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## ROMAN INGARDEN'S THEORY OF INTENTIONALITY

**1. Husserl's two theories**<sup>1</sup>. Husserl of *the Logical Investigations* period proposes the following theory of intentionality:

(H. 1) The subject *S* directs himself intentionally to the object *P*, by means of the signifier *Z*= df. The subject *S* fulfills a mental intention with a concrete, mental- n content (matter) *T*, while *Z* is the species (*species*) of this content *T*.

However, the theory did not last very long. Husserl very soon began to regard it as "too little phenomenological." It operates on the notion of *an ideal meaning*, epistemically accessible in principle only in the process of a compiled abstraction superadded to immanent perception. Meanwhile, the meanings we use in everyday life are available for us, Husserl believes, much more "directly," they seem to "stand before our eyes."<sup>2</sup> Husserl thus formulates his theory of noesis and noemat according to which what we commonly call "meaning" is no longer an ideal object. Husserl's meaning from this period is that *which is intended in the act, taken as such*, that is, *the object of reference*, taken as it is presumed. Dru- ga theory is thus as follows:

(H. 2) The subject *S* directs himself intentionally to the object *P*, by means of the signifier *Z*= df. Subject *S* fulfills a mental intention (noesis) of a specific mental content (matter) *T*, while *Z* is the intentional correlate (noe- mat) of this content<sup>3</sup>.

Most of the problems of Husserl's second theory concern *the ontological status of the noemat*, its place in the structure of intentional reference, and the relation in which a possible "transcendent" would stand to the noemat.

<sup>1</sup> The first paragraph of the article is, for the most part, a summary of the relevant theses of the article:  
A. Chrudzimski: *From Brentan to Husserl. The ontology of intentionality*. "Principia," XVIII-XIX (1997), s. 71-94.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. E. Husserl: *Vorlesungen über Bedeutungslehre. Sommersemester 1908* (Husserliana XXVI, hrsg. von U. Panzer). Dordrecht 1986, p. 35n.

<sup>3</sup> The first clear formulation of this theory can be found in *Vorlesungen Über Bedeutungslehre. Sommersemester 1908*, op. cit. Cf. on this subject G. Küng: *Husserl on Pictures and Intentional Objects*. "Review on Metaphysics," 23(1973), pp. 670-680.

object of reference. (1) Noemat, understood as the intentional correlate of a possible intention<sup>4</sup>, can be regarded as a Meinong object<sup>5</sup>. In this view, it would be something that would *have to exist (or occur) in the world* if a given intention is to be "accurate" or "true." In such a case, the noemat would constitute the purpose of the intention. (2) In accordance with many of Husserl's statements, however, it seems that the noemat can just as legitimately be traced as a "mediation" rather than the goal of intention<sup>6</sup>. (3) Finally, important fragments suggest that the noemat is an object *produced* in some way by a conscious act, that talk of *correlation* is not purely logical, but implies some sort of *quasi-causal* relation.

**2. Ingarden's theory of the purely intentional object.** Ingarden saw these ambiguities and tried to resolve them through some reformulation of Husserl's *second* theory, while preserving the basic features of the inherited concept.

Ingarden calls his counterpart of Husserl's *noemat a purely intentional* object, while he takes as the starting point for his theory the idea that this object, which plays for him essentially, though not exclusively, the role of an intermediary, is dependent in its existence on the immanent content of intention<sup>7</sup>. Thus, in Ingarden's case, it is quite clear that *there are* only those intentional objects that correspond to *actual* acts. They are not, therefore, Meinong's objects, which *are* (in Meinong's sense), regardless of whether some current intention "uses" them or not.

From this, however, comes another important point. Ingarden's intentional object is to be, as said, literally *produced* by the act. In that case, however, *it cannot* be understood as *an object of the act taken as it is presupposed in the act*, for no one, with the possible exception of phenomenologists, presupposes this kind of, to use Ingarden's language of *being heteronomous*<sup>8</sup>, object.

Beyond this, however, a purely intentional object must, if it is to fulfill its task at all, also do justice to those intuitions that speak of the object of intention taken as it is presumed. These intuitions are the only *phenomenological legitimacy* for the introduction of such entities.

<sup>4</sup> Cf.: Perception, for example, has its noemat, and at its very foundation its sense of the perceptual, i.e., that which is perceived, as such. " (E. Husserl: *Ideas of pure phenomenology and phenomenological philosophy*, transl. D. Gierulanka. Warsaw 1967, p. 182-according to the pagination of 1913 German edition).

