sense of a mental state referred to one's other state or another mental object (when, for example, I think "where were my eyes then!"), but it is nevertheless worth keeping this convention of Nozick in mind that he means the same thing that the term "first-person" expresses (Oedipus, before learning the truth about himself, also referred to himself by "the murderer of , " but in third-person). If I have been noticing dirty snow, brambles, dusty cars and a tank-monument on my way to work for days, I don't need to perform separate acts to realize that these are *my* perceptual states - which is different when I now actively (actively) recall these past states. This does not mean, however, that before I made them the object of present thoughts, these states were unconscious or nobody's (was I, driving to work, a zombie?)<sup>50</sup>. Perception and mental states in general are called "mental"

---

"Miscellanea Anthropologica et Sociologica" 2019, vol. 20, no. 1, pp. 36-38, 42 et . where I try to explain this "hesitation."

<sup>46</sup> D. Zahavi writes more strongly: identifications. This seems premature to me. See D. Zahavi, *First- person thoughts...*, op. cit. pp. 19, 21; the same, *Beyond Empathy. Phenomenological Approaches to Intersubjectivity*, "Journal of Consciousness Studies 2001, Vol. 8, No. 5-7, pp. 159 ff., 162.

<sup>47</sup> Husserl spoke of a "living now" - it seems that time is intrinsically something dynamic, flowing, in contrast to static space. On the other hand, however, space also seems to constitute itself, it is not "dully stagnant" (when one looks at the matter phenomenologically, cf. the phenomenon of "spreading , " which in its very name betrays a certain dynamism). I point out that I am writing about "living here," having in mind the phenomenon of the "living" or, more precisely, "lived" (from the point of view of the first person) body.

<sup>48</sup> See, for example, E. Stein, *On the Problem of Empathy*, translated by W. Stein, ICS Publications, Washington 1989, p. 63.

<sup>49</sup> D. Zahavi, *Beyond Empathy...*, op. cit. pp. 161, 163.

<sup>50</sup> See, e.g., D. Zahavi, *Subjectivity and Selfhood...*, op-ed, p. 21; S. Gallagher, D. Zahavi, *The Phenomenological Mind...*, op-ed, p. 45.

perhaps precisely because of this strange property that they are as unique as that light from the well-known metaphor - while illuminating everything else, they also illuminate themselves<sup>51</sup>. Medieval thinkers distinguished between reflection *in actu signato* and reflection *in actu exercito (vel concomitans)*; in the broad Brentan tradition, we speak of secondary consciousness (Brentano), pre-consciousness (Husserl), or intuition of transitivity (Ingarden); in the analytic tradition<sup>52</sup>, we speak of pre-introspective consciousness, (self-)pre-consciousness, or *implicite*<sup>53</sup>. However, it was often expressed in a manner similar to Nozick's, i.e., treating too literally *the self-reference of state*<sup>54</sup>. The problem is only (and as much as) that we do not have a good understanding of this property and have to resort to imperfect metaphors.

\*

It remains to respond to "reductionist" theories, whereby - as the reader may have already guessed - we will, in passing, as it were, discuss not only the irreducibility of persons, but also of times and places.

<sup>51</sup> See, for example, D. Zahavi, *First-person thoughts...*, op. cit. p. 17; D. Zahavi, *Subjectivity and Selfhood...*, op. cit. p. 61. The metaphor itself, as exposed by Al-Ghazali, for example, obviously has its source in Plato's parabola of the Sun.

<sup>52</sup> As an aside, for good measure, one could also count this tradition as Brentanian (a half-joking, half-serious question: can one think of Moore or Twardowski without Brentan? Or Russell without Meinong, Brentan's disciple?).

<sup>53</sup> See, for example, R. Poczobut, *Types of self-awareness*, "Analysis and Existence," 2008, no. 7, pp. 5-31; R. Ziemińska, *Self-awareness and self-knowledge from the point of view of epistemology*, op. cit. pp. 33-51.

<sup>54</sup> "For example, the simplest act [...] has [...] as a secondary object - " (F. Brentano, *Psychologia z empirycznego punktu widzenia*, translated by W. Galewicz, PWN, Warsaw 1999, p. 223); "with intuitive experiencing of the act, what is learned is simply identical with cognition, cognition is in this case grasping " (R. Ingarden, *O niebezpieczeństwie petitionis principii w teorii poznania*, transl. by D. Gierulanka, in: tegoż, *U podstaw teorii poznania*, PWN, Warsaw 1971, p. 377). Thus, it comes out that acts (all, according to Brentan; some, according to Ingarden) have two objects: e.g., a certain perception of a pen is at the same time a perception of a pen *and of oneself* [!]. Someone might note, however, that the criticism of the "self-reflecting thought" referred to the act - the aforementioned Zelaniec proposes that the reader try to fulfill an act... relating to oneself, having oneself as an object: perhaps in the case of passive states there is no problem, only in the case of an intentional attempt (which is actually a pleonasm) of self-referral we are forced to perform another act (reflection)? On the other hand, however, we have a "passive" example: a sign warning us about ourselves [!] (cf. W. Zlezaniec, *On the Non-Paradoxality...*, op. cit. p. 83 et seq., note 26), where the issue is not, as the author rightly emphasizes, the carrier of the sign (triangular metal on a post appropriately painted), but what it means... well, precisely, what this sign mean?

David Hugh Mellor would treat the above defense of the irreducibility of the self as an appealing thesis that there are "prospective facts," i.e., "non-supportable subjective facts," e.g., that it is *now* 2:33 p.m. on February 7, 2019 in Danzig, or that *I am* a philosopher (as opposed to the "objective" fact that Tomasz Kąkol is a , as far as the latter example is concerned)<sup>55</sup>. Meanwhile, the belief that I am a philosopher and the belief that Tomasz Kąkol is a philosopher refer to the same fact for the simple reason that I = Tomasz Kąkol. The only moral is that this fact should not be equated with the content of beliefs - the content of the first belief is a function attributing the person holding this belief to the fact that this person is a philosopher, while the content of the second is a function attributing the person holding this belief to the fact that Tomasz Kąkol is a philosopher. Theodore Sider argues similarly: a belief is simply one of the relations between person and a function from arguments that are, depending on occasional phrases occurring in the linguistic expression of that belief - moments, persons, places, etc. (Since there are times when beliefs change, one can also speak of momentary relations)<sup>56</sup>.

It seems that this retort is not satisfactory. The strategy of "there is no error in the world, it can only be in our beliefs" does not take into account the fact that, paradoxically, in this way it *confirms* rather than negates the dualism "world - beliefs" (or other mental states). Nor does it negate persons or moments - on the contrary, it forcefully affirms their indispensability. Yes, someone will say, for example, "So what? Persons are understood here as solid, material entities, and moments are understood according to the 'objective' theory of time, so called since McTaggart's B-series: the difference between past, present and future is only a difference in perspective; objectively, ontologically they are equivalent"<sup>57</sup>. Well, not-quite, because when I am convinced that it is *now* 2:33 pm on February 7 in Danzig

<sup>55</sup> D.H. Mellor, *Analytic Philosophy and the Self*, translated by R. Majeran, in *British Philosophy...*, op. cit. s. 415-435.

<sup>56</sup> T. Sider, *Four-Dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time*, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2001, pp. 18-21. Exactly the same (Kaplanian) semantics is assumed by Herman Cappelen and Josh Dever, authors of a paper with the provocative title *The Inessential Indexical. On the Philosophical Insignificance of Perspective and the First Person* (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2013, p. 16).

<sup>57</sup> Cf. T. Sider, *Four-Dimensionalism...*, op. cit, p. 21; D.H. Mellor, *Philosophy...*, op. cit. On time, see also M. Łagosz, *The Reality of Time*, Wyd. UWr, Wrocław 2007; J. Gołosz, *Time Upflow and onto-logy*, Wyd. UJ, Kraków 2011; cf. also T. Kąkol, *In Defense of Presentism and an Extratemporal God*, in *God, Time, Infinity*, ed. M. Szatkowski, de Gruyter, Berlin-Boston 2018, pp. 53-60.

