

JACEK JULIUSZ JADACKI  
University of Warsaw

### SOPHISM

*Hm, how - old, dull and sluggish -  
Do I manage to acquire skill in the logical crocks?  
But well, one must go!*

Strepsiades to  
himself (Aristophanes,  
*Clouds*)

The argument of Professor Bogusław Wolniewicz (hereinafter briefly: BW), contained in the text *Short Commentary on Point Eventism*<sup>1</sup> (hereinafter: "KK"), and directed against the views of Professor Zdzisław Augustynek (hereinafter: ZA), can be reconstructed as follows.

Let's agree that:

(1) BW - when writing "KK" - had in his hand and before his eyes a certain copy of "Philosophical Education" (hereinafter: EF).

(2) Each copy of the EF is a certain object or not. Next, let us assume that:

(3a) Each copy of the EF is a certain object.

(4a) Each object is a certain point event or a set trusted in point events.

If we now assume that:

(5a<sub>1</sub>) Each copy of EF is a certain point event.

(6a<sub>1</sub>) Every point event is something discontinuous.

then we have:

(7a<sub>1</sub>) BW - when writing "KK" - had in his hand and before his eyes something inextensible.

If, on the other hand, we assume that:

(5a<sub>2</sub>) Each copy of EF is a certain set funded in point events.

(6a<sub>2</sub>) Every collection is something invisible.

Then we have:

(7a<sub>2</sub>) BW - when writing "KK" - had something invisible in his hand and in front of his eyes.

Assume, however, that:

(3b) No copy of EF is an object.

(4b) If something is not an object, it is something that does not exist.

<sup>1</sup> I thank Professor Augustynek for providing me with a copy of the typescript of "KK" sent to him by the author.

Thus:

(5b) BW – when writing "KK" – had something non-existent in his hand and in front of his eyes.

Ultimately, therefore, we get:

(8) BW – when writing "KK", and having a certain copy of EF in hand and before my eyes – had *de facto* in his hand and in front of his eyes something either inextensible, invisible or non-existent.

## 2.

The reconstruction highlights three paths leading BW from (1) to (8). In the first trope ( $A_1$  - (1), (2), (3a), (4a) (5a J, (6a J, (7a J, (8) - three links belong *expressis verbis* to ZA's eventism: (4a) and (6a). In the second trope ( $A_2$ ) - (1), (2), (3a), (4a), (5a<sub>2</sub>), (6a<sub>2</sub>), (7a<sub>2</sub>), (8) – one link has this status: (4a). In the third lead (B) - (1), (2), (3b), (4b), (5b), (8) – none. The trope (B) can therefore be disregarded. For although the ZA accepts (4b) from elsewhere, he would certainly reject (3b). Likewise, trope  $A_1$  is dropped, since ZA would certainly reject any permissible explication of link 5A<sub>1</sub>.

This leaves the trope ( $A_2$ ). Contrary to BW's suggestions, the link (6a<sub>(2)</sub>), which is a member of the trope ( $A_1$ ), does not belong to class theory, but is a metaphysical (*resp.* epistemological) statement of some philosophers (in such a role here are the authors of *Elements of Mathematical Logic and Theory of Multiplicity*). For, among other things, the theory of classes is an axiomatic system in order to be free from all intuitions. In particular, the language of this system does not contain constants of the type "abstract" or "something invisible".

As for metaphysical intuitions related to class theory, they vary from person to person. *Nb.* recently, the disputes around the epistemological status of sets have clearly gained. Thus, one considers again whether they are (all? some?) observable, whether and possibly where they are located etc<sup>2</sup>.

Within the frame of this background, it has long been a matter of no particular theoretical excitement that, for example, (visible? ) properties are sometimes interpreted as sets of (invisible? ) all objects having these properties....<sup>3</sup>.

## 3.

The starting point of all BW's tropes is link (1). The trope ( $A_2$ ) aimed at ZA refers to a certain epistemological hypothesis.

<sup>2</sup> The rich English literature on the subject was familiar to the participants of the seminar, conducted for years by Professor Augustynek together with me.

<sup>3</sup> The premise proclaiming that a particular copy of "Philosophical Education" is a thing (and intended to add a kind of metaphysical *piquancy* to Professor Wolniewicz's argument) is, of course, superfluous to the derivation of conclusion (8). Let us note in passing, however, that among, for example, Polish authors interpret things as some particular set of Among others, Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz and Ryszard Wojcicki.

If one was to apply an epistemological measure to premise (1), it would turn out that it is not such a triviality that it unreservedly *makes an absurd* conclusion (8). After all, the question of what BW really had in his hand and before his eyes when he wrote "KK" is not epistemologically trivial. Maybe he had in his hand not the entire copy of EF, but only some *temporal cross-section* of it? Maybe he only had before his eyes some *spatial cross-section* (surface? )? So maybe he had in his hand and before his eyes a certain *theoretical construct*? How does this construct relate to *reality*?

This leads us to painstaking analysis, which cannot be replaced by ill-willed<sup>4</sup> logical tricks used to the delight of the market, which are otherwise not new<sup>5</sup>. To paraphrase Professor Wolniewicz, one would like to say: especially if they are applied to Professor Augustynek, who is a figure of the first magnitude in Polish philosophy.

<sup>4</sup> A symptom of such ill will is the suggestion that if one aspires to precision, one is infallible. As if proving someone wrong cancels out such aspirations.

<sup>5</sup> Almost 60 years ago, in a similar vein, Roman Ingarden criticized Ajdukiewicz's *charms*.