<sup>5</sup> Cf. on this issue: A. Meinong: *Über Gegenstandstheorie*, in *Gesamtausgabe*, Bd. II. Graz 1971, s. 481-535.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. "Every noemat has a 'content,' namely, its 'sense,' and refers through it to 'its' . " (E. Husserl: *Ideas...*, op. cit., p. 267).


<sup>7</sup> Cf. R. Ingarden: *O Dziale literackim*. Warsaw 1960, p. 179; Tegoż: *Spór o istnienie świata*, at cooked and parts of the text from German translated by. D. Gierulanka. Warsaw 1985, vol. II, part I, p. 186.

<sup>8</sup> Thatcher: *The Dispute over the Existence of the World*, vol. I, § 12.

In connection with this dilemma, Ingarden formulates a theory of two series of properties of a purely intentional object<sup>9</sup>. Properties of one kind concern the intentional object *as such*. These include, for example, being produced by an act, being epistemically accessible only in certain special phenomenological setting, and a certain unusual, and at the same time crucial for the theory of intentionality, *property of possessing content*. It is the content of a purely intentional object that is what phenomenologically "stands before our eyes" when we remain in a natural attitude<sup>10</sup>. It is this content, then, that will include all the properties of what is implicit in the act. These properties form the second row of properties that Ingarden speaks of.

Thus, according to Ingarden's theory, we have the following situation: If we think of *the Winner from under Jena*, we thereby produce the corresponding intentional object. However, we do not presume *the victor from Jena to be* produced by the act, so the feature of *being produced- by the act* applies only to the intentional object as such. On the other hand, *the intentional object as such* certainly did not have any possibility of *being a leader and defeating the enemy at Jena*, alone such things as *riding a mount*. Therefore, the latter qualities do not belong to him as such, but must form his content. Ingarden thus proposes the following scheme of intentional reference:

(I.1)



<sup>9</sup> Cf. *ibid.* vol. II, part 1, § 47, p. A.

<sup>10</sup> Cf. *ibid.*; and *On the Literary Work*, op. cit. p. 183.

The content of the act (2) fully determines the content (3\*) of the intentional object. This content includes certain characteristics of the object of reference. In order for the intention to be accurate, there must be an object that has the relevant characteristics (4\*) that "agree" with the content (3\*) of the intentional object (3). If we subject the elements (2), (3\*) and (4\*) to Husserl's *ideation*, we get their species, which in the terminology of early Husserl we would call pure *species*, and which Ingarden calls *ideal qualities*.

Thus, if the intentional reference is to pass, then the selves present in the content of the intentional object must be *the same qualities* that appear as qualities of the object of reference. If we think of the victor from under Jena, then qualities such as *the man, the leader of the victorious troops...* etc. become, according to Ingarden, *actualized* in the content of the purely intentional object. The person of Napoleon, on the other hand, is *a uni- (realization) of the same ideal qualities*. It is by virtue of this fact that Napoleon constitutes our object of reference. Thus, Ingarden's basic theory of intentionality outlined above appears to be a version of the classic Frege-Russell line, which can be called the "descriptive" theory of intentional reference. This type of theory holds that any representation (whatever else it may be) represents its object on this and only on this principle, that it somehow "exchanges" the relevant features of it.

(F-R) An object *P* represents an object *Q* only if the object *P* somehow specifies an appropriate set of characteristics of the object *P*, posing to distinguish *P* from other objects.

As we will see further on, within Ingarden's philosophy, the theory actually applies only to the basic *quasi-perceptual* intentional reference. In Ingarden's formulation of the theory of specifically linguistic intentionality, on the other hand, the thesis (F-R) is curiously restricted.