2019, or – to simplify the example - that *it is now 2 PM in Danzig*, then, according to this theory, I am in some specific relation to a certain mathematical object (function), which attributes the present moment to being 2 PM in Danzig [?], only that it would be necessary to specify in B-language which moment we are talking about. The remark "but the problem is (or was, because we just solved it) ontological, not linguistic!" won't help, because I can ask more briefly, without mentioning language - which moment are we talking about? The opponent can only answer by raising his voice: "oh, **THIS** one," assuming, in spite of himself, that "now" refers directly to his referent; relatively, he can look at the clock and say that about the moment (although, due to the simplified example, it is difficult to talk about the here!) called "2 PM." The latter (*nomen omen*), however, means that the sentence "it is now two o'clock in Danzig" means... "at two o'clock in Danzig it is two o'clock." If that were the case, why clocks when sentences about time are like tautologies? And while we can consider a sentence like "I am a philosopher" and come to similar conclusions, the very description of a belief about time (or any belief of mine), after all, speaks of "attributing to a person" - so which person is meant? "If it is your belief, you yourself admitted that it is about you". - will answer the opponent. Well, that's exactly it: I expected that he would say: "about Tomasz Kąkol". When I would ask who he is, I will not be satisfied with an evasive answer ("no kidding, after all, you know") – if I hear: "You!", I will ask, it is to be understood, the reference of this expression; and if I hear: "Tomasz Kąkol," I will reply that everyone knows this. "But if you want to show that you are not YOU [hear? which one exactly?] material body, but some "unknown self", then this argument will not help. After all, you will agree that I= Tomasz Kąkol, and this already means that you know the reference of this personal pronoun and are making fun of me." Such a retort again means adhering to the fact that "I" and similar occasional expressions refer directly to their referents. The irreducibility of the self (and moments and places) is not, we repeat, the irreducibility of the corresponding occasional expressions – language does not, with all due respect to opponents<sup>58</sup>, determine ontology, otherwise we would have the divine power to call worlds into existence with words, and we are said to laugh at people taking seriously stories about a witch who turns prince into a frog with an appropriate spell - rather, language tries to fit, with better or worse results, into the world. Talk of direct referral is an admission,

---

<sup>58</sup> Cf. T. Kąkol, *Epistemological realism. Discussion with two selected "anti-realist manifestos"* (Goodman, Putnam), "Philo-Sophia" 2014, no. 27, pp. 29-41.

That we can be sure of the existence of the self, here or now. In the words of Descartes: I am, I exist!

The question is: what is this self that (among other things) thinks?

\*

Before we try to answer this question, let's just consider David Lewis' proposition. On the one hand, it is considered reductionist, i.e., related to Mellor's or Sider's conception (so, by the way, Lewis is considered a proponent of the psychophysical identity thesis, although he can also be interpreted as a functionalist<sup>59</sup>). On the other hand, however, it is an attempt to show that propositional states *de se* are primary to *de dicto* [!] "to be convinced of something is to attribute to *oneself* [subclause - T.K.] a relevant property," e.g., if I am convinced that snow is white, it means that I attribute to myself the property of inhabiting a world in which snow is white<sup>60</sup>. If I am convinced that I am Thomas the Angle, I attribute to *myself* the property of inhabiting the world in which *I am* Thomas Kąkol. I am right because I have this property (which would be different if I thought I was Napoleon, for example). The same is true not only for states whose linguistic expressions include "I" (or the corresponding verb ending, such as in Polish), but also "here" or "now"<sup>61</sup>. Such a description, however, presupposes self-reference! Interestingly, Lewis utters strange words for someone who claims that we are material parts of the world: "No matter how much I may know about the things that make up the world [...], the knowledge of which of these things is *me* is something additional. This *de se* knowledge [...] is not knowledge about what the world is like"<sup>62</sup>. He also compares "prospective knowledge" to the stationary map familiar to tourists, with a dot (or other mark) on it with the caption "here is this map"<sup>63</sup>.

---

<sup>59</sup> In my planned work on the psychophysical problem, I take up (among other things) this issue.

<sup>60</sup> See D. Lewis, *Attitudes De Dicto and De Se*, in he, *Philosophical Papers*, Vol. 1, Oxford University Press, New York-Oxford 1983, p. 137. More accurately, we should write "one of the worlds," but this would give the wrong impression that Lewis' proposal presupposes his (in)famous "modal ultrarealism."

<sup>61</sup> With "now," strictly speaking, the situation is a bit more complicated, since it leads, according to Lewis, to so-called perdurantism (in simpler terms, the thesis that surrounding objects such as people or tables are not three-dimensional, but four-dimensional creations). See *ibid*, p. 143 et seq. Let us omit here the criticism of this concept.

<sup>62</sup> D. Lewis, *Reduction of Mind*, translated by M. Iwanicki, in *Analytical Metaphysics of Mind. Recent controversies*, edited by M. Miłkowski, R. Poczobut, Wyd. IFiS PAN, Warsaw 2008, p. 215.

Without this stamp, the map would definitely be missing something<sup>64</sup> (this is not, of course, about that trivial truth that every map, as a certain simplification, is missing something). One can, of course, interpret Lewis as simply proclaiming that the elimination of "perspectivism" is the elimination of some portion of "objectivity," because the former is a distinguished instance of the latter<sup>65</sup>. Nevertheless, this approach is either incoherent when it contrasts the world and the self (I am already omitting the here and now), or it blurs the distinction between first-person and third-person self-reference<sup>66</sup>.

<sup>63</sup> Lewis, *Attitudes...*, A.D, pp. 138, 144. Note in passing that while, for example, the circular shield on the post with the words "the place of this sign" falls under the plea of the Beggar ("WHAT sign?" - one might ask without hoping to get a non-circular answer), Lewis's example, contrary to what we suggested above in footnote 54, to show the coherence of the act of knowing oneself, provided that one simultaneously knows something else! I think this would be worth exploring further.

<sup>64</sup> Ibid.

<sup>65</sup> This is how Mellor or Sider understand it. Cf. also P. Engel, *Does a naturalistic theory of mind eliminate subjectivity?*, translated by J. Marganski, in *Philosophy of the Subject*, edited by J. Górnicka-Kalinowska, Aletheia, Warsaw 2001, pp. 243-259.

<sup>66</sup> Cf. L. R. Baker, *Persons and Bodies. A Constitution View*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, MA 2000, p. 77, fn. 35. As for Chisholm's proposal (see the same, *The First Person. An Essay on Reference and Intentionality*, University of Minneapolis Press, Minneapolis 1981) Baker, in the aforementioned footnote, rightly noted that Chisholm exposes himself to the same charge as Lewis: blurring the distinction between "I hope Jones survives the flight" and "I hope I survive the flight" (both sentences uttered by the same Jones). See also A. Chrudzimski, *Theory of intentionality...*, op. cit. p. 82 et seq. The reader may also be curious to know what to think about one of the newer proposals, mentioned above in footnote 56. Well, first of all, the authors express themselves as if they contradict themselves, e.g., it is enough in the text of Ruth Millikan, quoted by them with approval, to emphasize "I" everywhere (cf. "It [= "Ruth Millikan" - T.K.] names a person whom I [!] know, under that name, how to manipulate directly... But in order to know how to manipulate this person, why would I [!] need to think indexical thoughts?" - p. 44 ff.); similarly on p. 65, fn. 4 ("them"); p. 103 ("to himself" in the context of Lewis' Zeus); p. 159 ff. ("itself" about another fictional being, carrying mirrors with him everywhere); p. 170 (about John, who "fails to recognize himself as himself" [*sic!*]) or p. 177 ("what we receive through vision is information about the features of, and spatial relations among various objects [among them, us and parts of our bodies]"). On p. 135 we read that proprioception does not have to be about the "self", because it can be about....

"the compound bodily parts that belong to *self*" [subclause - T.K.]. Weak arguments also include science-fiction thought experiments (p. 131 and . 4); equating information about "one's past self" with information about other people [!] (p. 177); taking so-called reductive theories of personal identity for good coin without argument (p. 178 et .); telling that the practical syllogism "someone is in pain; this someone is in a special relationship with me; and therefore I should relieve him" is used by psychopaths [!] (p. 179) or the suggestion that "creatures that escape from predators only when they exemplify special states *de se* "predator-avoiding" are most likely to be eaten" (p. 180). The authors also fail to recognize the difference between *Leib* and *Koerper*, about which more below.