Thus, for Ingarden's theory, the key fact seems to be the *sameness* that occurs between the general object (quality) exemplified by the object of reference and the general object (quality) that is "used" by the subject in the above-described manner (as actualized in the content of the purely intentional object). This type of in the theory of intentionality to general objects, which could be, on the one hand, somehow "apprehended" by the subject, and on the other hand, "emplaced" by the objects of reference, is a very natural move. It has several advantages, among which the most serious is the uniformity with which one can explain, on the one hand, the classical puzzles of the theory of intentionality.

tionality, and on the other, the classical Platonic problems of Unity in the multitude." The theory of intentionality propounded by Frege<sup>11</sup> lends itself very naturally to this simple scheme. As we remember, he claimed that our intentional references are mediated through senses. In the sense, in turn, writes Frege, "[... ] is contained that manner which the object is given."<sup>12</sup> If we allow ourselves to interpret these senses as abstract- ne objects that can be exemplified by individual objects of carrying<sup>13</sup>, then we obtain the following theory:

- (F) Subject *S* directs himself intentionally to object *P* by means of sense  
 Z= df. The subject *S* mentally captures the general object (property) Z, and the subject *P* exemplifies the property Z<sup>14</sup>.

The relation of *mental apprehension* leaves Frege as the primary, non-definable term of the theory. If we now compare Ingarden's account with the concept expressed in (F), we can see that Ingarden's theory can be interpreted as a version of (F), according to which the mental apprehension of a general object would consist in the production by the subject (1), by means of mental content (2), of a corresponding intentional object (3) with content (3\*), this value being the actualization of this very abstract object be, according to (F), mentally . Thus, it can be assumed that Ingarden accepts the theory of (F), but at the same time *particularizes* it by claiming that:

- (F-I) Subject *S* mentally apprehends general object Z= df. Subject *S* fulfills- a certain mental act that (like any act) produces its purely intentional object, and general object Z is actualized as the content of this purely intentional object.

However, a question must be raised about the justification of the complication that Ingarden's concept of mental capture (F-I) introduces into a simple theory (F). The answer to this question is unfortunately not simple. It would seem that to square the whole matter with the remark that the theory (F) is simpler, and therefore better, is of little use. After all, Ingarden's theory has the ambition to explain a very broad spectrum of phenomena, and the complex structures of immanent content,

<sup>11</sup> Cf. G. Frege: *Sense and meaning*. In He: *Semantic Writings*, translated by. B. Wolniewicz. Warsaw 1977, pp. 60-88.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid, p. 62.

<sup>13</sup> In the case of the sense of the whole sentence, we can assume that this abstract entity is a *state of affairs* that would possibly be exemplified by the world of individual things, taken as a whole, which we can also treat as a "great" individual.

<sup>14</sup> Cf. on this issue: A. Chrudzimski: *From Brentan to Husserl...*, op. cit. p. 79.

of the intentional object and its content are precisely to make it possible to conceptually grasp and distinguish these phenomena.

**3. "Transferability" of a purely intentional object.** The groups of issues of particular importance to Ingarden's theory of intentionality are, first, the ontology of the products of art, second, the general theory of believing, or judging, that..., and third, and finally, the theory of neutral "consideration" of certain contents, that is, the theory of the kind of acts that Meinong called "*Annahmen*." Ingarden can provide an explanation for all these things by assuming that a purely intentional object can perform very different functions in intentional structures.

In the case of Meinong's *Annahme*<sup>15</sup>, when we merely consider a state of affairs, the ray of intention ends its course on a *purely intentional object* (or, more precisely, on its contents)<sup>16</sup>. We have the state of affairs before our eyes *as presented*, and that is all. We can study its components, consider its consequences, but we do not pose the question of its real occurrence or not. In the case of *a court* issued in earnest, the case is different. Intentionality is extended here and the content of purely intentional objects is confronted with an autonomously existing reality<sup>17</sup>. In the case of a successful overlay with the structures of the world, purely intentional objects disappear, as Ingarden says, from view<sup>18</sup>. In the case of a successful overlay with the structures of the world, purely intentional objects disappear, as Ingarden says, from view. They become visible only when something goes wrong, if our beliefs have turned out to be *false*. In the case of the objects represented in a work of art, on the other hand, we are dealing with an intermediate state. On the one hand, we do not pose the question of truth here, but on the other hand, we do not consider these objects as "purely represented" either. According to Ingarden, the viewer of a literary work applies a certain game, "pretends" as it were, to take seriously what is presented, and thus "transfers" the intentionally presented objects into the real world. However, all this happens without the final step, which would be a confrontation with this world in terms of truth. The purely intentional objects are thus intentionally "anchored" in the real world (insofar as there is one), but only in order to create a kind of hybrid, a kind of half-only-assumed, half-authentic world<sup>19</sup>.