## The question of the body, that is me, *Leib* and *Koerper*

The phenomenological difference between the sensory field and "external" space is a fact, and arguments for psychophysical identity may convince someone, but this fact will not be abrogated. Speaking of the sensory field, I want to encompass with this term all so-called sensory fields<sup>67</sup>, as well as those first-person data that are difficult to subsume under the concept of "sensation"<sup>68</sup>. I now feel, among other things, pressure on limbs resting on a table, chair, floor<sup>69</sup>, I feel "under my fingers" keys, I do feel the positioning of body parts, I have auditory, visual impressions (especially); sometimes I have what could be called an impression, that I once already thought the thought that..., etc. "Alive" extends as widely as the sensory field – one can also use the term "*Leib*" (meaning body experienced in a first-person perspective) known in phenomenological literature<sup>70</sup>. When I now look at my fingers sliding across the keyboard, I am, of course, convinced that it is not the body of, for example, my neighbor from the third floor, but in terms of spatiality, being subject to physical factors (e.g., being burned by a flare), etc., it is not something *radically* different from plastic buttons, (live) carrots or (live) earthworms. Fluctuations of the sensory field, and therefore of the boundaries (if we can talk about boundaries<sup>71</sup>) of the *Leib*, are well known – sometimes no trauma or pharmacological means are needed

<sup>67</sup> See, e.g., R. Ingarden, *Spór o istnienie świata*, vol. II, part 2, PWN, Warsaw 1987, pp. 200, 212, 224 or T. Fuchs, *Phenomenology and Psychopathology*, in *Handbook...*, op. cit., p. 563 ("experiential space"). "Sensory field" here has nothing to do with the same-sounding term in neuroanatomy, where it means part of the cerebral cortex. See, for example, W.Z. Traczyk, *Physiology of Man in Outline*, PZWL, Warsaw 1989, pp. 130, 132, 143, 145, 168 et. An anonymous reviewer has rightly pointed out that some (following, by the way, some of Husserl's remarks in *Idea II*) distinguish the sensory field from the sensory field. Unfortunately, I cannot devote space here to arguing that this distinction (e.g., as made by Łukas Przybylski) is, in my opinion, unconvincing - a controversy I hope to address in my planned dissertation.

<sup>68</sup> Cf. D.W. Smith, *The Circle of Acquaintance...*, op. cit. p. 96; D. Chalmers, *Consciousness and its place in nature*, translated by R. Poczobut, T. Ciecierski, in *Analytical Metaphysics...*, op. cit. p. 444.

<sup>69</sup> Despite shoes and socks (similarly, I feel pressure on a chair, despite my clothes). The phenomenon of feeling with the end of a prosthesis or other device (cf. Ingarden's example - a pilot "feeling" an airplane, *Disputation...*, op. cit. p. 199) is an extreme case of this phenomenon.

<sup>70</sup> Husserl sometimes equated the sensory field with *Leib*, cf. the quotation cited in J.-P. Petit, *A Husserlian...*, op. cit. p. 206, note 10.

<sup>71</sup> At least insofar as we understand the border as something sharply defined.

to disrupt its "typical" unfolding<sup>72</sup>. Given what we wrote above, one would like to admit that "I" originally refers to *Leib*. However, this is hindered by the fact that sometimes *Leib* appears as something that, although different from anything given outside of it, transcends, as it were, the "proper self", just like my leg seen now (and heard – its movements cause the creak of the chair). Without losing the characteristic "anchoring" or "Partial submersion" in the sensory field, the self can, to some extent, "illuminate" sometimes quite large tracts of this field, "retreating"<sup>73</sup> as it were, from oneness with it, which is perhaps a misleading term, but one can hardly think of a better one here. For "withdrawing" can be understood, for example, as denying one's connection to something/someone, or even denying one's identity. When, for example, I look in the mirror in the morning and am alarmed by my *Koerper* given visually, I may exclaim (as in the iconic *Teddy Bear*), "that hairy monkey with the black snout is supposed to be me?!" Nevertheless, the "I" in this usage is similar to the "I" in statements like "I'm flying to Boston" – it doesn't mean I'm flying on my own power, but tightly confined in a jet<sup>74</sup>. Nor does it mean that I is originally to be understood as something housed in the *Koerper* like, for example, the brain in the skull, since the brain is also part of *the Koerper* (including the living brain – e.g., the patient's brain during trepanation or mine, given to me indirectly on a functional MRI monitor). "Withdrawal from unity with the sensory field" does not necessarily occur, as one might expect, e.g. when one is engaged in "abstract", as they say, problems (e.g. how to formalize some of Descartes' reasoning) – for then one can interpret this state as a kind of forgetting of this unity (more or less in the sense that I forget that I have a hand or

<sup>72</sup> Cf. for example, the famous "rubber hand illusion" (see, e.g., M. Tsakiris, *The Sense of Body Ownership*, in *The Oxford Handbook...*, op. cit., p. 182; a popular description is for example, in Science World 2008, no. 1(9) [special issue]) or even something resembling OBE (*out-of-body-experience*) without the use of transcranial stimulation or similar techniques (M. Tsakiris, *The Sense...*, op. cit., p. 197). Patients deprived of a sense of almost the whole body are IW, Christine or LB (see, for example, J. Cole, *Agency with Impairments in Movement*, in *Handbook...*, cit..., p. 655 et seq.; J. Bremer, *The Person...*, cit..., p. 429 et seq.; A. Damasio, *The Mystery of Consciousness. The body and emotions co-create consciousness*, translated by M. Karpinski, Rebis, Poznań 2000, p. 230 et seq.).

<sup>73</sup> S. Judycki writes about "distancing" in this case. See the same, *Consciousness and Memory. Justification of anthropological dualism*, TN KUL, Lublin 2004, pp. 106, 311, 314. Similarly, A. Chmielecki, *Between brain and consciousness. An attempt to solve the psychophysical problem*, Publishing House of IFiS PAN, Warsaw 2001, p. 80.

<sup>74</sup> Cf. U. Meixner, *Classical Dualism Modernized. A Proposal*, in *Dualistic Ontology of the Human Person*, ed. by M. Szatkowski, Philosophia Verlag, Muenchen 2013, p. 17.

underwear on myself – I simply "live in unity" with it), as the self is absorbed in something else entirely. Paradoxically, in my case at least, the state in which the self clearly cuts itself off from at least part of the sensory field occurs in subdued states of consciousness, such as on certain nights, between waking and sleeping. E.g., yesterday I went to bed, having my consciousness "dominated" by the experience of what could awkwardly be called "fatigue-pain" (because it was a clear confluence of a feeling of intense fatigue and a feeling of pain), localizing phenomenally (so with severely blurred boundaries) in my head, with a pronounced intensification in the eyeball area. In addition to the usual sensations such as the sound of breathing and heartbeat, I was marked by an extremely gentle<sup>75</sup> noise, well known to me, which temporarily changed its "color and tone", only to return to its previous state in a moment, which a neurophysiologist would explain, for example, by a temporary deformation of the auditory trumpets. I could, with some hesitation, compare this gentle hum to the noise emitted by the dryer "heater" known to people of my generation, used to put children to sleep. Its effectiveness was explained by the generation of sensations that the baby experienced in the womb (heat combined with the hum of blood in the mother's blood vessels)<sup>76</sup>. The thoughts expressed in these sentences also appeared "in the context" of the nocturnal sensations I am writing about here now, although in a more "fuzzy" form, which is hardly surprising when conscious control was limited. Most interesting in all this was precisely the phenomenon of the self "disengaging" (at least partially) from sensations<sup>77</sup>, which now, on waking, can be interpreted, in my opinion, this way: sensations (impressions and other first-person data) as not differentiating between *Leib* and "the rest of the world" – in the sense that what I called "gentle noise" as well as what now in the form of auditory sensations (e.g. the noise of vehicles from the ring road), constitutes the sphere of *Leib* (the sensory field) without a "qualitative leap" between what is treated as "flowing from the body" (e.g., "overtired brain",

---

<sup>75</sup> It is clearly distinguishable from the intense buzz that may have occurred a few times in his life clearly pathological states (extreme exhaustion, fever, side effects of certain medications). The latter was qualitatively different in nature.

<sup>76</sup> As an aside, for the curious: I was surprised when Rafal Palczewski pointed me to publicly available recordings of the "farelka" – see, for example, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SDuEcDTPITM>, accessed 27.02.19, note: this video does not show the original 1970s orange "farelka".

<sup>77</sup> Having already written an account of my experience of the "self-withdrawing from the field of sensation," I found a similar description in M. de Biran thanks to Legrand (see D. Legrand, *Phenomenological Dimensions of Bodily Self-Consciousness*, in: *The Oxford Handbook...*, op. cit. p. 210).

"pulsating blood") and that what is seen as "flowing from the neighborhood" ("the swish of the wind in the chimney", "the barking of the dog outside the window"). In short, *it is impossible for the self to identify outright with Leib*, from a first-person perspective.

Of course, the ideal would be for this description to be verifiable to a degree similar to the verifiability of a patient's leg reaction to a blow below the kneecap – otherwise, someone will say, we are forced to sort of take the word of the describer of his dream. This analogy, however, the phenomenologist will say, is inaccurate, since it's not an idiosyncratic sensation, but a typical one – "verify it yourself on yourself if you don't believe it". If one argues that the problem is that someone can say "I checked and I don't see what you see," then there is no chance of reaching some neutral authority to settle the dispute. We can, admittedly, be guided by the concordance (always approximate) of accounts of phenomenological reflection, but – as in the case of a dream – it is impossible to exclude (leaving aside the inevitability) that the relator missed something he should have seen (if the "object-oriented" analysis of dreams is accurate, which can be doubted<sup>78</sup>) or simply quickly forgot what he experienced (as in the case of often even very vivid dreams – with each second after waking, the ability to reproduce it in me gradually fades).

\*

Let us contrast the description above with the classic analysis of certain aspects of the psychophysical problem contained in paragraphs 76-79 of Ingarden's *Disputation...*<sup>79</sup>. Key, in my opinion, in this well-known (at least among Polish phenomenologists) text are the following observations:

Whatever one may claim about alleged interruptions in the stream of consciousness, "at the base" of the alleged unity of the stream of consciousness lies "the identity of the experiencing self"<sup>80</sup>. "Feeling a break in the stream of experience [e.g., in the case of dreamless sleep - T.K.], we do not feel it at all in our existence"<sup>81</sup>. Ingarden is well aware that what is different is the problem of

---

<sup>78</sup> I.e., that in a dream we do not "project" (at least to some extent) sensations, but encounter objects whose aspects can be perceived or not, i.e., in the latter case, they remain "unperceived." Of course, this *does not* mean that "object-oriented" dream analysis assumes that dream objects are real objects, e.g. somewhere now or in the past (or future? Or maybe on another planet?) existing houses.

<sup>79</sup> R. Ingarden, *Spór o istnienie świata*, vol. II, part 2, PWN, Warsaw 1987, pp. 141-236.

<sup>80</sup> Ibid, p. 162.

<sup>81</sup> Ibid.

legitimizing this experience (it belongs to "epistemology"<sup>82</sup>); in any case, I would cease to function normally "if even for a moment this sense were missing"<sup>83</sup>. Let us also consider the once popular view<sup>84</sup> that the self is unknowable in the sense that, yes, it is *the premise of* all cognition, but by definition, as it were, it be *the object of* cognition (because it is *the subject of* it). This thesis is equivalent to the fact that the relation of cognition cannot be reflexive – the only question is how we know this. However, if nothing could be known about the self, how could I know, for example, that I am thinking now, ba, that I am thinking and not someone else? – asks Ingarden rhetorically<sup>85</sup>. Nevertheless, the term "I" is systematically ambiguous in the sense that its designators can, according to the author of the *Disputation...* be arranged as follows: (a) the self as a conscious subject, without presupposing anything else; (b) the self as a composite centre of the person (whereby it is necessary to ask what a person is); (c) the self as a mental being; (d) the self as a psychophysical being, whereby even within the physical aspect the boundaries of the self are not sharp (cf. above, the example with the jet, although Ingarden limits himself to pointing to clothing<sup>86</sup>). Derek Parfit, along with others, asked how we know that we continue to be the same self<sup>87</sup>. Yes, I don't feel a break in existence between yesterday's self and today's self, he would say, but – leaving aside the possibility of an illusion – I feel that by talking about me, for example, that I cried as a five-year-old, you are talking about someone else: here I feel perhaps not a break, but simply the difference you feel when someone talks about two different people (and you know they are different).

Many have tried to argue with Parfit (but also many Parfit has convinced [*sic!*]), nevertheless it is difficult to argue with feeling. One can appeal to the feelings of others (and attempts have been made to do so; it is another matter whether by chance the alleged confirmation of Parfit's theory<sup>88</sup> was not achieved by prompting respondents with suggestive questions), but in my opinion it cannot be interpreted other than as a case of amnesia, since the alternative explanation

---

<sup>82</sup> Ibid.

<sup>83</sup> Ibid.

<sup>84</sup> He is associated with Kant (nb. Ingarden polemicizes with neo-Kantian Paul Natorp in this context). Today he is defended by Andrzej Chmielecki. See A. Chmielecki, *Between the Brain...*, op. cit. p. 80.

<sup>85</sup> R. Ingarden, *Dispute...*, op. cit. p. 168.

<sup>86</sup> Ibid, p. 170.

<sup>87</sup> Doubts were introduced here by the considerations of John Locke or David Hume.

<sup>88</sup> See Raymond Martin's work, *Self-Concern. An Experiential Approach to What Matters in Survival*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, MA 1998.

attributes a trivial error (projecting a definition of "self," such as "that with which I feel strongly psychologically connected," which is circular, by the way)<sup>89</sup>.

However, when talking about amnesia, we are talking about memory; memory, however, is not *an experience* as such, but a certain *disposition*. The self treated solely as a subject of experiences (and its experiences) is not enough. Likewise, when I face, to put it crudely, a dilemma (to write in spite of fatigue or to go to sleep) and, experiencing an effort, I choose (to write!), I have a tangle of often "contradictory" experiences (fatigue, pain, helplessness, anger, hope, experience of strength, relief... I omit typically "perceptual" experiences, e.g. visual perceptions), out of which a coterie of different ones break through to the foreground, to give way in a moment to others. The experience of force, however, is not force, just as memory (as opposed to the act of remembering to oneself, for example) is not experience. Force or the ability to choose are dispositions. The experiencing self is thus a certain abstraction, not least because experiencing as a certain actual characteristic of the self (e.g., when I now perceive, think, etc.) presupposes a capacity, a disposition of that very self to do those things. In this sense, the self is complex (see "I" *sub* (b)). And in this complexity, in many of its aspects, it is difficult to know, as it was already written on the wall of the Delphi temple, nay, sometimes "very foreign"<sup>90</sup>.

And is it unique? Or the opposite, can it have a "double"? The intuitive answer is: not at all<sup>91</sup>. Imagine, moreover, an encounter with one's supposed "double." Now a puzzled man walks into the room who looks like my mirror image. I'm horrified to find that he has the same nervous movements and the same annoying voice that I sometimes hear on a video quietly recorded by a child. To my questions about things that only (I think) I know about, he answers truthfully<sup>92</sup>. Anyhow, it doesn't have to be,

<sup>89</sup> Cf. G. Madell, *The Essence of the Self. In Defense of the Simple View of Personal Identity*, Routledge, New York-London 2015, p. 74. I agree with Zahavi that "the identity of the self (self) is defined in terms of *givenness* rather than temporal continuity" (D. Zahavi, *Unity of Consciousness and the Problem of Self*, in *The Oxford Handbook...*, op. cit., p. 328 et.). Cf. also that author's, *Subjectivity and Selfhood...*, op. cit., p. 234 et seq., note 14, where Zahavi formulates an identical argument to Ingarden's (without possibly knowing *the Disputation...*) against the concept of "sequences of self" separated by total unconsciousness (see R. Ingarden, *Disputation...*, op. cit., pp. 153-158, 161-163).

<sup>90</sup> R. Ingarden, *Dispute...*, op. cit. p. 187.

<sup>91</sup> Ibid, p. 186 ff.

<sup>92</sup> A similar situation was masterfully described by Fyodor Dostoevsky in *The Double* precisely.

someone will say, a mental-physical duplicate<sup>93</sup>: so let's assume that he has the appearance of complete unknown to me, but the behavior, relations of "personal" things, etc., all "match". Would this shake my sense of identity? Could it be that I would be talking *to myself*? Well, no. In the insight his psyche is given to me (or is he a philosophical zombie after all?); however, I don't know what is given to him of me until I ask him - yes, he relates to me things that none of the people other than me (and my wife, but her fidelity I am sure of like *the ego cogito* of Descartes), it seems to me, can know (e.g. how many times I have cohabited with my wife - could it be that burglars who leave no trace have found my secret notebook?), but from this it does not yet in any way follow that it is *me*<sup>94</sup>. "Well, but how do you know it's not you after all!" – someone will say. "From the fact that it doesn't follow, you can at most infer that you don't know it's you, but not that you know it's *not* you." Yes, but then it is enough for me, for example, to go to Italy, and my supposed "other self" – to Hawaii [!]<sup>95</sup>.

Returning to Ingarden, the Polish phenomenologist adopts the terminological convention to use the heavily loaded word "soul" to denote the subject of mental dispositions and character traits. This subject, however, is simply the self, only that it is no longer included only in the aspect of being the subject of experiences. "Person", in turn, is to be called the soul, in which the "guiding role" is played by this very subject

---

<sup>93</sup> The notion of "mental duplicity" is besides so contradictory, insofar as the mental is considered to be closely related or even identical to the first-person perspective, which, by the way, is phenomenologically accurate. Some dualists strangely fail to see this. See, for example, R. Swinburne, *The Structure of the Soul*, in *Persons and Personality. A Contemporary Inquiry*, eds. . Peacocke, G. Gillett, Basil Blackwell, Oxford 1987, pp. 51, 55; G. Madell, *The Essence...*, op. cit. p. 92 et seq.