<sup>15</sup> Cf. A. Meinong: *Über Annahmen*. Graz 1977 (Gesamtausgabe, Bd. IV), pp. 2-5.

<sup>16</sup> Cf. R. Ingarden: *On the literary work*, op. cit. p. 236.

<sup>17</sup> Cf. *ibid.* p. 230n.

<sup>18</sup> Cf. Toni: *The Dispute over the Existence of the World*, vol. II, part I, op. cit. p. 191; *On the Literary Work*, op. cit. p. 233.

<sup>19</sup> Cf. *ibid.* p. 238n. How deeply the depicted objects will be anchored in the real world, moreover, can be the starting point for determining the measure of realism of a work (in the sense of defining a literary genre). Cf. *On the literary work*, p. 239n

Thus, Ingarden introduces a kind of *grounding of the relationship* in which a purely intentional object can stand to the corresponding real object, or to the entire object domain (world). The purely intentional object can be, (1) in certain types of intentional- nous references (Meinong's *Annahmen*), considered for itself. Then not as a *substitute for* the proper object of reference. (2) It can be further, as if *projected* into the world, functioning as a kind of phantom available for esthetic contemplation (art objects). (3) It can become, in a successful "after important" object reference, "transparent", and then we direct ourselves directly to the corresponding real object, (4) and finally, it can also, in the case of unsuccessful references (illusions, errors), as it were, obscure" reality, thus falsifying it.

Thus, what in Husserl's case was, or at least seemed to be, a certain indeterminacy of the proper position of the noemat in the intentional structure, acquires in Ingarden's case the character of a fundamental and essential feature of the intentional object. In turn, what in Husserl's case looked like the incompatibility of the theory of the "emergence" of the noemat with any "reasonable" ontology, takes the form in Ingarden's philosophy of distinguishing two aspects of the intentional object: its content and its characteristics as such.

**4. Meaning specifically linguistic<sup>20</sup>.** Ingarden modifies Husserl's theory in one more, extremely important respect. Well, in both of Husserl's theories, the concept of *meaning* was framed extremely broadly. Every intentional reference took place through a corresponding meaning, which under the theory from *Logical Investigations* was the ideal species of mental intention, while under the late theory - the corresponding noematic creation. Thus, we are dealing with such generalized meaning not only in specifically linguistic references. As a result, the distinction between specifically linguistic reference and exclusively mental reference is characteristically blurred in Husserl. Everywhere we have mediation through meaning creations.

Ingarden takes a different path. In his theory of *basic* intentional reference, which we have just discussed, he does essentially the indications of Husserl's late science. However, this basic form of intentional reference, which is characteristic if only of perception, *does not draw out* what happens when we are dealing with specifically linguistic intension. Within the framework of the latter, mainly for reasons related to issues of intersubjectivity, Ingarden feels compelled- to engage ideal objects in a much more direct way than happened when actualizing ideal qualities in the content of the

<sup>20</sup> On Ingarden's philosophy of language, cf. J. J. Jadacki: *On Roman Ingarden's views on language*. "Semiotic Studies" 5(1974), pp. 17-54.

purely intentional object. To this end, he otherwise refers to Husserl's theory of... of *Logical Investigations*. Thus, the two chronologically consecutive Husserlian approaches to the problem of intentionality in general (and thus to the problem of generalized meaning), which, taken in such generality, seem incompatible, were used by Ingarden, after modifying- them quite significantly, as theories of two types of intentionality: rudimentary mental intentionality and specifically linguistic intentionality.

As we remember, Husserl's theory from *Logical Investigations* (H. 1) propounded treating meaning as a *species*, that is, a species of mental intention that accompanies the word used. Purely linguistic intentionality is, according to Husserl, entirely secondary to the primary mental intentionality. The attribution of meaning to a word is accomplished by associating it with a rest- knowing mental act, and the meaning thus given to a word will simply be the meaning of that act.

Ingarden points out, however, that our meanings with the insertion of new words, undergo significant modifications when words occur in different contexts, and finally evolve often depending on the evolution- cation of our knowledge. For these reasons, considering them as unchanging, eternal Platonic entities does not seem to be a good move. is because it seems that the same meaning of a word (in the common sense) may correspond to different genre intentions (and therefore different meanings in the sense of early Husserl). In many cases, when we use the same word in (colloquially) *the same sense*, our *mental intentions* are, as to their content, different. Ingarden, however, does not want to completely reject Husserl's early theory. He argues that the species of mental intention accompanying a word is also an essential component of meaning. In this regard, Ingarden argues that one must assume that meaning *can change while remaining the same meaning*. This means, however, that it cannot be the kind of ideal entity that Husserl wanted it to be <sup>22</sup>. Meaning, then, must rather resemble entities such as *the enterprise* or the state, which can remain *the same enterprise* or state even if very many essential elements change.