<sup>94</sup> Incidentally, if in fact someone like this walked in here now, I would think it was a hallucination or some "supernatural" vision, devil, angel, etc. (a Muslim might think the same thing, still taking into account jinns; a Hindu or Buddhist - depending on the school - would also have some package of "acceptable beings" etc. at the ready).

<sup>95</sup> It cannot in any case be the case that, for example, the conscious state of seeing red poppies in the blue sky and the simultaneous (or almost simultaneous, if one wants to take into account the physically possible speed limit, although - given the short distance - this is not relevant) conscious state of seeing Venus in the black night sky are states of the same *human* subject (we omit here, of course, access mediated by, for example, a telecommunication device). If someone says that this is possible, only that these states are "mutually inaccessible", then such a situation is no different from the case of two persons/subjects, e.g. the Italian president contemplating his way to Rome and the US president contemplating the Hawaiian sky at that time. It won't help here to assure that there can be an "extra-empirical difference" here, as long as there is nothing in subjectivity that goes beyond the first-person point of view.

experiences<sup>96</sup>, suggesting that the soul can exist without such a system, which sounds strange to say the least. This could be understood to mean that the "non-personal (yet? already?) soul," if you , exists in states of unconsciousness and/or in some mental condition, but the interesting thing here is the factual problems, not the terminology. Ingarden rightly writes of "inner impressions" that "as if" are stretched in the body (that's why I show the doctor where it hurts me<sup>97</sup>) – it's about the body in the *Koerper* sense, the impressions themselves ultimately constitute *Leib*<sup>98</sup>. The self in the broader sense (*sub* (c) and especially *sub* (d)) is a system,

"whose equilibrium is always to some extent unstable"<sup>99</sup> in the sense that different aspects (*Leib*, *Koerper*, the "pure" self) can gain "advantage" in it, or even: be in implicit conflict. Examples abound: the self does not want to "accept the fact" that "her" *Koerper* is no longer the owner of a luxuriant hairdo (the "Samson" shampoo turned out to be a dud); the growing of certain bodily sensations disturbs the "pure" self (which, by the way, leads to the appearance of other sensations), and disturbs because of the observer *Koerper*, while *Koerper* begins to tremble in certain places, which causes, it seems, clear distress on the face of this observer, etc.; fatigue and eye pain spilling over *Leib* leads her to stop writing, and so on.

Ingarden asks the question: can you ask where you made the decision to write next, just as you can ask where, more or less, you feel pain (now? the area around your eyes)? He answers that the question makes no sense<sup>100</sup>. However, one can retort that no one would say, for example, in a chair or a leg<sup>101</sup>. The "pure" self, according to Ingarden, "in some way" is located in the body<sup>102</sup>, although, like impressions, "without any proximate location"<sup>103</sup>. It is not coincidental to suggest that the self, if anything, is "in the vicinity of the head"<sup>104</sup>, but this is not due to the projection of the findings of neuroscience onto our experience, but, as Chmielecki aptly pointed out, due to the location of the senses (mainly the eyes). Here is his thought experiment: our nerves are stretchable and someone painlessly (and "miraculously" preventing

---

<sup>96</sup> R. Ingarden, *Dispute...*, op. cit. p. 191.

<sup>97</sup> *Ibid*, p. 196.

<sup>98</sup> *Ibid*, p. 213 ff, especially note 86.

<sup>99</sup> *Ibid*, p. 202.

<sup>100</sup> *Ibid*, p. 211.

<sup>101</sup> *Ibid*, p. 213.

<sup>102</sup> *Ibid*, p. 211.

<sup>103</sup> *Ibid*, p. 213.

<sup>104</sup> *Ibid*.



hemorrhages, etc.) takes out our brain and shows it to us (without interrupting the innervation with the "rest of us") – the experience of the presumed "location of the self" not change! If, on the other hand, our eyes were taken out in a similar way and turned away, we would experience something like an autoscopic experience<sup>105</sup>. On the other hand, hearing and inner sensation (especially of the highly innervated face) cannot be neglected either: during the nocturnal experiences described above, in the absence of clear visual sensations, if I had to use a visual metaphor when asked about the location of the self, I would describe it as surrounded or wrapped by a "phenomenal head", or perhaps even more sensually: a self like a head wrapped in a cap and scarf of sensations. The area around the head clearly imposes itself<sup>106</sup>.

\*

To sum up, the *self* separates though it does not detach from the sensory field, this in turn contrasts with what is given as the now-seen fingers, the now-heard clatter of the keyboard, moreover, the now-heard circulation of my blood in my head and the felt pressure on my fingertips. Ingarden gives the impression that he identifies *Leib* with *Koerper*, and unfortunately he is not alone in this: the piece of *Koerper* seen "from the outside", the finger, *is at the same time* "felt from the inside", so it constitutes a fragment of *Leib*<sup>107</sup>. Indeed, one can say that I see a finger and feel the same finger, but the visual impression as well as the sensory impression (proprioceptive, kinesthetic, etc.) is not a finger, just as the visual impressions I have when looking at a screen are not a screen. Besides, it is difficult to expect from a thinker of the same class as Ingarden to switch to the (after all, criticized by him elsewhere) idealist or phenomenalist position,

---

<sup>105</sup> See A. Chmielecki, *Between the Brain...*, op. cit. p. 12. On *autoscopic* experiences, see, for example, A.L. Mishara, *Autoscopy: Disrupted Self in Neuropsychiatric Disorders and Anomalous Conscious States*, in *Handbook...*, op. cit. p. 591 et seq.

<sup>106</sup> In the case of dreaming consciousness, I would also use the term "phenomenal head" as something "woven of feelings," although this is less clear, and in any case depends on the dream. For example, in one dream I experience myself as having a "cephalic" localization of the sense of self, e.g., in one dream I feel the cold barrels of guns attached to my head (probably the influence of the critical films I am watching), in another - and sometimes the same - my point of view and overall experience suddenly changes so that I have an autoscopic sensation (the sense of seeing and experiencing myself occurs despite the different appearance of the body! Although I remember only one single case, still from my childhood, where I did not have a human body, but... a cat body. Unnatural augmentation or diminution - or at least experienced as such, deformities or even decomposition, more often already. Insensitivity to arrows, to gravity - or at least to some extent - are familiar things to many dreamers).

<sup>107</sup> See R. Ingarden, *The Dispute...*, op. cit. pp. 195, 200, 210; E. Stein, *On the Problem...*, op. cit. p. 43.

identifying the object of perception with a bundle of impressions. Rather, contemporary identification of impressions or sensations with neurophysiological processes ("something physical") is known, which Ingarden did not accept, although, if I interpret him correctly, he allowed<sup>108</sup>. It is, moreover, characteristic that the representatives of "embodied phenomenology," although well aware of the difference between *Leib* and *Koerper*, sometimes express themselves in an astonishing way. José Luis Bermudez, who is otherwise close to "embodied phenomenology," disdains this distinction<sup>109</sup>, declaring in passing that "feeling and sensation are experienced only within the boundaries of the body"<sup>110</sup> - presumably he means *Koerper*, since *Leib* is delimited precisely by the sensory field. The question is what delimits *Koerper*<sup>111</sup>. On the one hand, he argues that "the spatiality of *bodily experience* is fundamentally different from the spatiality of our experience of the world,"<sup>112</sup> but ultimately it comes down, in his view, to different systems of reference<sup>113</sup>. Legrand, mentioned at the very beginning of this essay, is also well aware of the difference between *Leib* and *Koerper*<sup>114</sup>, but ultimately crosses it out<sup>115</sup>. To quote Gallagher and Zahavi again, who, carefully distinguishing between *Leib* and *Koerper*, conclude that "what we describe as a *lived (lived)* body from a phenomenological perspective is exactly the same body as the biological body we study from an objective perspective"<sup>116</sup>. However, if impressions are indeed

<sup>108</sup> R. Ingarden, *Dispute...*, op. cit. pp. 210, 218 (especially note 93), 220, 226-228.

<sup>109</sup> J. L. Bermudez, *Bodily Awareness and Self-Consciousness*, in *The Oxford Handbook...*, op. cit. s. 158 ff, 175.

<sup>110</sup> Ibid, p. 164.

<sup>111</sup> The easiest way is to point to the skin, but - even leaving aside the concepts of the so-called extended mind (see, for example, A. Clark, D. Chalmers, *Extended Mind*, translated by M. Miłkowski, in *Analytical Metaphysics...*, op. cit. pp. 342-357; in the planned dissertation I will also refer to this proposal) - this is to some extent arbitrary, and besides, the problem only shifts when we ask about the limits of the skin. Cf. also the work of Eric Olson, who, identifying the self with the *Koerper* (understood as a biological organism), tries to find its limits, reaching shocking conclusions (e.g., that there are no brains and limbs [!], or postulating the rejection of the term "body" as misleading); see the same, *Why I Have no Hands* [and more - T.K.], "Theory" 1995, Vol. 61, No. 2, s. 182-197; he, *A Compound of Two Substances*, in *Soul, Body and Survival*, ed. C. Corcoran, Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London 2001, pp. 73-88; he, *Is There a Bodily Criterion of Personal Identity?*, URL: [https://www.sheffield.ac.uk/polopoly\\_fs/1.101671!/file/BodilyCriterion.pdf](https://www.sheffield.ac.uk/polopoly_fs/1.101671!/file/BodilyCriterion.pdf), accessed August 22, 2019).

<sup>112</sup> J. L. Bermudez, *Bodily Awareness...*, op. cit. p. 176.

<sup>113</sup> Ibid, pp. 175-177.

<sup>114</sup> D. Legrand, *Phenomenological Dimensions...*, op. cit. p. 209.

<sup>115</sup> Ibid, p. 222.

<sup>116</sup> S. Gallagher, D. Zahavi, *The Phenomenological Mind...*, op. cit. p. 140.

a certain specific kind of neurophysiological processes, then *if* we do not identify the self after Hume's manner with a bundle of sensations,<sup>117</sup> we will *not* have made the identification essential for the theory of psychophysical identity, because from the considerations we have made, the psychophysical issue does not come down to finding the "how" between two, but between *three* members: the self, the sensory field and *the Koerper*.

Those familiar with "embodied phenomenology" may note, however, that the status of impressions is problematic here. They will eagerly insist, following such critics of phenomenology as Daniel Dennett, that there are no *qualia* understood as objects that are "atomic, non-relational, inexpressible, incomparable and uncorrelatable"<sup>118</sup>. Only that long before Dennett, it was noted that the so-called pure impression data are a certain abstraction - even under specially selected conditions (a dark room, flashes of monochromatic light), the mind seems<sup>119</sup> to spontaneously make an "object interpretation" of impressions ("I see something like a green explosion") on the one hand, "synchronous" so to speak, and inscription in the context of mental life – on the other ("diachronic" – "I said 'explosion' because it's probably the best word, given my earlier experience"). Accordingly, Dennett's descriptions of "what it was like to be a Lutheran parishioner listening to Bach in Leipzig in 1720" are by all means adequate, but certainly cannot be an argument for the thesis that *qualia* are fiction<sup>120</sup>.

Let us add that the relationship between the self and the sensory field, which has only been roughly described with vague metaphors, has caused trouble for phenomenologists. For example, Edith Stein, on the one hand, emphasizes that sensation "does not flow from the pure self" and "never takes the form of the cogito,"<sup>121</sup> while several

---

<sup>117</sup> In any case, neither "classical" nor "embodied" phenomenology (if one makes such a division at all) supports Hume in this regard. James Baillie and Joseph Bremer, following Oliver Sacks, suggest that if Hume were right, the subject would suffer from something akin to Korsakov syndrome [!] (see J. Baillie, *Problems in Personal Identity*, Paragon House, New York 1993, s. 107 et .; J. Bremer, *Person...*, op. cit. p. 181, note 11.

<sup>118</sup> S. Gallagher, D. Zahavi, *The Phenomenological Mind...*, op. cit. p. 118.

<sup>119</sup> I write so carefully not to prejudge the veracity of this theory. See M. Rosiak, *Realism and Time*, in *Consciousness, World, Values*, ed. by D. Leszczynski, M. Rosiak, Oficyna Naukowa PFF, Wrocław 2013, p. 383 et . and especially note 42; the same, *What is Stretch*, "Lectiones & Acroases Philosophicae" 2015, vol. 8, no. 2, p. 38 et seq., 44.

<sup>120</sup> Cf. D. Dennett, *Consciousness Explained*, Little, Brown and Co., Boston-Toronto-London 1991, pp. 386-388. In my planned dissertation I will also add my three cents to the critical analysis of this work.

<sup>121</sup> E. Stein, *On the Problem...*, op. cit. p. 42.

Pages farther she asserts that "impressions are real components of consciousness and as such belong to the self" and that "sensory feelings [...] flow from my own *self*"<sup>122</sup>. One may suppose that it is no coincidence that the "purity" of this self is not mentioned in these subsequent places, but the point, I think, is also that sensations or (self-)sensations, as constituting the sphere of consciousness, cannot be without a self, since consciousness without a *self* is unthinkable<sup>123</sup>. On the other hand, it makes no sense to liken impression to perception by tying the impression to the subject on the one hand and the object on the other in the manner of: "I get the impression that *p*". – for this phrase has a purely metaphorical sense: "I have the impression that there is a tree there" means "it seems to me that there is a tree there" or "that looks like a tree to me". Or, more directly: "hm, such visual impressions can be produced by a tree"<sup>124</sup>. At the same time, the latter phrase expresses a spontaneously (naturally, cf. "natural attitude") held realist belief.

\*

However, there is another interpretation of the position of embodied phenomenology on the traditional psychophysical problem. It is possible to treat the quoted statements of their representatives as unfortunate, and highlight such, for example: "the notion of embodiment, the notion of the embodied mind or the 'embodied' (*minded*) body, is intended to replace traditional notions of *mind* and body, which are derivations and abstractions [of the former]."<sup>125</sup>. Evan Thompson<sup>126</sup> and Robert Hanna interpret this as follows: the psychophysical problem has, as contemporary phenomenology supposedly shows

<sup>122</sup> Ibid, p. 48 .

<sup>123</sup> As an aside: an anonymous reviewer pointed out that consciousness without the self was thought by Sartre in the years of

30 Yes, in this sense it was "thought" by many: Hume, Lichtenberg, Nietzsche, Parfit, Metzinger, not to mention Husserl himself (in the *Fifth Survey*) - the only question is whether they did not succumb to a misunderstanding (a positive answer to it was justified, in my opinion, by Zahavi in *Subjectivity and Selfhood*..., op. cit. pp. 33-36, 99-130).

<sup>124</sup> This last paraphrase may seem (*nomen omen*) inaccurate if we abstract from the (do- mere) situational context here.

<sup>125</sup> S. Gallagher, D. Zahavi, *The Phenomenological Mind*..., op. cit. p. 135. Also in *Subjectivity and Selfhood*... Zahavi emphasizes right after the "I am the body" thesis that it is about *Leib*, while *Koerper* is about "abstraction" (p. 205 ff.).

<sup>126</sup> With Francis Varela and Emily Rosch, he co-authored *The Embodied Mind* (MIT Press, Cambridge, MA 1991), considered the opening work of the "embodied" strain of both modern phenomenology and cognitive science.

and cognitive science, a "simple" solution – "consciousness" properties, or "experiential" (or *phenomenal*, in the jargon of modern philosophy of mind), and physical (constituting *Koerper*) are non-identical with each other, but necessary, aspects of *Leib*<sup>127</sup>. Thus, this is about the otherwise familiar so-called "dual aspect theory," except that here we do not have a "neutral" or "proto-phenomenal" or even "unknown" *X* being the subject of these aspects, but the *Leib* known from phenomenology. The authors are aware that non-identity (in the sense of the negation of logical sameness<sup>128</sup>) is one thing; another is the positive characterization of the relationship between the said "aspects." Hanna and Thompson write about "non-analytic necessity" and define it as follows: a sentence *P* is non-analytically necessary if and only if *P* is true in every logically possible world not contradicting the "metaphysics of the real world" (while these worlds must also be physically possible), but outside the distinguished class of worlds verifying *P* the sentence does not assume any logical value<sup>129</sup>. Leaving aside the question of what is meant by logical possibility<sup>130</sup> and what kind of metaphysics it refers to, it certainly has no more connection with "embodied" phenomenology than, for example, with the proposal of Chalmers, whom the authors, moreover, misinterpret (e.g., as supposedly on the zombie issue<sup>131</sup>). In an essay titled *Consciousness and its place in nature*, the Australian philosopher clearly leans towards neo-Russellism, which he sometimes describes similarly to the authors, i.e. as a theory of double aspect<sup>132</sup>, but sometimes also interprets as a variant of the theory of psychophysical identity precisely<sup>133</sup>! Assuming so-called physical structuralism (we must defer discussion of the arguments for this position)<sup>134</sup>, the possibility may occur to some that the experiential character

<sup>127</sup> See R. Hanna, E. Thompson, "The *Mind-Body-Body Problem*," *Theoria et Historia Scientiarum* 2003, Vol. 7, No. 1, pp. 25-44.