However, this raises the problem of identity of meanings, closely related- to the problem of intersubjectivity. What determines that a changeable meaning nevertheless remains *the same meaning*; and how is it that the

<sup>21</sup> On Ingarden's theory of specifically linguistic meaning, see also A. Chru- dzinski: *Arc Meanings in the Head? Ingarden's Theory of Meaning*. "Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology" [accepted for publication].

<sup>22</sup> Cf. R. Ingarden: *On the literary work*, op. cit. pp. 159-161.

using meanings that change according to the individual and contextual variations of our intentions, we can nevertheless have?

Ingarden's solution is to introduce an additional factor that determines the meaning of a word, which is to be the *ideal concept* or *idea of the object* to which the word refers. Thus, this is a certain version of Husserl's concept from *Logical Investigations*. The realm of ideal concepts or ideas is the realm of eternal, Platonic objects, and is largely to Husserl's ideal meanings. In Ingarden, however, they are not attributed to *possible intentions*, but primarily to their objects. His concept is as follows: With the help of our shaky *mental intentions* we refer to certain objects. In turn, the intersubjectivity of this reference is ensured by the fact that these objects fall under certain *ideal concepts (ideas)*. Thus, in the course of linguistic communication, we can, despite the variability of our intentions, determine "what we are really referring to," if only we ensure that we can gain adequate epistemic access to the relevant ideal concepts (ideas)<sup>23</sup>. Relative to Husserl's conception, the domain of ideal entities, relevant to the theory of meaning, is thus shifted from the subject side to the object side. Ingarden argues, in effect, that every signifier is a "partial actualization" of the corresponding ideal concept or idea<sup>24</sup>.

The introduction of ideal concepts (ideas) as an essential component of specifically linguistic meaning has extremely far-reaching consequences. This is because, according to Ingarden's theory, these entities are in no way dependent on our intentions. As a result, a certain component of meaning is, at least in principle, beyond the reach of Husserl's mental intentionality. Note that, according to Husserl's conception, the meanings the subject uses must, by definition, be *epistemically transparent* to him. Meaning is completely determined by our mental intention. In this sense, according to Husserl, it is impossible for us *not to know* the meanings we use. This kind of concept is quite widely criticized today<sup>25</sup>, the fact that Ingarden's theory does not seem to imply this kind of thesis is not insignificant.

Due to the fact that the meaning of a word is to be constituted in part by the nature of the mental intention, and in part by the ideal entity corresponding to the

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<sup>23</sup> Ibid, pp. 443-446.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid, p. 443.

<sup>25</sup> Cf. H. Putnam: *The Meaning of 'Meaning'*. In: *Mind, Language and Reality. Philosophical Papers*, Volume 2. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1975, pp. 215-271; S. Kripke: *Naming and Necessity*, transl. B. Chwedeńczuk. Warsaw 1988.

given to the designator of a word, the domain of specifically linguistic meaning ceases to be, in Ingarden's view, a clearly defined realm of being and rather a certain relational structure, stretched between the ideal Platonic heaven and the mental intentions of a given linguistic community. Ingarden's theory of specifically linguistic meaning thus looks as follows:

- (I. 2) Subject *S* uses the word *W* in the sense  $Z = \text{df.}$  The subject *S*, in uttering the word *W*, directs himself by means of the intention *I* to a certain possible antecedent *P*, falling under the ideal concept (idea) *Id*, while *Z* is a function of both the content of the idea *Id* and the species of the content of the intention *I*.


**5. Epistemic access to ideas - the division of linguistic labor.** The critical point of the theory under discussion is naturally *the ontological status of the ideal entities* postulated within its framework, and the question of the nature of *the cognitive access* we have to them. In *On a Literary Work*, Ingarden spoke equally of *ideal concepts* and ideas<sup>26</sup>. However, in his later works, especially in the *Disputation on the Existence of the World*, he already considers only ontological problems concerning *ideas*. Only very vague remarks are devoted to ideal notions, from which not much can be deduced, in addition to which Ingarden expresses doubts whether such notions exist at all<sup>27</sup>. Thus, in accordance with the evolution of Ingarden's philosophy, in the following we will focus exclusively on ideas, while we will disregard ideal notions.

Ideas<sup>28</sup> are entities with a similarly two-sided structure as purely intentional objects. They have their *properties as ideas*, in addition to their *containtiveness*. There is, however, a fundamental difference: Ideas are not produced by any act. They are eternal Platonic entities, which are the object of the study of ontology. Ideas resemble concepts in that *they have their objects*. While these objects need not exist, they must at least be possible. An idea is an idea of this and that object if it has (or would have if it existed) a corresponding essence. The object *P* falls under the idea *I* if and only if *the essence of the object P* is an exemplification of the same set of ideal qualities whose *concretization* is the content of the idea *I*. We will not deal here with ontological issues that inevitably impose themselves in connection with Ingarden's theory. Instead, we will take a closer look at problems of cognitive access to ideas. Consider the following scheme:

<sup>26</sup> Cf. R. Ingarden: *On the literary work*, op. cit. p. 446.

<sup>27</sup> Pot. of the same: *The Dispute over the Existence of the World*, vol. II, part 1, § 38, op. cit.

<sup>28</sup> The theory of ideas was first laid out in *Essentiale Fragen* (1925). The most complete exposition is found in the *Disputation of the Existence of the World*, cf. especially r. X.



The word "horse" used by the subject (1) refers to some specific representative of this species (4), which, let's assume for the sake of simplifying our considerations, exists in real life. We will call this relation a *semantic relation* (S). This reference is possible only because - at this point Ingarden accepts Husserl's theory unreservedly - that with the word we associate a certain mental intention, whose object of reference is the horse. This intention repeats the structure of the mental content and the purely intentional object captured in the scheme (I. 1) above. The mental content (2) completely determines the content of the intentional object (3\*). In turn, intention refers to the object (4)

only because there is a certain set of its qualities (4\*), which are ujednostiches of the same ideal quality, whose actualizations form the content (3\*) of the intentional object (quality II=III).

Significant differences from (I.1) appear in connection with distinguishing the second set of features in the subject (4). It is about the set of qualities that make up its *essence* (5). It is the possession of such an essence and not another that makes the object (4) fall under the idea (7). We will call this relation the *ontological relation* (O). The object (4) falls under the idea (7) because the same ideal quality (quality IV), which is *unitized* as its essence, is at the same time *concretized* as the content (7\*) of the idea under consideration.

We can see that, on the one hand, the set of qualities (4\*) makes an act relate to that particular object *does not have to be* at all (although it is not excluded that *it can*) the essence (5) of that object. It is not even necessary for there to be a common part (6) of these sets. So, it seems that when using a word in a meaningful way, we do not need, according to Ingarden's theory, to reflect in any way on that component of meaning that we have marked as (7\*). That (7\*) constitutes one of the factors of the relational structure of meaning Z is ensured not by some mental activity of the subject, but by the combined occurrence of the relations S and O. On the other hand, however, *some cognitive access to the content of the relevant idea* is supposed to be, as we remember, relevant to the question of intersubjectivity. Since in speech we very rarely think about the essence of our objects, it can only be about cognitive accessibility *in principle*, about the ideal possibility of obtaining (if necessary) episodic access to the content of the relevant idea. But what could such access look like?

Ingarden writes about a kind of *intuitive (eyewitness) apprehension* The content of ideas. This is naturally, taken over essentially from Husserl, a conception of direct viewing of universals. In application to the theory of linguistic intentionality outlined above, however, this concept functions decidedly badly.

For let us assume that, being fluent users of the Polish language, we use our word "horse" in a meaningful way. According to the doctrine of direct viewing, this would have to mean that we can essentially visualize *the idea of a horse* at any time. But is this really the case- ? Let's assume that we have not been very diligent in our zoology classes and we have learned that the horse is an even-toed ungulate. Does this prevent- us from using the word "horse" in its standard sense? It seems not. However, if we can use the- word "horse" in a standard way, without knowing exactly "what we are talking about," is there any way in which we could visualize the correct concept of horse or even discover that our concept of horse is incorrect?