<sup>128</sup> Logical identity satisfies certain axioms: it is a reflexive relation and implies indistinguishability (which in turn entails, among other things, symmetry and transitivity), see, e.g., P. Garbacz, *Logic and Artifacts*, Wyd. KUL, Lublin 2006, p. 43 (n.b., the formalism is described on p. 16 et.).

<sup>129</sup> R. Hanna, E. Thompson, *The Mind...*, op. cit. p. 31.

<sup>130</sup> Cf. T. Kąkol, *Leibniz's Monadology Today*, "Studia Philosophica Wratislaviensia" 2018, vol. 13, no. 1, s. 47, fn. 36.

<sup>131</sup> R. Hanna, E. Thompson, *The Mind...*, op. cit. pp. 38-40.

<sup>132</sup> Cf. D. Chalmers, *Consciousness...*, op. cit. pp. 484, 487.

<sup>133</sup> Hence he often calls it "monism" (of a certain type). Ibid, pp. 482, 484 et seq.

<sup>134</sup> See, for example, J. Foster, *The Immaterial Self. A Defence of the Cartesian Dualist Conception of Mind*, Routledge, London and New York 1991, pp. 121-125; W. V. O. Quine, *Things and their place in theories*, translated by T. Szubka, in *Metaphysics in Analytic Philosophy*, ed. T. Szubka, TN KUL, Lublin 1995, s. 48; D. Chalmers, *Consciousness...* in: *Analytical Metaphysics...*, pp. 446, 468., 482-484.

is an aspect of the physical, and it is a fundamental aspect – in the sense that what we usually call "physical" is "merely" a form, a structure, a network of relations (spatial, causal) and dispositions (active and passive), not a "content", "'what' of things": this "something" is precisely what *qualia* are<sup>135</sup>. In any case, this is also how the thesis that *Leib* is basic and *Koerper* from the "physical" and *qualia* from the "mental" side – "abstractions" – *can be* interpreted. But is this what the leaders of "embodied phenomenology" have in mind? And what argument can be made in favor of this position, since phenomenologically precisely – as we tried to show above – the case with the identity of self and *Leib* is different<sup>136</sup>?

\*

To sum up, I have tried to show that the answer to the question "in light of embodied phenomenology, is the thesis of psychophysical identity better justified?" is negative. Phenomenology, according to the second motto, rightly seeks to faithfully describe conscious experience instead of proceeding with unspecified intuitions about "consciousness" to the question of reduction or lack thereof. However, according to the first motto, the psycho-physical problem remains as puzzling as it was before the descriptions developed within the "embodied phenomenology" trend: the question of presumed psycho-physical identity is, and may long remain, open<sup>137</sup>.

---

An interesting argument is given by M. Heller in his *Elements of Quantum Mechanics for Philosophers* (Copernicus Center Press, Krakow 2014, pp. 168-172; for a review of the dispute, see the same, *Spór o realizm strukturalistyczny*, in the *Philosophy and the Universe*, Universitas, Krakow 2012, pp. 197-234).

<sup>135</sup> Cf. J. Foster, *The Immaterial...*, op-ed, pp. 121-125. Although to many Chalmers' inclusion among those leaning toward psychophysical identity theory sounds like a dissonance, Chalmers himself clearly considers it a matter of terminology, rather than strictly factual, to include neo-Russellism in the group of theories, as he writes, "materialist" (see D. Chalmers, *Consciousness...*, op-ed, pp. 484 et .).

<sup>136</sup> Still returning to the aforementioned proposition of Hanna and Thompson, it may be added that their identification of *Leib* with "animal" sounds like a dissonance, especially when we consider Eric Olson, who is cited by them. See R. Hanna, E. Thompson, *The Mind...*, pp. 26 ff., 32 ff. and above, fn. 111.

<sup>137</sup> Some may still take Gallagher and Zahavi's declaration that "what we de- in phenomenology... is the deliberate blurring of the distinction between ontology and epistemology and, consequently, the clear rejection of metaphysical realism" (S. Gallagher, D. Zahavi, *The Phenomenal Mind...*, p. 126). However, if this is the case, not only the psycho- physical problem, but any metaphysical issue is a misunderstanding for phenomenology!

## Bibliography

- Baillie J., *Problems in Personal Identity*, Paragon House, New York 1993.
- Baker L. R., *The First-Person Perspective: A Test for Naturalism*, "American Philosophical Quarterly" 1998, Vol. 35, No. 4, pp. 327-348.
- Baker L. R., *Persons and Bodies. A Constitution View*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, MA 2000.
- Bermudez J. L., *Bodily Awareness and Self-Consciousness*, in *The Oxford Hand- book of The Self*, ed. S. Gallagher, Oxford University Press, New York 2011, s. 157-179.
- Brentano F., *Psychology from an empirical point of view*, translated by W. Galewicz, PWN, Warsaw, 1999.
- Bremer J., *Person - fiction or reality? Identity and unity of the Self in the light of neurological research*, Aureus, Krakow 2008.
- Campbell J., *Personal Identity*, in *The Oxford Handbook of The Self*, ed. S. Gallagher, Oxford University Press, New York 2011, pp. 339-351.
- Cappelen H., Dever J., *The Inessential Indexical. On the Philosophical Insignificance of Perspective and the First Person*, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2013.
- Chalmers D., *Consciousness and its place in nature*, translated by R. Poczobut, T. Ciecierski, in *Analytical Metaphysics of Mind. Recent controversies*, ed. by M. Miłkowski, R. Poczobut, Wyd. IFiS PAN, Warsaw 2008, pp. 442-494.
- Chisholm R., *The First Person. An Essay on Reference and Intentionality*, University of Minneapolis Press, Minneapolis 1981.
- Chmielecki A., *Between brain and consciousness. An attempt to solve the psychophysical problem*, Publishing House of IFiS PAN, Warsaw 2001.
- Chrudzimski A., *Roderick Chisholm's theory of intentionality*, "Philosophical Quarterly" 2009, vol. 37, no. 3, pp. 75-87.
- Clark A., Chalmers D., *The expanded mind*, translated by M. Miłkowski, in *Analytical metaphysics of mind. Recent controversies*, ed. by M. Miłkowski, R. Poczobut, Wyd. IFiS PAN, Warsaw 2008, pp. 342-357.
- Cole J., *Agency with Impairments in Movement*, in *Handbook of Phenomenology and Cognitive Science*, eds. S. Gallagher, D. Schmicking, Springer, Dordrecht- New York-Heidelberg-London 2010, pp. 655-670.

Damasio A., *The mystery of consciousness. The body and emotions co-create consciousness*, transl.

M. Karpinski, Rebis, Poznań 2000.

Dennett D., *Consciousness Explained*, Little, Brown and Co., Boston-Toronto-London 1991.

Engel P., *Does the naturalistic theory of mind eliminate subjectivity?*, translated by J. Marganski, in *Philosophy of the Subject*, edited by J. Górnicka-Kalinowska, Aletheia, Warszawa 2001, pp. 243-259.

Foster J., *The Immaterial Self. A Defence of the Cartesian Dualist Conception of Mind*, Routledge, London and New York 1991.

Fuchs T., *Phenomenology and Psychopathology*, in *Handbook of Phenomenology and Cognitive Science*, eds. S. Gallagher, D. Schmicking, Springer, Dordrecht-New York-Heidelberg-London 2010, pp. 547-573.

Gallagher S., Zahavi D., *The Phenomenological Mind. An Introduction to Philosophy of Mind and Cognitive Science*, Routledge, London-New York 2008 (Polish translation: *The Phenomenological Mind*, translated by M. Pokropski, PWN, Warsaw 2015).

Garbacz P., *Logic and artifacts*, Wyd. KUL, Lublin 2006.

Gołosz J., *Time lapse and ontology*, Wyd. UJ, Kraków 2011.

Haldane J., *The theory of mind-world sameness and the challenge of anti-realism*, transl. by S. Judycki, T. Szubka, in *British Philosophy at the End of the 20th Century*, ed. by P. Gutowski, T. Szubka, TN KUL, Lublin 1998, pp. 117-154.

Hanna R., Thompson E., *The Mind-Body-Body Problem*, "Theoria et Historia Scientiarum" 2003, Vol. 7, No. 1, pp. 25-44.

Heller M., *Spór o realm strukturalistyczny*, in Heller, *Philosophy and the Universe*, Universitas, Kraków 2012, pp. 197-234.

Heller M., *Elements of quantum mechanics for philosophers*, Copernicus Center Press, Kraków 2014.

Husserl E., *Lectures on the Phenomenology of the Internal Consciousness of Time*, translated by J. Sidorek, PWN, Warsaw 1989.

Ingarden R., *O niebezpieczeństwie petitionis principii w teorii poznania*, translated by D. Gierulanka, in: tegoż, *U podstaw teorii poznania*, PWN, Warsaw 1971, s. 357-381.

Ingarden R., *Spór o istnienie świata*, vol. II, part 2, PWN, Warsaw 1987.

Judycki S., *Consciousness and memory. Justification of anthropological dualism*, TN KUL, Lublin 2004.



- Kąkol T., *Epistemological realism. A discussion of two selected "anti-realist manifestos" (Goodman, Putnam)*, "Philo-Sophia" 2014, no. 27, pp. 29-41.
- Kąkol T., *Leibniz's monadology today*, "Studia Philosophica Wratislaviensia" 2018, t. 13, no. 1, pp. 39-53.
- Kąkol T., *In Defense of Presentism and an Extratemporal God*, in *God, Time, Infinity*, ed. M. Szatkowski, de Gruyter, Berlin-Boston 2018, pp. 53-60.
- Kąkol T., *On empathy. E. Stein and R. Ingarden vs cognitive psychology*, "Miscellanea Anthropologica et Sociologica" 2019, vol. 20, no. 1, pp. 36-45.
- Kripke S.A., *Naming and Necessity*, translated by B. Chwedeńczuk, PAX, Warsaw 1988.
- Legrand D., *Myself with No Body? Body, Bodily-Consciousness and Self-consciousness*, in *Handbook of Phenomenology and Cognitive Science*, eds. S. Gallagher, D. Schmicking, Springer, Dordrecht-New York-Heidelberg-London 2010, s. 181-200.
- Legrand D., *Phenomenological Dimensions of Bodily Self-Consciousness*, in *The Oxford Handbook of The Self*, ed. S. Gallagher, Oxford University Press, New York 2011, pp. 204-227.
- Lewis D., *Attitudes De Dicto and De Se*, in *he, Philosophical Papers*, Vol. 1, Oxford University Press, New York-Oxford 1983, pp. 133-159.
- Lewis D., *Reduction of mind*, translated by M. Iwanicki, in *Analytical metaphysics of mind. Recent controversies*, edited by M. Miłkowski, R. Poczobut, Published by IFiS PAN, Warsaw 2008, pp. 191-222.
- Łagosz M., *Reality of time*, UW publishing house, Wrocław 2007.
- Madell G., *The Essence of the Self. In Defense of the Simple View of Personal Identity*, Routledge, New York-London 2015.
- Martin R., *Self-Concern. An Experiential Approach to What Matters in Survival*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, MA 1998.
- Meixner U., *Classical Dualism Modernized. A Proposal*, in *Dualistic Ontology of the Human Person*, ed. by M. Szatkowski, Philosophia Verlag, Muenchen 2013, s. 15-22.
- Mellor D.H., *Analytic Philosophy and the Self*, translated by R. Majeran, in *British Philosophy at the End of the 20th Century*, edited by P. Gutowski, T. Szubka, TN KUL, Lublin 1998, s. 415-435.
- Mishara A.L., *Autoscopy: Disrupted Self in Neuropsychiatric Disorders and Anomalous Conscious States*, in *Handbook of Phenomenology and Cognitive*

- Science*, eds. S. Gallagher, D. Schmicking, Springer, Dordrecht-New York-Heidelberg-London 2010, pp. 591-634.
- Morris D., *Empirical and Phenomenological Studies of Embodied Cognition*, in *Handbook of Phenomenology and Cognitive Science*, eds. S. Gallagher, D. Schmicking, Springer, Dordrecht-New York-Heidelberg-London 2010, s. 235-252.
- Nozick R., *Philosophical Explanations*, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1981.
- Olson E., *Why I Have no Hands*, "Theory," 1995, Vol. 61, No. 2, pp. 182-197.
- Olson E., *A Compound of Two Substances*, in *Soul, Body and Survival*, ed. C. Corcoran, Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London 2001, pp. 73-88.
- Olson E., *Is There a Bodily Criterion of Personal Identity?*, URL: [https://www.sheffield.ac.uk/polopoly\\_fs/1.101671!/file/BodilyCriterion.pdf](https://www.sheffield.ac.uk/polopoly_fs/1.101671!/file/BodilyCriterion.pdf), accessed August 22, 2019.
- Petit J.-L., *A Husserlian, Neurophenomenological Approach to Embodiment*, in *Handbook of Phenomenology and Cognitive Science*, eds. S. Gallagher, D. Schmicking, Springer, Dordrecht-New York-Heidelberg-London 2010, s. 201-216.
- Poczobut R., *Types of self-awareness*, "Analysis and Existence" 2008, no. 7, s. 5-31.
- Pruss A., *One Body*, Notre Dame University Press, Notre Dame 2013.
- Quine W. V. O., *Things and their place in theories*, translated by T. Szubka, in *Metaphysics in Analytical Philosophy*, edited by T. Szubka, TN KUL, Lublin 1995, pp. 31-51.
- Rosiak M., *Realism and time*, in *Consciousness, world, values*, ed. D. Leszczynski, M. Rosiak, Oficyna Naukowa PFF, Wrocław 2013, pp. 375-389.
- Rosiak M., *What is extensibility*, "Lectiones & Acroases Philosophicae" 2015, vol. 8, no. 2, pp. 9-51.
- Sider T., *Four-dimensionalism: an Ontology of Persistence and Time*, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2001.
- Smith D.W., *The Circle of Acquaintance. Perception, Consciousness, and Empathy*, Kluwer, Dordrecht-Boston-London 1989.
- Stein E., *On the Problem of Empathy*, translated by W. Stein, ICS Publications, Washington 1989.
- Swinburne R., *The Structure of the Soul*, in *Persons and Personality. A Contemporary Inquiry*, eds. . Peacocke, G. Gillett, Basil Blackwell, Oxford 1987, s. 33-55.
- Traczyk W.Z., *Physiology of man in outline*, PZWL, Warsaw 1989.

- Tsakiris M., *The Sense of Body Ownership*, in *The Oxford Handbook of The Self*, ed. S. Gallagher, Oxford University Press, New York 2011, pp. 180-203.
- Zahavi D., *Beyond Empathy. Phenomenological Approaches to Intersubjectivity*, "Journal of Consciousness Studies" 2001, Vol. 8, No. 5-7, pp. 151-167.
- Zahavi D., *First-person thoughts and embodied self-awareness: some reflections on the relation between recent analytical philosophy and phenomenology*, "Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences" 2002, Vol. 1, Issue 1, pp. 7-26.
- Zahavi D., *Subjectivity and Selfhood. Investigating the First-Person Perspective*, Bradford Book/MIT Press, Cambridge, MA 2005.
- Zahavi D., *Unity of Consciousness and the Problem of Self*, in *The Oxford Handbook of The Self*, ed. S. Gallagher, Oxford University Press, New York 2011, s. 316-335.
- Ziemiańska R., *Self-awareness and self-knowledge from the point of view of epistemology*, "Analysis and Existence" 2008, no. 7, pp. 33-51.
- Żelaniec W., *On the Non-Paradoxality of the Veridic*, "Phenomenology" 2014, no. 12, pp. 77-85. "Science World," 2008 No. 1(9) [special issue].

## Summary

Representatives of so-called embodied phenomenology give the impression that they are defending the thesis of psycho-physical identity. After arguing for the irreducibility of the self - I distinguish phenomenologically the so-called sensory field and the body understood as a *Koerper*, pointing out that the identification of these three elements is not sufficiently justified, at least on the grounds of phenomenology.

**Keywords:** body, phenomenology, self, *Koerper*, *Leib*, psychophysical identity thesis, embodiment

## Summary

### **Embodied Phenomenology and the Psychophysical Identity Thesis**

Phenomenologists inspired by the embodiment approach seem to subscribe to the psychophysical identity thesis. I argue that I (ego) cannot be eliminated and I differentiate phenomenologically between the sensory field and the body understood as a *Koerper* holding that the identification of those three items as "in fact one and the same" is not sufficiently warranted, at least on phenomenological grounds.

**Key words:** body, embodiment, I, *Koerper*, *Leib*, phenomenology, the psychophysical identity thesis