The obvious common-sense answer to the last question is on the tural: "Yes, of course there is such a way. We just have to look in a zoology textbook, or ask someone who was a better student." What's more, this answer is extremely interesting philosophically. For draws attention to a key fact in language theory, that *there is no equality in the question of the insight behind the value of an idea, which is supposed to be relevant to semantic issues, and which we have labeled X. A physicist has a "better insight" into the concept of the atom than a sociologist, even though they both use the word correctly. Hence, the best method of obtaining the most complete insight possible will generally be to advise authorities, professionals, experts in the field, who simply know better.* The reference to *experts* brings irresistible associations with Putnam's well-known concept<sup>29</sup>, referred to by the author himself as *the theory of the division of linguistic labor*. It seems that this concept can be successfully applied to the explication of that part of Ingarden's doctrine that deals with cognitive access to ideas. An idea would be, with this interpretation, simply *an idealized full theory of the object* to which the word applies. Approximations of such a full theory, on the other hand, would be theories formulated by experts in a given linguistic community. So our access to the relevant ideas or concepts (X) would be mediated primarily through the authority of science. It would thus be a matter of education rather than intuitive insight<sup>30</sup>.

**6. Causal Theory.** A moment's reflection, however, is enough to realize that the kind of participation in a given linguistic community that is relevant to our considerations *presupposes the use of language-* itself. It is a sad fact that we can enjoy the benefits of the division of linguistic labor only when we can already do cho- a relatively small part of it ourselves. To be able to complete our understanding of the term "atom" we need to be able to find a physics textbook and understand what it says.

How this can happen is explained by another famous semantic theory, formulated- by Kripke. Kripke emphasizes that what is essential for linking the word- wa with the object to which it refers is not having a descriptor in the mind, uniquely identifying the object, as he would like to see it

<sup>29</sup> Cf. H. Putnam: *The Meaning of 'Meaning'*, op. cit.; and of the same, *Meaning and Reference*. W: B. Stanosz (ed): *Philosophy of language*. Warsaw 1993, pp. 246-257.

<sup>30</sup> We do not claim that *Ingarden himself* would have unreservedly accepted such a reformulation of his theory. There is not the slightest doubt that the concept of intuitive apprehension of ideal objects is extremely important for his entire philosophy. We only claim that Ingarden's theory of meaning *allows for* this kind of explication, and that this explication can be interesting not only from an exegetical point of view. (For more on this subject, see A. Chrudzimski: *Are Menings in the Head?...*, op. cit).

philosopher following the ideas of Frege and Russell<sup>31</sup>. Such descriptors, as a rule, we do not have. What is important is the presence of a *real causal chain*, linking the person who is currently using the word to the situation of giving meaning to that word in the immediate presence of the object<sup>32</sup>. Our semantic-*c*z (S) relation would thus have to turn out to be, in fact, some real causally conditioned relation.

However, if we try to put this question within the framework of Ingarden's philosophy, we will not be able to directly follow Kripke's suggestions. This is because Ingarden nowhere introduces causal connections as semantically relevant elements. Therefore, the answer can only be sought in the first part of Ingarden's theory of imperfect, unstable mental intentionality. However, this theory taken in isolation is, as said, a version of the Fregow-Russell descriptive theory.

Thus, if we decide to follow our interpretation of Ingarden's conception of specifically linguistic intentionality, which seems to drift- in the opposite, "Putnamian" direction, we will have to supplement the theory expressed in the schema (I.1) relatively in the form F)+ (F-I) with some additional- k factors. The most natural candidate for this would be elements of *the context* in which the word was used. Well, it seems that it is not ruled- out that the kind of shaky intentions Ingarden speaks of, even if they do not *in* any way contain Russellian definite descriptors (and we have good reason to believe that they do not even *generally* contain them), may nevertheless be sufficient in situations of clear context and the immediate presence of the object of reference. However, in order to build a theory of this kind of reference without going around in circles, this *context* itself will have to be described already in *objectivist* terms, i.e. involving infor- mations about the real world, and not exclusively about the mental acts of the subject. Such a procedure in relation to Ingarden's philosophy, although rather bold, does not seem entirely illegitimate given doubts he had throughout his life about the sensibility and limits of Husserl's postulate of *phenomenological reduction*.

<sup>31</sup> It seems that both of Husserl's theories are essentially descriptive theories.

<sup>32</sup> Cf. S. Kripke: *Naming vs. necessity*, op. cit, p. 92.